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Preface and Acknowledgments

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was an extraordinary achievement of law,
politics, and human rights. On the fiftieth anniversary of the Act's passage, it is appropriate to reflect on the successes and failures of the civil
rights project reflected in the statute, as well as on its future directions.
This volume represents an attempt to assess the Civil Rights Act's legacy.
On October 11, 2013, a diverse group of civil rights scholars met at the
University of Michigan Law School in Ann Arbor to assess the interpretation, development, and administration of civil rights law in the five
decades since President Lyndon Baines Johnson signed the Civil Rights
Act. In the volume that follows, readers will find edited versions of the
papers that these scholars presented, enriched by our lively discussions
at and after the conference. We hope that the essays in this volume will
contribute to the continuing debates regarding the civil rights project in
the United States and the world.
This volume, and the conference from which it emerged, would not
have existed without the generous financial support of the AntiDiscrimination Center. We thank the Anti-Discrimination Center and its
executive director, Craig Gurian, for their tremendous assistance. The
current and former deans of the University of Michigan Law School,
Mark West and Evan Caminker, also were especially supportive of this
project. We thank Jenny Rickard, Jenny Whalen, and Jessica Hanes for
their tireless staff work to make the conference and volume a success.
And last but not least, we very much appreciate the editorial assistance
of two terrific students, Cali Cope- Kasten and Rachel Goldberg.
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Performative Citizenship in the Civil
Rights and Immigrant Rights Movements

Kath ryn Abrams

In August 2013, Maria Teresa Kumar, the executive director of Voto
Latino, spoke alongside civil rights leaders at the fiftieth anniversary of
the March on Washington. A month earlier, immigrant activists invited
the Reverend AI Sharpton to join a press conference outside the federal
court building as they celebrated a legal victory over Joe Arpaio, the
anti -immigrant sheriff of Maricopa County. Undocumented youth organizing for immigration reform explained their persistence with Manin
Luther King's statement that "the arc of the moral universe is long, but it
bends towardjustice." 1
The civil rights movement remains a potent reminder that politically
marginalized groups can shape the law through mobilization and collective action. This has made the movement a crucial source of symbolism for those activists who have come after. But it has also been a
source of what sociologist Doug McAdam has called "cultural innovations"2: transformative strategies and tactics that can be embraced and
modified by later movements. This chapter examines the legacy of the
Civil Rights Act by revisiting the social movement that produced it and
comparing that movement to a recent and galvanizing successor, the
movement for immigrant rights.3 This movement has not simply used
the storied tactics of the civil rights movement; it has modified them
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in ways that render them more performative: undocumented activists
implement the familiar tactics that enact, in daring and surprising ways,
the public belonging to which they aspire. 4 This performative dimension would seem to distinguish the immigrant rights movement, at the
level of organizational strategy, from its civil rights counterpart, whose
participants were constitutionally acknowledged as citizens. However,
focusing instead on the legal consciousness and self-conception of individual activists may unveil greater similarities between participants in
the two movements. As the individual narratives elicited by sociologists
and historians of the civil rights movement demonstrate, participants in
many civil rights campaigns were asserting a citizenship in which they
did not feel secure, notwithstanding its formal recognition in law. In this
respect, both movements relied on what Patricia Williams has called the
"alchemy" of claiming rights that may be emergent or precarious as a
means of securing their formal recognition.
Part I of this chapter examines the civil rights movement and the
immigrant rights movement from the standpoint of organizational
strategy and tactics. It focuses on two "cultural innovations" that have
become hallmarks of the civil rights movement: the use of direct action,
particularly civil disobedience, to protest Jim Crow laws in Southern
states, and the campaigns that sought to prepare and register black residents for the franchise in rural communities of the Deep South, such
as Mississippi. Both direct action and civic engagement campaigns have
been central to the emerging movement for immigrant rights. But they
have been implemented with distinctive variations, which enable the
assertion of belonging by one visible and compelling segment of the
immigrant population-undocumented youth. Part II reconsiders the
claim advanced in Part I, that the immigrant rights movement is distinct
in its performative dimension, by focusing on the individual legal consciousness of participants. This analysis suggests that early civil rights
activists also performed a citizenship they did not experience as secure
in order to bring it more fully into being. The work of social scientists such as Francesca Polletta and Charles Payne, who have studied
the civil rights movement at the level of individual legal consciousness, demonstrates that the sense of belonging experienced by grassroots activists in the movement was shaped as much by the pervasive
threat of state-sanctioned violence as by the formal rights of citizenship
they were seeking to enforce. The role of "first-class citizens," which
activists undertook to secure the enforcement of their rights, may have
felt to them as uncertain or aspirational as the civic roles embraced by
undocumented immigrants.

Performative Citizenship in the Civil Rights and Immigrant Rights Movements

I. Organizational Tactics: Adoption and Adaptation
A. Direct Action and Civil Disobedience

The civil rights movement deployed a range of direct action tactics,
whose moral impetus and visual imagery became synonymous with the
movement in the public mind. Boycotts brought coordinated economic
pressure to bear on those who followed segregationist laws or practices.5
Sit-ins violated Jim Crow laws, which protesters viewed as inconsistent
with federal guarantees of equal protection.6 Freedom riders exercised
the federal right to integrated public accommodations in state contexts
where that act of integration sparked violent resistance? These actions
made visible to the public that constitutional guarantees of equal protection and full citizenship were being flouted by Jim Crow laws and Southern resistance. Direct action tactics also highlighted the moral resolve of
protesters and their willingness to endure hardship in order to communicate their message. 8
But these tactics served an additional purpose: they exposed the
regime of often-violent enforcement that held segregative practices in
place. 9 The dogs and firehoses that Bull Connor loosed on student protesters in Birmingham and the angry mobs who attacked Freedom Riders as they debarked at interstate bus terminals set in motion several
responses that were critical to movement strategy. These repressive
responses often triggered court challenges, which enabled federaljudges
to articulate the federal guarantees applicable to African Americans. 10
Moreover, where state officials targeted protesters with violence, or
failed to restrain the violent response of their citizens, protesters could
demand-and occasionally received-federal intervention and protection.11 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, confrontations between
nonviolent protesters and violent state officials or citizens elicited broad
media coverage, which could incite empathy, indignation, and outrage
across broad swaths of the American public. 12 Campaigns targeting
communities that combined Jim Crow laws with volatile law enforcement were particularly effective in influencing a legislative response. 13
The meetings, trainings in nonviolent protest, and mass arrests that surrounded direct action events also built deep solidarity among protesters.14
The immigrant justice movement has deployed many of these tactics
with a full awareness of the expressive value of their legacy. Protests
over the enactment of Arizona's S.B. 1070, the first in a spate of antiimmigrant state laws, utilized many of the direct action tactics that
had helped civil rights activism to gain purchase. The enactment of
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the law was swiftly followed by the announcement of an economic
boycott of the state, organized by coalition of immigrant groups and
endorsed by Rep. Raul Grijalva, a proimmigrant member of Congress. 15
A cascade of protests, including a one-hundred-day vigil at the state
capital, followed.16 Protesters held sit-ins on public streets and at state
and federal buildings; they occasionally blocked the vehicles of antiimmigrant SherriffJoe Arpaio of Maricopa County. A group of undocumented activists boarded the Undocubus for an interstate journey to the
2012 Democratic National Convention (DNC)F However, the contexts
in which movement activists utilized these tactics, and the ways in which
they were executed, often diverged from those of the civil rights movement.
First, the appeal to the federal government implicit in these tactics
was a more ambivalent undertaking. While the Obama administration
ultimately challenged S.B. 1070 on the grounds that it was preempted
by federal authority over immigration, a complex array of laws and
programs, such as section 287(g) of the immigration and National Act
(287(g)) and Secure Communities, created partnerships between state
and local officials and the federal government in the enforcement of
immigration law. This meant the federal government was often directly
implicated in the very patterns of enforcement to which protesters
objected. Second, although direct action tactics have been similar, they
have been directed toward different targets and have reflected different
kinds of strategies. Because enforcement of federal immigration law
rests substantially in the discretion of state and federal law enforcement
agents, it is more difficult to stage a protest that targets a particular law,
or captures its symbolism, in the way that the lunch counter sit-ins,
for example, captured the quotidian yet corrosive character of segregation. Early examples of direct action by immigrants were often staged
to manifest generalized resistance, with protesters sitting on a banner
in the middle of a busy street or in a courtyard in front of a state or
federal building. More recently, activists have sought to target the operation of immigration enforcement by chaining themselves to buses carrying immigrants toward deportation or buildings where the detention
or processing of those subject to deportation occurs.18 Moreover, direct
action tactics by immigrant groups have not predictably provoked the
repressive response that sparked widespread publicity during the civil
rights movement. Although a sea of cell phones has been raised to capture each encounter between police and protesters, 19 there have been
few incidents of brutality in the confrontation or arrests of those practicing civil disobedience. This may be partly because law enforcement
officials have learned the lessons of the civil rights protests. But it may be
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because officials have had a different weapon to wield against protesters,
particularly as undocumented activists began to join in acts of protest
and civil disobedience. The fact that undocumented activists taken into
custody in connection with civil disobedience or other acts of protest
could be subject to detention or deportation on the basis of their immigralion status has introduced a new dynamic into direct action events.
The fear of deportation and family separation is present for undocumented protesters, as the fear of violence had been for civil rights
demonstrators. But it is a less visible fear, and when realized in the context of an "off-camera" administrative process, it has not subjected law
enforcement to publicity or to comparably widespread moral judgment.
Consequently, activists have been required to develop additional tactics
to turn direct action protests to their strategic advantage.
One particularly powerful tactic was introduced by DREAMers,
undocumented youth who were among the first undocumented activists
to assume visible leadership in the larger immigrantjustice movement.
Beginning in 2010, as they mobilized for a federal law that would have
granted a path to citizenship for childhood arrivals, DREAMers began to
"come out" as "undocumented and unafraid."20 This tactic drew inspiration from the self-disclosures that became paradigmatic for the LGBT
movement as a vehicle for fighting isolation and generating both community and public awareness.21 It also drew on the practices of selfnarration common in feminist consciousness raising and in mass meetings of the civil rights movement. 22 This self-narration had several functions in immigrant activism. The first was raising consciousness and
conveying information. The stories of undocumented activists communicated what it was like to be a person without legal statu s, thus conveying a reality that was starkly unfamiliar to most Americans. Young
activists described surviving day to day without even the assurance provided by a legal presence that a family would not be deported or separated; they described the difficulties of trying to make a living or get
an education any of the government-conferred benefits-from a social
security number to in-state tuition or scholarships-that many with
legal status take for granted.23 But the stories of undocumented youth
were not simply narratives of suffering. They were also stories about
progress made in confronting and transcending these limitations, both
through individual effort and through political solidarity. Finally, there
was also a persuasive and performative dimension of "stories of seli
that was directed at the larger public. Coming out as "undocumented
and unafraid" reflected an almost Austenian performativity. Those who
declared their fearlessness in coming "out of the shadows" may well have
felt fear, yet they found energy, strength, and resolve in their own dec-
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larations, the parallel actions of others, and the responsive shouts of
"undocumented and unafraid" that surrounded them as they exposed
their identities, crossed borders, or chained themselves to public property. By speaking directly and candidly to the public and petitioning the
government for redress of grievances, they were claiming the role of
citizens-a role that felt both earned and precarious. 24 They were also
enacting, in salient respects, the political reality to which they aspired:
a political world in which they could engage, as members, over critical
questions of national policy. But because undocumented immigrants
did not yet enjoy, as a matter of formal law, the role that they were
claiming, these disclosures had persuasive as well as performative value.
They showcased DREAMers as participants with moral courage and
political responsibility who were willing to take risks to win a role for
which they were otherwise prepared, much as the willingness to endure
violent attacks with nonviolent perseverance had distinguished civil
rights protesters.
Whether activists were mobilizing for federal reforms or resisting
oppressive state laws, practices of "coming out of the shadows" and
"telling your story" had a flavor of civil disobedience. They made visible
an ongoing violation of the law and exposed violators to potential consequences25 in order to change the law. When these practices of selfdisclosure26 were combined with familiar forms of direct action, the
combination made the risk-taking of undocumented activists visible and
generated visibility for the movement. For example, in july 2012, during
the federal civil rights trial of Sherriff Joe Arpaio, four undocumented
Phoenix activists held a press conference announcing their status and
sat down in th e street in front of the federal court building, subjecting themselves to arrest. 27 Or, later that summer, several dozen undocumented activists rode the Undocubus across several states that had
enacted or considered anti-immigrant legislation, en route to the in the
Democratic National Convention in Charlotte, North Carolina. 28 T h ese
protests used tactics popularized by the civil rights movement: the sit-in,
the freedom ride, the confrontation at the Democratic National Convention. But in each case, protesters used a new and innovative tactic-selfdisclosure and self-narration by undocumented activists- to attain the
visibility and mount the kind of moral claim that civil rights protesters
had achieved by exposing themselves to state-sponsored violence.
B. Voter Registration and Civic Engagement

As a movement of citizens who were, for all practical purposes, disenfranchised, the civil rights movement embraced twin imperatives.
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First, it sought to enable African Americans to exercise their right to
vote, which would signal the advent of"first-class citizenship" and would
be integral in securing future legislative reforms. Second, because that
right, and any future reforms, would likely require legislative action for
its vindication, the movement sought to elicit the political mobilization
of those who were already able to exercise the franchise-namely, sympathetic whites. The vote was sometimes the object of direct action campaigns, such as the Southern Christian Leadership Conference's (SCLC)
efforts in Selma in 1964, 29 but it was also the focus of a second kind
of campaign. In the counties of the Deep South, activists from groups
like the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) sought to
persuade black residents to register to vote. This was no modest undertaking. Blacks who attempted to register suffered economic retaliation
and physical violence from employers, neighbors, and state actors.30 Yet
organizers sought to highlight voter participation as a vehicle for full citizenship and to impart to participants the knowledge and civic responsibility that would sustain it. For example, in SNCC's "Mississippi Project," organizers not only sought to facilitate black voter registration but
also provided registrants and residents of local communities with the
experience of electoral participation through the Mississippi Freedom
Democratic Party (MFDP). 31 The MFDP conducted its own primaries
and conventions for local African American participants, giving those
who had not previously participated direct experience of the electoral
process. The project also enabled some MFDP activists to communicate
their experience and commitment to a dubious white public as a result
of claiming their right to be seated at the 1964 Democratic National
Convention. Another innovation of the Mississippi Project (sometimes
referred to as "Freedom Summer") was to bring hundreds of elite, white
college students to work with local organizers in rural Mississippi. 32 The
role of whites in promoting registration in Mississippi, which built on
years of organizing by SNCC activists, was more than an injection of
relief troops in a sharply embattled region. T he dangers to which both
black and white activists were exposed-captured chillingly by the murders of organizers Goodman, Cheney, and Schwerner in the summer of
1964-made the meaning of massive resistance, and of second-class citizenship, stunningly concrete to the students and their well-connected
parents. Their concrete understanding of the ways that racial hierarchy was maintained by state-supported violence prompted demands
for protective federal intervention in Mississippi and created a body of
influential allies for the movement as a whole.33
Civic engagement has also played a large role in the movement for
immigrant rights, but it has been structured by a different set of dynam-
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ics. Undocumented immigrants face a barrier to the franchise that is different from the registrars and sheriffs of Mississippi. With no legal status
(and for most no legal presence), undocumented immigrants cannot
assert even a formal right to the franchise. Legislative reform providing
some path to citizenship is necessary before such a claim can be made.
To enlist support for such legislation, immigrant activists, like their civil
rights counterparts, have been required to mobilize voters beyond the
group who stands directly to benefit. The immigrant rights movement,
however, can draw on a group of Latino voters that is more proximate
than the general population of whites and far larger than the group of
"Freedom Summer" parents whose familial connection to segregationist
violence spurred their political participation. Many Latino voters have
firsthand exposure to the struggles of undocumented family members,
friends, and neighbors or have experienced their own fear of family separation. The challenge, however, has been to reach and mobilize a group
of voters who have not historically turned out in high numbers 34 and
help them make the connection between the changes they want to see,
and their own electoral participation.
A pivotal innovation in this effort has been the recruitment of undocumented youth to register and mobilize Latino voters. A series of civic
engagement campaigns in Arizona demonstrate the potential of this
practice. Undocumented youth have been volunteering in civil engagement campaigns in Arizona since at least 2011 when Randy Parraz and
Citizens for a Better Arizona mounted a recall campaign against Russell
Pearce, the legislative sponsor of S.B. 1070.35 Youthful volunteers signed
on to challenge a politician who had exposed their communities to fear,
surveillance, and harassment. Both those who had already been active
in politics, such as members of the Arizona Dream Act Coalition and
those who were entirely new to organizing, came out for the effort
to register voters. When voters seemed reluctant about registering or
doubted that their vote could make a difference, undocumented volunteers engaged them by narrating their own experience under S.B.
1070, arguing that if they could make a difference when they could not
even cast a ballot, surely a registered voter could make a contribution to
bringing about change. 36 This tactic was given a powerful boost when
Pearce was defeated by an unlikely combination of Latino voters, mod-

erate business interests, and concerned Mormons. Both Latino voters
and undocumented volunteers saw that they could make a difference in
the direction of state politics. 37 Perhaps the most striking example of
this approach occurred in the summer and fall of 2012, when a coalition between a proimmigrant civic engagement organization and a local
union recruited more than two thousand teenage volunteers and orga-
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nizers, many of them undocumented, to register voters for the November 2012 election. Calling their campaign "Adios Arpaio;' the activists
used the reelection campaign of the sheriff of Maricopa County as a
hook for registering and motivating Latino voters. 38 Through a systematic training process supported by nationwide organizations such as the
Center for Community Change, young activists learned to share their
stories of racial profiling and family separation perpetuated by Arpaio's
forces and to engage creatively with apathetic or reluctant voters. A
DREAM Act organization supplemented their efforts with the "I am a
DREAM Voter" campaign, in which DREAMers asked registered voters
to cast their ballots on in support of pro-DREAMer candidates and policies. Although Arpaio was reelected, his margin was very narrow, and
the campaigns registered tens of thousands of new Latino voters in the
greater Phoenix area. 39
The civic engagement campaigns reflected another dimension of the
performative strategy of the immigrant rights movement. The volunteers who canvassed in Arizona's civic engagement campaigns became
deeply involved not only with the principal goal of replacing particular
elected officials but also with the mechanics of the vote, the issues facing
particular neighborhoods, and the concept of political accountability.40
In many cases they taught citizens either about the substantive issues
or about filling out a ballot. Placing undocumented youth in an integral
facilitative role in relation to one of the most central rights of citizenship
created a new political reality just as the meetings, caucuses, and elections of the MFDP created a new political reality in wh ich mainstream
participants could see the knowledge and commitment of the new participants differently. Yet, if anything, the inauguration of new political
relations-the improbable claiming of the "space of citizenship"-was
even more striking in the case of young immigrants. Theirs was not a
parallel process: they were integrally involved with citizens in their registration to vote and the casting of their ballots. And the young people
who performed this role were not American citizens brutally deprived
of their voting righ ts but residents with no legal status and, in some
cases, no legal right to be present. Both the efficacy and the transformative symbolism of this strategy were such th at it was perhaps no surprise
that the Arizona legislature soon began to enact legislation regulating the
roles of volunteers in the early balloting process.

9

10 A Nation of Widening Opportunities

11. Rights Consciousness, Emergent Rights, and Performative
Rights Assertion

Thus far the civil rights movement and the immigrant justice movement
have been considered as constellations of actors on the public stage. This
lens reveals that the discourse, the strategies, and the specific tactical
repertoires of the civil rights movement have become symbols and templates for the immigrant justice movement and for many other movements. This perspective also highlights the ways that immigrant activists
have revised these strategies and tactics to encompass new practices.
These practices of self-narration and multifaceted civic engagement are
performative along several dimensions. First, they enable immigrants to
reject the fear and the resulting posture of hiding that governmental officials have sought to impose on them through anti-immigrant legislation
and enforcement efforts. Second, these tactics have enabled undocumented activists to "claim the space of citizenship" while simultaneously developing and manifesting the skills and attributes that serve to
unsettle public understanding of undocumented immigrants and their
belonging. Finally, these performances create an outside-a public
impression-that emanates more from desire and imagination than
from legal foundation or subjective self-conception. In concrete and
socially transformative ways, immigrants undertake the tasks of a citizenship they have not yet been granted and manifest a confidence and
self-possession that may belie a far more ambivalent set of feelings and
expectations. These performative dimensions of the recent immigrant
mobilization might seem to distinguish it from a civil rights activism
that was grounded in the guarantees of the Civil War Amendments and
sought to make good on their incomplete promise through federal legislation and enforcement.
But the literature of social movements suggests another way to look at
these two efforts: not as movements engaging with legal institutions in
carefully choreographed repertoires but as situated groups of individual
actors, asserting or negotiating rights claims. From this perspective, the
question is how actors in these two movements think about their rights,
or how they see their relation to the polity as they go about their dayto-day work. Viewed in this way, taking the individual activist and his or
her legal or rights consciousness as the focus, 41 the difference between
the movements is not as stark as one might initially suspect. For many
grassroots participants in the civil rights movement, the formal rights
to citizenship and to equal protection that were conferred on Mrican
Americans by the Civil War Amendments were less constitutive of their
sense of rights and of belonging than the regimes of social and institu-
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tional exclusion, economic retaliation, and public-private violence that
structured their daily existence. In pivotal contexts such as movement
organizing in Mississippi, the self-assertion of African American activists
had aspects of performativity that, in some respects, resemble those of
the immigrant justice movement.
A Rights Consciousness and Emergent Rights among Immigrant
Activists

As noncitizens who lack a legal status and, in most cases, a legal right to
be present, immigrant activists do not instinctively regard their "rights"
as formal claims that can be directed to courts or enforced by legislatures.42 The experience of mobilizing without legal status, and indeed
the experience of navigating American society without many formal
rights, has engendered in many immigrant activists an attitude of
improvisatory self-reliance. They view progress as more likely to arise
from their own organizing than from the declarations of the courts. 43
Consequently, groups often operate orthogonally to formal occasions
of rights declaration.44 Immigrant activists have used major court dates
as opportunities for rallying, marching, or direct action-for reminding
public officials that "we are still here and we are watching."45 Activists
across the country marched on the day that the Supreme Court heard
argument in Arizona v. United States. 46 Activists in Arizona held a press
conference and engaged in civil disobedience on the day that Sherriff
Joe Arpaio testified before the district court in Melendres v. Arpaio.47
Participants also seem to understand their activism as working parallel
to formal adjudicative processes. For example, activists sometimes say
that the Melendres decision simply confirmed what they knew about joe
Arpaio when they sat down in front of his trucks or conducted the "Adios
Arpaio" campaign.48
One primary way in which undocumented activists seem to understand their own rights, however, is as claims to be negotiated or extended
through assertion in encounters with law enforcement officials. One
starting point for this assertion of rights is the "Know Your Rights" sessions that have been held throughout Arizona and other states, often
sponsored by legal organizations such as the ACLU in conjunction with
local proimmigrant organizations. These forums have been frequent
and well-attended events that have served as both a basis for organizing
and a vehicle for preventing panic in the face of legislation like S.B.
1070. 49 They advise members of the community about what they should
do in preparation for a stop, detention, or deportation. The range of
rights that undocumented immigrants can assert in encounters with
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state law enforcement officials or with agents of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is, in a formal sense, limited. 5 For example,
they can decline to tell law enforcement officials wh ere they are from
(though this information may become available if they are ultimately
held and fingerprinted). They can ask for a lawyer if they are detained.
They can create an advance directive specifying who will be responsible
for their children (or pets or property) if they are deported. None of
these rights, however, will predictably prevent detention or deportation.
Yet some immigrant activists report that knowing about these rights can
make a difference in the way they engage law enforcement if they are
actually stopped and the way they live their daily lives.51 This greater
confidence is an advantage to th e movement because it may prevent
daunted immigrants from returning to their countries of origin in the
face of restrictive state legislation. Some report that simply having made
arrangements for the care of their children gives them greater peace of
mind as they travel from home to work and back.52 Others say that they
feel less panic when they are stopped, and they are less likely to make
costly errors. One young woman explained that this kind of preparation helped her assert her rights over a thirty-six-hour period of detention. She noted, moreover, that the calm and persistent way that she
responded when questioned helped persuade Immigration and Customs (ICE) officials that she was "a good person"-the kind of person
who should be released rather than deported even though officials ultimately understood that she was in the United States without authorization.53
This example points to a peculiar feature of immigration enforcement, particularly in a period of legislative stalemate, in which many
important decisions related to detention and deportation rest on a broad
and differentially applied set of enforcement priorities. In the gray area
of intersection between immigration law and discretionary enforcement
priorities such as those contained in the Morton memorandum,54 one's
de facto "right" to remain - which is not a formal legal right but an experientially grounded judgment about the acts for which, or circumstances
under which, one will not be deported-may ultimately be established or
extended by tendentious efforts to push the envelope. One young man,
a naturalized citizen who had been active in the early formation of Arizona's DREAM Act movement, described his disbelief when he heard
that the first DREAMers had identified themselves publicly as undocumented. "My God, I thought, those kids are going tO be deported. But
then they were not. And soon others joined them," making similar selfdisclosures.55 Had those initial DREAMers not disclosed their status,
the entire community might still believe that their self-identification

°
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would trigger deportation. After their action, many began to believe that
it might not-at least not predictably-do so. Hundreds of DREAMers began to live their lives and conduct their politics differently as a
resu1L.56 This assertion of emergent rights57 was performative in the
sense that it reflected neither a foundation in established law nor a
grounding in the subjective expectations of the participants, who likely
al so assessed the risk of deportation as great. Perhaps more important,
th is act was performative in the sense that activists' willingness to suffer
the consequences of a previously untested form of political conduct
helped establish this form of engagement as a plausible strategy-a
lower-risk activity than had previously been believed. Because activists'
legal status has not changed, these acts of self-assertion continue to
occupy a gray area of hazard. Although the DREAMers themselves may
not be deported for coming out as "undocumented and unafraid," there
are cases in which their family members have been detained or have
come close to deportation in the wake of this form of activism.58 But,
due in large part to this purposeful pressing of the envelope, the scope
of the de facto "right to remain" has expanded a bit.
Activists explain the resolve that has animated these risk-taking acts in
many ways.59 Some point to a feeling of necessity-that is, they must
attempt to press boundaries because there is no other choice. 'When
your back is to the wall, you come out swinging" is a phrase that emerges
regularly among Arizona activists. Another kind of explanation that
reflects some tension with the preceding explanation is that undocumented youth often feel like they belong to American society. "We are
citizens without the papers," activists frequently say.60 A sense of authorization may also come from a subset of families who approach being
undocumented matter-of-factly and teach their children that it should
not be a barrier to their aspirations. 61 A feeling of authorization may also
be generated through solidaristic activity within the movement through
which activists learn that "it doesn't have to be this way: we can empower
ourselves to make a change" 62 or that "the safest place for anyone targeted by these laws is out, proud, and part of an organized community."63 But performative assertion of emergent rights-asserting oneself
and/ or one's right to remain in a negotiation with a state or federal official acting in a gray area of enforcement discretion- may have value in
establishing new boundaries for the activity of undocumented immigrants.
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B. Emergent Rights and Performative Citizenship in the Civil Rights
Movement

One might expect this pattern of rights-consciousness and rightsassertion to distinguish the immigrantjustice movement from the civil
rights movement, which is grounded on a conception of rights as legally
established entitlements. No less a document than the Constitution
declares the rights of former slaves and their descendants to citizenship
and to the nondiscriminatory exercise of the right to the vote. These
rights faced adamant resistance; they required articulation by the courts
and enforcement by the elected branches, neither of which was a foregone conclusion as the civil rights movement waged its early campaigns.
But the specific rights asserted by the movement had a basis in written
law. Moreover, as citizens and as federal rights holders, African Americans assumed a plausible role when they petitioned their government
for the redress of their grievances.64 The notion of rights as formal constitutional guarantees, which had only to be enforced by the federal government against state and local resistance, was central to the discourse
of the movement As Martin Luther King Jr. told a mass meeting at the
beginning of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, "We are not wrong... [and]
if we are wrong, the Supreme Court is wrong, and if we are wrong, the
Constitution is wrong."65
But if we move from the public discourse and group-based tactics of
the movement to the self-understandings of participants doing the work
of the movement on a daily basis, a different picture emerges. For the
mother sending her child to the first integrated school in her city or the
Mississippi sharecropper mustering the courage to register to vote, for
countless movement participants facing administrative intransigence,
employer retaliation, and the ever-present threat of state-sanctioned
violence, rights were never simply constitutionally established objects
of federal enforcement. 66 In individual and family conversations and
in mass meetings at black churches, participants had to persuade themselves and each other that they could claim the role of citizens, a role
that was as much a product of their persistent, if uneasy, self-assertion as
of the declarations of federal courts.
This dimension of the civil rights struggle can be glimpsed, for example, in Francesca Polletta's analysis of rights consciousness among SNCC
activists in Mississippi from 1961 to 1966. 67 Studying the sharecroppers
and domestic workers who risked their lives and livelihoods to register
to vote, Polletta did not find actors who felt that their constitutionally
established rights simply had to be vindicated by federal intervention
and affirmation. She saw people whose daily lives drove home the
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lessons of their m arginality and second-class citizenship, and whose
struggle, as they put it, to achieve "first-class citizenship" was fraught
with retaliation, harassment, and pervasive physical danger. These
activists, Polletta explained, played an active role in unsuccessful lawsuits
against registrars who denied their rights or sheriffs who beat them.
They spent hours giving statements or testifying in court because they
experienced a pride in being able to tell their stories. They gathered at
the courthouse each day for the trials, fueled by a sense of wonder at witnessing efforts-however unsuccessful-to hold white men to account.
In much the same way as immigrant activists in Arizona, these activists
saw moments of adjudication as opportunities for community organizing, for relating their own experience, for bearing witness to the possibilities of an ongoing struggle rather than simply as occasions of rights
declaration.
Civil rights organizing in Mississippi was also characterized by
moments of improvisatory rights assertion, which sometimes provided
activists with greater room to maneuver. Neither the groups of prospective voters who presented themselves to registrars in rural Greenwood
County, nor the African American organizers who made a practice of
attending the white movie theater every Wednesday, nor the registrants
who defended themselves with words or the occasional shotgun against
neighbors or officials who carne to intimidate them, knew what awaited
them in these encounters. 68 As the courage of these actors became contagious in a county or a region, the tide of violent enforcement would
sometimes recede a little.
While participants may have drawn the courage for these moments of
rights assertion from the knowledge of their formal constitutional rights,
scholars of movement organizing point to other sources with greater
parallels to the experience of undocumented students. Some of those in
the movement drew their strength from the instruction and support of
family. Charles Payne quotes one Mississippi organizer: "I think somehow you've always had families who were not afraid ... they just talked to
their immediate family and let them know, you know 'You're somebody.
You can't express it right now but you keep this in mind. You're just as
much as anybody, you keep it in mind.' And then when the time for this
carne, we produced." 69
Also crucial in fueling this impetus were mass meetings, often held in
local black churches.70 At these meetings, participants were exhorted by
leader-organizers like Fanny Lou Hamer or Aaron Henry.7 1 They sang
together72 and they narrated to each other the burdens and dangers of
trying to comport themselves like "first-class citizens" by surmounting
the many perils of registering to vote.73 By sharing and witnessing each
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other's stories they began to earn the status of first-class citizens in each
other's eyes, if not yet in the eyes of the law.74 This attainment enabled
them to push forward, much like the DREAMers who have celebrated
each other's "stories of self," both in public and in smaller, organizational
settings. Participants in Mississippi organizing campaigns had formal
citizenship, but their daily lives were a constant reminder of its unaccomplished status. Their rights were emergent75 and their participation
as citizens-though constitutionally warranted-was, in important ways,
performative. It inaugurated a new political reality in which African
Americans in the rural South emerged from the constraints imposed by
threats and fear to be participants in public life, and it created a powerful
external impression that fueled rather than reflected a subjective sense
of entitlement. Their "first-class citizenship"-like the undocumented
immigrants' de facto right to remain-was always in the process of being
forged by activists' often excruciating efforts.
Ill. Conclusion

When immigrant justice activists employ the tactical forms or the broad
equal opportunity frames of the civil rights movement, this may in
fact be part of their performative strategy. They embrace the paradigmatic example of citizens vindicating their rights in the face of brutal
opposition and uncertain enforcement as yet another way of modeling
the citizenship that they hope to attain. Perhaps the recapitulation of
the tactics or frames of the civil rights movement in a more pointedly
performative register is the ultimate example of creative adaptation. It
demonstrates that the conceptual and tactical vocabulary developed to
claim the full measure of citizenship can also be deployed by those who
lack even its formal guarantees. But immigrant justice activists may also
glimpse something about the civil rights movement that much of the
public (and many legal scholars) has tended to miss-namely, that for
African Americans fighting for civil rights, their recognition was never a
fait accompli. Their first-class citizenship was always at stake, something
that had to be contended for every day?6 These parallels suggest an
insight that may be applicable not only to the civil rights movement but
to many movements for inclusion through law. Even as we most firmly
assert our claims to belonging, we are performing, with a fragile mix of
hope and insistence, our entitlement to exercise them.
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Notes
1. Martin Luther King, Jr. used this phrase in a number of speeches. When he
first published it in a 1958 article in The Gospel Messenger, Dr. King placed the
expression in quotes, indicating his belief that the phrase was in circulation
at the time he used it. See Martin Luther King, Out of the Long Night, GoSPEL
MESSENGER, February 8, 1958, p. 3, p. 14 col 1, https://archive.org/srream/
gospelmessengerv107mors#page/ nl77/ mode/ 2up. A similar phrase is attributed
to the American Transcendentalist and abolitionist, Theodore Parker, who said, "I
do not pretend to understand the moral universe, the arc is a long one and my
eye reaches but little ways...But from what I see I am sure it bends towards justice.''
See htrp:l/ quoteinvestigator.com/ 20 12/ 11/15/ arc-of-universe/.

2. Doug McAdam, "Initiator" and "Spinoff" Movements: Diffusion Processes in Protest
Cycles, in REPERTOIRES AND CYCLES OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 217, 236 (Mark Traugott
ed., 1995).
3. The term that those activists in the movement use to refer to themselves is
still a work in progress. Some activists, particularly those figh ting for federal
reform, use the term "immigrant rights movement" perhaps as part of the effort
to underscore similarities to the civil rights movement and to emphasize the
aspiration to formal rights for immigrants, such as those reflected in S. 744's
path to citizenship. In Arizona, activists refer to their struggle with the term
"immigrant justice movement." (They may also describe their work less globally
and more specifically as "advocating for the community" or "fighting
deportations.") The term "immigrant justice" may reflect the fact that resistance
to legislation such as Arizona's anti-immigrant law S.B. 1070 may be more a
matter of justice than of presently enforceable rights: there are not many rights
that an undocumented immigrant can assert in the face of an official demand to
show his or her papers. Perhaps more to the point, this term seems intended to
emphasize the moral imperative behind the movement. There is value in both
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terms-the latter for its moral impetus, the former for its performative selfassertion (participants in the civil rights movement, one might argue, could point
to a range of formal rights whose recognition and enforcement comprised the
goals of their movement). Both terms, as appropriate, will be used in this chapter.
4. The term "performative," which has attained broad theoretical usage in the last
two decades, is subject to different kinds of understandings or interpretations. In
this chapter, I will have recourse to three distinct though sometimes interrelated
understandings. The first draws on]. l. AUSTIN, HOW TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS
(1962). Austin distinguishes "performative utterances" from "constative
utterances," the latter of which purport to describe or report on phenomena in
the world and may be true or false. Id. at 1. Performative utterances "do not
'describe' or 'report' or constate any thing at all...[and] the uttering of a sentence
is, or is part of, the doing of an action." !d. at 5. Paradigmatic examples include
saying "J take this woman to be my wife" in the context of a wedding ceremony
or "I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth" while smashing a bottle across the
stern. Austin clarifies that the uttering of the words is not "the sole thing necessary
if the act is deemed to have been performed...it is always necessary that the
circumstances in which the words are uttered should be in some way, or ways,
appropriate, and it is very commonly necessary that either the speaker himself
or other persons should also perform certain other actions, whether 'physical' or
'mental' actions or even acts of uttering further words." Id. at 8. The second draws
on the work of Judith Butler. Butler, who has written on this concept famously
and extensively, contrasts an "expressive" understanding of gender, as a "core
or identity... [that] is prior to the various acts postures and gestures by which
it is dramatized and known" with a "performative" understanding of gender
in which "these attributes [acts postures and gestures] effectively constitute the
identity they are said to express or reveal." Judith Butler, Peiformative Acts and
Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory, 40 THEATER].
519, 527-28 (1988). This understanding may be viewed as having an Austenian
resonance in the sense that those acts which might conventionally be understood
to describe actually bring into being. Butler uses this understanding inter alia
to challenge what she views as a pervasive notion of gender as an ontology, its
external signs functioning as an expression of an internal essence. Through her
contrasting notion of gender as "repeated acts within a highly rigid regulatory
frame that congeal over time to produce...a natural sort of being," jUDITH BUTLER,
GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 33 (1990), she
suggests the ways that we intuitively make use of the social scripts and the
materials through which gender is constructed in mainstream culture, and the
possibility of using gender performance to disrupt those scripts. This
understanding has certain parallels with the third notion of performativity, which
draws on recent work on immigrant activism in particular by Cristina Beltran.
In her article Going Public: Hannah Arendt, Immigrant Action, and the Space of
Appearance, 37 PoL. THEORY 595 (2009), Beltran uses the work of Hannah Arendt
and Michael Warner to offer a provocative characterization of the proimmigrant
marches of 2006. By appearing in the public domain to march in large numbers,
undocumented immigrants constituted themselves as a Warnerian
"counterpublic;' forging a resistant collectivity and creating individual
subjectivities that had not existed before. As Beltran notes, "when subjects enter
the public realm, they are not simply enacting their already-existing
commitments. Instead, subjectivity is produced and transformed through these
civic encounters." !d. at 616. In this way, the marchers of 2006 exercised what
Arendt called the "power of beginnings": "the freedom to call something into
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being, which did not exist before, which was not given, not even as an object
of cognition or imagination, and which therefore, strictly speaking, could not be
known." !d. at 601 (quoting Hannah Arendt, What Is Freedom?, in BElWEEN PAST
AND FUTUR E: EIGHT EXERCISES IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 151 (2006)). In evoking
Arendt's performativity, Beltran is not marking a contrast between a public
performance and some ostensibly expressed interior state; rather, her vision is
confluent with Butler's in its sense of the way a public performance creates
conforming o r resistant meaning through its iteration of familiar and unfamiliar
elements. "By elaborating new citizenships, new privacies, and new critical
languages," Beltran argues, "this plurality of counterpublics challenged familiar
scripts regarding the u ndocumented, unsettling traditional notions of sovereignty
and blurring the boundaries between legaJ and il1ega1, assimilation and resistance,
civic joy and public outrage." !d. at 598.

5.

For an interesting history of the Montgomery Bus Boycott from a legal scholar's
perspective, see Randall Kennedy, Martin Luther King's Constitution: A Legal History
of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, 98 YALE LJ. 999 (1989) [hereinafter MLK's

Constitution].
6.

See, e.g., Michael Walzer, A Cup of Coffee and a Seat, DISSENT, 112 (1960). For a
discussion of the range of tactics employed by the civil rights movement, see
Doug McAdam, Tactical Innovation and the Pace of Insurgency, 48 AM. Soc. REv. 735
(1983) [hereinafter Tactical Innovation].

7.

For a comprehensive history of the 1961 Freedom Rides, see RAYMOND
ARSENAULT, FREEDOM RIDERS: 1961 AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL jUSTICE {2006).

8.

See, e.g., MLK's Constitution, supra note 4, at 1023 (ability of African Americans
in Montgomery to create alternatives to bus use during the boycott reflected
"the extraordinary sense of political commitment that suffused and mobilized
the black community"). See also Jeff Goodwin & Steven Pfaff, Emotion Work in

High-Risk Social Movements: Managing Fear in the U.S. and East German Civil Rights
Move-ments, in PASSIONATE POLITICS: EMOTIONS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 282 Ueff
Goodwin et al. eds., 2001) (describing process through which protesters learned
to manage the fears created by high-risk tactics in civil rights movement)
[hereinafter Emotion Work in High-Risk Social Movements].
9. See Doug McAdam, The Framing Function of Movement Tactics: Strategic Dramaturgy
in the American Civil Rights Movement, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS: POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES, MOBILIZING STRUCTURES, AND CULTURAL
FRAMINGS 338 (Doug McAdam et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter Strategic Dramaturgy].
10. See, e.g., MLK's Constitution, supra note 4, at 1001 (describing First Amendment
decisions on rights of protesters that emanated from civil rights movement).
11. See Tacticallnnovation, supra note 5, at 745 (1983) (quoting james Farmer, architect
of the Freedom Rides, as saying the intention was uto provoke the Southern
authorities into arresting us and thereby prod the justice Department into
enforcing the law of the land").

12. See Strategic Dramaturgy, supra note 8.
13.

Tactical Innovation, supra note 5, at 748-50 (describing role of community-wide
protest campaigns in Birmingham and Selma in passing civil rights legislation).

14.

For vivid discussions of t.he sense of purpose, intimacy, and solidarity that
emerged among movement participants, see CHARLES PAYNE, I'VE GOT THE LiGHT
OF FREEDOM: THE ORGANIZING TRADITION AND THE MISSISSIPPI FREEDOM
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STRUGGLE 236-64 (2007); DOUG McADAM, FREEDOM SUMMER 66-115 (1988);
Emotion Work in High-Risk Social Movements, supra note 7.
15. See Randall C. Archibold, In Wake of Immigration Law, Calls for an Economic Boycott
ofArizona, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2010. See also Randall C. Archibold, Phoenix Counts
Big Boycott Cost, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2010.
16. Daniel Gonzalez, SB 1070 Protesters Hold Vigil, Pray Court Overturns Law,
AzCENTRAL.COM (June 21, 2012, 10:58 PM), http://www.azcentral.com/ 12news/
news/ articles/ 20 12/ 06/ 21/ 20 12062lsb-1 070-protesters-hold-vigil-pray-courtoverturns-law.html (describing vigil held at state capitol for 103 days, from the
signing of S.B. 1070 to the decision of federal district court to enjoin several of its
provisions, and subsequent vigil between Supreme Court argument and decision
on constitutionality of S.B. 1070).
17. Griselda Nevarez, The Undocubus: DREAM Activists Arrive in Charlotte to Make Their
Voices Heard at the Democratic National Convention, HUFFINGTON PosT (Sept. 3,
2012, 12:36 PM), http://www.huffingtonpostcom/ 2012/ 09/ 03/ undocubus-dreamactivists-democractic-convention_n _ l852019.html. For an array of opinions on
the politics of the Undocubus, see Is Getting on the "UndocuBus" a Good Idea?,
THE OPINION PAGES: ROOM FOR DEBATE, NYTIMES.COM (Aug. 1, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/ roomfordebate/ 2012/ 08/ 01/ is-getting-on-theundocubus-a-good-idea. For the travelers' own blog relating the events and
images of their journey, see No Papers No Fem·: Ride for Justice,
NOPAPERSNOFEAR.ORG (last visited Feb. 11, 2014).
18. DREAMers Switch to Civil Disobedience to Help Cause, UPI.COM (Aug. 26, 2013, 3:09
PM), http://www.upi.com/Top_ News/ US/ 2013/ 08/ 26/ Dreamers-switch-to-civildisobedience-to-help-cause/ UPI-95551377544151 (describing shift in strategy
suggested by direct action protests at ICE building and immigration facility).
Perhaps the most controversial direct-action protest to date has been the return
of the DREAM 9, a group of undocumented activists who reentered the United
States after either experiencing deportation or leaving to be reunited with family
in Mexico. Although they were initially taken into custody at the border and
detained, they were subsequently released and have cleared the initial,
comparatively low hurdle (a "credible fear" screening) in their claims for asylum.
Aura Bogado, Undocumented Activists Take a Giant Risk to Return Home, COLORLINES
Uuly
23,
2013,
8:30
AM),
http://colorlines.com/ archives/ 2013/ 07/
Undocumented%20Activists%20Take-a-Giant-Risk-to-Return-Home.html.
See
also Julia Preston & Rebekah Zemansky, Demonstration at Arizona Border Divides
Supporters of Immigration Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2013, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/ 2013/ 08/ 05/ us/ demonstration-at-arizona-borderdivides-supporters-of-immigration-overhaul.html?_ r=O; David Leopold, The
Dream 9's Misguided Protest, FOX NEWS LATINO (Aug. 9, 2013),
http://lati no. foxnews.com/ latino/ opinion/20 13/ 08/ 09/ david -leopold-dream-smisguided-protest/ #ixzz2dfw3ygPj.
19. Conventional media sources also covered these protests and were tuned into
potential sites of conflict. However, the use of cell phones to capture potential
confrontations (which was vigorously encouraged both by activist groups and by
allies such as the ACLU as protests unfolded) signaled the increasing contribution
of movement-generated coverage and social media in communications strategies
of the movement.
20.

See Dream Activist: Undocumented Students Action & Resource Network,
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DREAMACTIVIST.ORG,
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/ search?q=cache:http:l/www.
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dreamactivist.org/ comeout/. For sociological discussions of "coming out" in the
DREAM Act movement, see WALTER J. NICHOLLS, THE DREAMERS: How THE
UNDOCUMENTED YOUTH MOVEMENT TRANSFORM ED THE IMMIGRANT RIGHTS
DEBATE (2013); Hinda Seif, "Unapologetic and Unafraid~· Immigrant Youth Come Out
from the Shadows, in YOUTH CIVIC DEVELOPMENT: WoRK AT THE CUTI'ING EDGE
59-75 (C. A. Flanagan & B. D. Christens eds., 2011).
21. For an analysis of the relation between LGBT and undocumented "comings out,"
see Rose Cuison Villazor, Coming Out of the Undocumented Closet, 92 N.C. L. REv. 1
(2013).
22. A public form of this kind of self-narration in the civil rights movement was
Fanny Lou Hamer's statement to the Credentials Committee at the Democratic
National Convention in 1964.
23. DREAMer narratives sometimes also had additional goals. They may have been
aimed at dispelling stereotypes, such as those that circulated among supporters of
anti-immigrant state legislation that undocumented immigrants were associated
with Latin American drug cartels or had come to the United States to d raw
on public benefits. Some early DREAMer narratives also involved a claim that,
because they had been brought to the United States as children, undocumented
youth had violated immigration regulations through no fault of their own. This
"no fault" strategy has more recently been criticized within the movement as
d ivisive and hierarchizing and has been muted as undocumented youth have
sought to make claims on behalf of the eleven million, and to explain and
celebrate, rather than stigmatize, the sacrifices of their parents. See NICHOLLS,
supra note 19, at 127-29.
24. Many undocumented immigrants, particularly those who have been in the United
States since early childhood, express the feeli ng that they are "citizens in every
way but the papers." Arizona Immigrant justice Project, supra (interview
transcripts and notes on file with author). On the other hand, they understand
that this experience of familiarity and cultural belonging can be shattered at any
m oment by an encounter with a law enforcement official or the detention of a
family member. This contradictory reality was captured vividly by the experience
of Arizona DREAMer Erika Andiola, a cofounder of the Arizona Dream Act
Coalition, and a highly visible and effective activist. Her home was raided by ICE
agents on the evening of january 10, 2013, and her mother and older brother
were taken into custody. Stephen Lemons, DREAM Activist Erika Andiola Says
Mom and Brother Taken into Custody by ICE, PHOENIX NEW TIMES BLOCS Uan.
11, 2013, 9:00 AM), http:l/b logs.phoenixnewtimes.com/ bastard/2013/ 011
dream_activist_erika_andiola_s.php. Andio)a made a video that was then
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ErikaAndiola's Family Separated, YouTUBE Uan. 11, 2013), http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=FVZKfoXsMxk. The national outcry prompted by Andiola's video
resulted in her mother's release, and the video petition has become a powerful
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25. The risk to which an undocumented activist was exposed through such selfrevelation depended, in part, on the context in which he or she made it. Sharing
one's status or one's story at an organization meeting created less risk of
consequences than sharing one's status at a public rally, which in turn was less
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risky than sharing one's status at public rally at which one was about co be arrested
for sitting down in a public thoroughfare. The varying consequences of selfdisclosure permitted activists some ability to regulate the risk to which they were
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26. Over time, self-narration in the context of direct action enabled demonstrators
who might not possess the familiar credentials of DREAMers to engage in similar
performative, persuasive acts. They highlighted their civic courage and
commitment by talking about their work or family-implicitly, the jobs they
would imperil or the children who would have to be cared for by others-while
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mothered them-not just the notion of them. We nurtured rights and gave rights
life...The making of something out of nothing took immense alchemical fire: the fusion
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of a whole nation and the kindling of several generations. The illusion became real
only for a very few of us; it is still elusive and illusory for most. But if it took this long to
breathe life into a form whose shape had already been forged by society...imagine how
long would be the struggle without even that sense of definition, without the power of
that familiar vision.

Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights,
22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 401, 430 (1987). In her understanding, the form of
rights did for African Americans in the civil rights movement what the civil rights
movement is now doing for immigrant activists: it gave them a template with a
legitimating grounding in law that activists, by force of will and determination,
could extend into uncharted areas. Williams may be able to access a perspective
not available to many legal scholars because her approach, although not
systematically empirical, draws-as does Polletta's-on the narratives and
perspectives of actors engaging in the process of asserting and defending their
rights.
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Discriminatory Animus

Cary Franklin

In addition to barring employers from discriminating on the basis of
race, sex, and a number of other protected categories, Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act provided for the creation of a new federal agency,
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 1 The EEOC's powers
were relatively limited in the years immediately after Title VII was
enacted, and the political compromises necessary to secure the law's
passage deprived the agency of any real enforcement authority. 2 From
the very beginning, however, the EEOC had the power to collect data
from employers regarding the number of women and racial and ethnic
minorities in their workforce. 3 One of the first regulations the EEOC
issued required large employers and government contractors to submit
annual EE0-1 reports supplying this information to the agency. 4 The
EEOC continues to require EE0-1 reports from employers to this day,
meaning the agency now has data from nearly half a century documenting changes and fluctuations in the racial and gender composition of a
substantial percentage of American workplaces. 5
Sociologists Kevin Stainback and Donald Tomaskovic-Devey recently
decided to analyze four decades of EE0-1 reports to determine what
these reports could tell us about the successes and failures of the project
of racial and gender integration inaugurated by Title VII. 6 They found
that from the time Title VII went into effect untill980, American workplaces were desegregating, sometimes significantly, in terms of both race
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and gender, due in no small part to the implementation and enforcement of antidiscrimination law? At the start of the 1980s, however,
progress began to stall-and it has not picked up since then. 8 In fact,
over the past decade or two, numerous industries in the United States
have begun to resegregate. Thus far in the twenty-first century, nearly a
third of all industries have witnessed racial resegregation among white
and black men; 9 racial resegregation among white and black women
has been even more "disturbingly widespread." 10 Moreover, resegregation and exclusion have tended to rise with higher income opportunities11-a trend that has contributed to growing economic inequality and
led Stainback and Tomaskovic-Devey to the rather dispiriting conclusion that "[t]he United States is no longer on a path to equal opportunity."12 Put succinctly, the EE0-1 reports tell a story of early success and
subsequent decline: Title VII got off to a promising start, but progress
under the statute began to stall within two decades of its enactment and
has not yet shown much sign of reviving.13
Stainback and Tomaskovic-Devey attribute the decline in Title VII's
efficacy as a tool for desegregating American workplaces to the major
political and policy changes that accompanied Ronald Reagan's ascendance to the White House. 14 They argue that white voters' exhaustion
with, and frustration over, civil rights projects such as affirmative action,
busing, and government aid to the poor helped contribute to Reagan's
victory in the presidential election of 1980, and that the new administration's stance toward civil rights enforcement mirrored the attitudes
of these constituents. 15 The policy implications of this new stance were
immediately apparent in the sections of the federal government tasked
with enforcing Title VII and other civil rights provisions. The Reagan
administration reduced the budget of the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance Programs (OFCCP)-the office within the Department of
Labor charged with ensuring that federal contractors comply with the
government's affirmative action and equal employment guarantees-so
significantly that the OFCCP was forced to cut more than half its staff
and drastically reduce the number of compliance reviews it conducted;
this resulted, inter alia, in a 77 percent reduction in back pay awards
between 1980 and 1982. 16 The scene at the EEOC was similar. In the first
two years of the Reagan administration, the EEOC's budget was reduced
by 10 percent, its staff was cut by 12 percent, and travel funds for EEOC
investigations were eliminated. 17 The agency's new head, Clarence
Thomas, declared himself "unalterably opposed to programs that force
or even cajole people to hire a certain percentage of minorities" 18 and
suggested that employment policies that have a disparate impact on protected groups ought not to count as discrimination under Title VII. 19 By
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1983, the EEOC was bringing less than half the number of Title VII lawsuits it had brought during the mid-1970s, despite the fact that the number of discrimination claims it received was substantially greater in the
later period. 20
Stainback and Tomaskovic- Devey use numbers (EE0- 1 reports and
data regarding agency funding and staffing) to tell a story about the history of Title VII over the past fifty years. This essay tells a similar story
about the history of Title VII over the past half-century, not by analyzing
vast demographic shifts in the workplace but by focusing on the shifting meaning of a single word-"animus"-over the same period of time.
The concept of "discriminatory animus" plays a central role in the interpretation of Title VII. 21 Thus, examining how the meaning of this phrase
evolves over time can provide additional purchase on the historical trajectory documented in the EE0-1 reports. It can help illuminate the
change in mind-set and understanding that accompanied the cessation
of progress the EE0-1 reports reveal. It can tell us something about how
courts and regulators thought about the concept of discrimination in the
decade or two after Title VII was enacted, and how these actors came to
think about discrimination after what Stainback and Tomaskovic-Devey
call the "short regulatory decade" 22 from 1973 to 1980 came to an end.
One of the reasons the word "animus" functions as such a useful
barometer for measuring attitudinal change over time is that it admits
of multiple meanings. In this sense, it is like the word "age."23 The
Supreme Court has noted that "the word 'age' standing alone can be
readily understood either as pointing to any number of years lived, or
as common shorthand for the longer span and concurrent aches that
make youth look good." 24 So, for instance, the word may mean something very different in "a sentence like 'Age can be shown by a driver's
license; [than it does in]. .. the statement, 'Age has left him a shut-in."'25
The Court has been highly attentive to these variations in the meaning
of the word "age" when interpreting the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. 26
As we shall see, however, courts have not been as attentive to such
semantic differences when deploying the word "animus" in Title VII
cases. They almost never take note of the fact that "animus" also has
two primary, and quite distinct, meanings. It can mean basic attitude,
governing spirit, or motivation; this meaning carries no negative connotations. But it can also mean prejudiced or spiteful ill will, hostility,
dislike, or hatred. Animus, in this second sense, connotes something far
less innocuous. To harbor animus against someone, or against an entire
group of people, is to actively wish them harm and-in the context of
antidiscrimination law-seems tantamount to bigotry.

31

32

A Nat1on of Widening Opportunities

From the perspective of a plaintiff in a Title VII lawsuit, it matters
very much which type of animus one is required to prove. It is not easy
to prove that an employe r's actions were motivated by hatred or animosity toward a protected group, if only because most contemporary
employers are too savvy to confess openly to harboring such attitudes,
and judges are often hesitant to find employers guilty of outright bigorry.27 If animus, defined in this way, were the legal standard, few plaintiffs would win Title VII suits. Officially, of course, it is not the standard.
Plaintiffs alleging disparate treatment under Title VII are not required
to prove that an employer acted out of hostility toward a protected class
but simply that race or sex or one of the other protected categories animated, or played a role, in the employer's decision.
In practice, however, courts in Title VII cases have not always maintained a clear division between these two meanings of the word "animus." As frustration with the traditional project of antidiscrimination
law mounted in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, Americans
increasingly began to view race and sex discrimination as phenomena of
an earlier era, which surfaced now only as aberrant conduct perpetrated
by a few malevolent employers in a generally egalitarian labor market.
Against this backdrop, Title VII increasingly came to be seen not as a tool
for combating the kinds of structural problems that continue to generate
vast racial and gender-based inequ alities in the labor market but rather
as a mechanism for policing outliers. Today, this is all too often precisely
how Title VII functions. This essay argues that if Title VII is to accomplish the broader, more structural purposes for which it was enacted, we
need to engage in a new conversation-or really, reinvigorate an older
conversation-about what constitutes discrimination under the law.
I. The Emergence of "Animus" in Title VII Law

The word "animus" does not appear in the text of Title VII. Nor does
it appear in early Title VII case law. From the rnid-1960s through the
mid-1970s,judicial opinions almost never use the word when discussing
discrimination by employers. 28 For the first decade of Title VII's existence, "animus" simply did not play a significant role in the law's implementation or the adjudication of employment discrimination cases.
This is not to say, however, that the word "animus" never surfaces in
discourse about Title VII in the years after the statute was enacted. Legal
scholars and lawyers at the EEOC sometimes used the term during this
period to refer to the old, outdated conception of discrimination Title
VII was designed to replace. Alfred Blumrosen, who assisted in the organization of the EEOC in 1965 and served as its first chief of concilia-
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tions and director of federal-state relations from 1965 to 1967, asserted
that, in the post-World War II era, before the enactment of Title VII,
"[d]iscrimination was seen as the evil act of the misguided,"29 or as "conduct [that was] motivated by the dislike of the group or class to which
the victims of discrimination belonged."30 Blumrosen noted that governmental actors who attempted to police this form of discrimination
were not terribly successful, in part because "evil motive" was extremely
difficult to prove, even in midcentury Arnerica. 31 Neither employees nor
judges have access to employers' minds, and courts were generally loath
to find that employers had acted with malice or ill will toward racial
minorities. For this reason, among others, antidiscrimination law in the
postwar period did little to improve the status of racial minorities at
work.32
Commentators-and courts-in the late 1960s agreed that Title VII
had moved antidiscrimination law beyond this search for animus. 33 The
House Report that recommended passage of Title VII asserted that the
law was necessary not in order to protect minorities from racial animosity on the part of employers but to ameliorate the following three
problems: (1) black unemployment rates were double those of whites; (2)
black workers were concentrated in the lowest paid, least stable job classifications; and (8) given comparable age, education, and experience, the
median annual wage and salary income of black workers was 60 percent that of white workers.34 Commentators pointed to these passages
as evidence that Congress had identified the racial stratification of the
American labor market as a pervasive and urgent social problem and
had passed Title VII to ameliorate it. 35 They asserted that the law's goal
is to ensure that those who had historically encountered discrimination
and exclusion would now be full and equal participants in the workplace. The law aimed to accomplish this goal, they argued, by providing
American workers and lawyers advocating on their behalf with tools to
dismantle structural practices that perpetuate inequality-not simply to
identify and censure a few renegade employers with sinister motives. 36
In keeping with this understanding of Title VII's purpose, the lawyers
tasked with enforcing the statute in the years after its enactment targeted
the kinds of structural practices, such as employment tests and seniority
systems,37 that locked historically subordinated groups out of good jobs.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a number of federal courts issued
key rulings holding that such practices violate Title VII because they
continue to freeze out members of the groups the law is designed to
protect. 38 The reasoning in these decisions reveals that there was not
a sharp conceptual divide between discriminatory effects and discriminatory intent in this period.39 If an employer's policy had the effect of
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depriving members of protected classes of employment opportunities,
that was considered sufficient- by courts, by the EEOC, and by many
academic commentators-to show intent. Courts in this era repeatedly
explained that if an employer implements a policy or practice it can
reasonably fo resee will have a deleterious effect on the job prospects of
minorities protected by Title VII, its cognizance of the probable outcome of its actions satisfies any intent requirement in the statute.40 In
other words, courts held, it is fair to assume that an employer intends the
likely consequences of its actions. Foreseeable effects were deemed sufficient to show intent in this period because interpreters of the law were
not focused on what was transpiring inside the employer's head. They
had a thin conception of intent: the focus was on eradicating instances
in which race or sex was functioning as a barrier to employment, not on
plumbing the depths of employers' minds to determine their motivations.41
In the mid- to late 1970s, in the constitutional context, courts began to
define discriminatory intent differently, and more narrowly, than they
had in the preceding decade. By 1980, evidence that a decision maker
could reasonably foresee the deleterious effects a particular policy or
practice would have on a protected class was no longer deemed sufficient
evidence of discriminatory intent. The Court suggested in Washington v.
Davis42 that discriminatory intent and discriminatory effects were conceptually distinct categories that involved separate structures of proof.43
A few years later, the Court held in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney44 that to prove discriminatory intent for the purposes of
equal protection law, a plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the
state had adopted a particular course of action not simply "in spite of"
its adverse effects on a protected group but at least in part "because of'
those effects.45 In other words, Feeney defined "intent" as acting not simply with an awareness of impending harm but also out of a base desire to
cause such harm. As a result, courts began to understand discriminatory
intent, for purposes of equal protection law, as a "state of mind akin to
malice.''46
Davis and Feeney were not Title VII cases; they concerned state action
and the meaning of discrimination under the Constitution. But they
reflected a turn inward-a turn toward the mental state of the discriminator-that was also occurring in Title VII law.47 By this time, courts
had made it clear that disparate treatment and disparate impact were
also to be treated as distinct doctrines under Title VII. And it was at this
moment, in the late 1970s, that the word "animus" first entered Title VII
case law. For the first decade of the law's existence, "animus" played no
role in judicial discourse about employment discrimination. But by the

Dtscrimmatory Animus 35

late 1970s, courts began to assert, in dozens of Title VII cases each year,
that an allegation of disparate treatment requires proof of "discriminatory animus."48 By the 1980s and 1990s, the word "animus" started to
appear in hundreds of Title VII cases each year. 49 After the turn of the
century, such appearances began to number in the thousands. 50 Today,
it has become routine for courts in disparate treatment cases to ask
whether an employer has acted with "discriminatory animus."51
II. The Double Meaning of "Animus" and Its Implications for
Title VII

To be perfectly clear: Title VII doctrine does not require the plaintiff in
a disparate treatment case to demonstrate that an employer acted with
animus defined as hostility or ill wi11.52 A plaintiff is required to show
only that an employer acted with discriminatory intent. Thus, when
courts assert, as they frequently do, that proof of "discriminatory animus" is required under Title VII, they are ostensibly using the word "animus" as a synonym for "intent." In the late 1970s, when courts first began
to deploy the word "animus" in antidiscrimination cases, they sometimes took care to explain this. One court explained, for instance, that
when it used "[t]he term 'animus,' [it meant that term] to be synonymous with 'motivation,"'-as in, race animated the decision-and did not
mean to refer to "animus" in its secondary sense of personal hostility or
enmity.53
In practice, however, it has proven difficult to maintain a strict separation between these two senses of the word. It is difficult to hear the word
"animus" without also hearing its negative connotations. The phrase
"discriminatory animus;' or "racial animus," seems to point to a thicker
conception of intent. So when courts routinely declare that disparate
treatment claims under Title VII require evidence of "discriminatory
animus," this cannot help but shade our understanding of the kind of
conduct that violates the law. Whatever the formal doctrine says, the
term "animus" seems to describe a particular mental state, with overtones of ill will or hostility toward a particular group. Indeed, this usage
is far more common in normal everyday discourse than the more innocent use of the word "animus" to mean, simply, intent.
Not surprisingly, courts often seem to find it difficult to eradicate the
negative connotations of the word "animus'' from their thought process
when determining whether a plaintiff has succeeded in meeting the burden of proof in a Title VII case. This second layer of meaning seems
regularly to spill over into judges' consideration of what constitutes discriminatory intent and, thus, what counts as discrimination under the
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law. Consider, for instance, the rhetoric the First Circuit deployed when
discussing discrimination in Candelario Ramos v. Baxter Healthcare, 54 a
Title VII case in which the Puerto Rican employees of a health-care
products manufacturer alleged they had been discriminated against on
the basis of their national origin. The court rejected this claim on the
ground that "there is simply no evidence that Baxter management acted
out of animus to Puerto Ricans."55 The court noted that "there are no
statements by Baxter management disparaging Puerto Ricans,"56 nor
any evidence that the reasons proffered by the employer for its actions
were pretexts for "wicked motives."57 There is simply no evidence, the
court concluded, that the company's management "harbored animus
toward Puerto Ricans."58
My point is not that the plaintiffs in Candelario Ramos should have won
their case but rather that this kind of rhetoric, in which there seems to be
considerable slippage between the two meanings of the word "animus,"
subtly or not-so-subtly affects our understanding of what constitutes
discrimination. Such rhetoric is not unusual in contemporary Title VII
cases.59 Courts today sometimes reject disparate treatment claims on the
ground that the plaintiff failed to produce any evidence of "racial animus"60 or "sex-based animus," 61 and it is hard not to conclude that the
word "animus" does some work in these instances. For example, when
courts find for an employer on the ground that the plaintiff has "offer[ed]
no evidence ... of antipathy toward Hispanics"62 or "anti-Hispanic animus"63-or when a court observes that a plaintiff has failed to show that
an employer acted with "invidious racial animus"64 -it seems clear that
the more negative connotations of the word "animus" have conditioned
the way adjudicators think about the kind of conduct Title VII prohibits.
Doctrinally speaking, these courts must simply mean that there is no
evidence in these cases that race or sex played a role in the adverse
employment actions the plaintiffs allege. But by framing intent as "animus," courts may allow a lack of evidence of group-based hatred or ill
will to bring them most of the way to a decision. Thus, although Title
VII law has not formally incorporated the notion that plaintiffs must
prove evil motive (indeed, the law explicitly rejects this idea65), the word
"animus" can nonetheless muddle the meaning of "intent" in a way that
allows it to slide in that direction.
It is not a coincidence that the word "animus" began to appear in Title
VII case law with increasing frequency at precisely the same moment
workplace integration began to stall. The emergence of this word coincided with a new (or, perhaps, renewed) understanding of discrimination
as conduct perpetrated by bad apples-a relatively circumscribed number of employers with evil motives-rather than the pervasive and
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deeply entrenched social problem Title VII was designed to address. The
hunt for animus makes sense if one believes discrimination is largely a
thing of the past-if one believes there may still be isolated bad actors,
but conditions in the workplace are now generally fair, and any inequalities along lines of, say, race are likely attributable to factors other than
discrimination. In fact, by the late 1970s, the Court had started to reason
about discrimination in this way. This conception of discrimination led
the Court, in the context of affirmative action, to invalidate a series of
programs designed to integrate institutions of higher education and sectors of the labor market previously reserved for whites. 66 In the context of public education, it motivated the Court to curtail the pursuit
of desegregation through busing and other race-conscious integrative
measures.67 Today, this narrative features quite prominently in Supreme
Courtjurisprudence: it recently played a central role in the Court's decision to eviscerate § 5 of the Voting Rights Act.68 Title VII law has not
formally incorporated the more restrictive definitions of discrimination
that historically subordinated groups now confront in the context of
equal protection law. But as the past several decades of EE0-1 reports
reveal, employment discrimination law has not remained untouched by
these conceptual shifts. 69
The only way to revive the project of workplace integration inaugurated by the passage of Title VII is to begin to tell a different story about
discrimination than the one that has currently captured the Court's
imagination. It is not a new story, exactly-it is the story that lawyers at
the EEOC and academic commentators told in the 1960s, just after the
enactment of the Civil Rights Act. These commentators looked to the
1963 House report as a guide to the statute's interpretation. That report
concluded that discrimination in the workplace was an urgent social
problem-and that a new federal employment discrimination law was
necessary-because (1) black unemployment rates were double those
of whites; (2) black workers were concentrated in the lowest paid, least
stable job classifications; and (3) given comparable age, education, and
experience, the median annual wage and salary income of black workers was 60 percent that of white workers.7° Statistics like these do not
come about through the conduct of a few bad actors. They are evidence of major structural problems. Early proponents of Title VII, and
indeed, many courts, viewed the law as a means of combating such problems-not by targeting employers with bad motivations but by dismantling policies and practices that impede equality in the workplace.
Today, fifty years after the passage of Title VII, (1) black unemployment rates remain double those of whites? 1 (2) blacks, and other racial
minorities, are still concentrated in the lowest paying, least stable job
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classifications; 72 and (3) black households earn on average just 59 percent
as much as white households. 73 Thus, we might echo the academics and
EEOC lawyers of the 1960s in saying that workplace inequality is an
urgent social problem. Statistics like these do not come about through
the conduct of a few bad actors. They are evidence of major structural problems. I believe antidiscrimination law still has a role to play in
addressing these sorts of problems, but it will not-it cannot-do so if
we conceive of its goal as the policing of outliers who harbor "animus"
against protected groups.
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Civil Rights 3.0

Nan D. Hunter

President Obama 's endorsement ofgay marriage...was by any measure a watershed.
A sitting United States president took sides in what many people consider the last
civil rights movement...
-New York Times, May 9, 20121

The LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) rights movement
owes an immeasurable debt to the advocates for racial justice who created the modem American idea of civil rights as well as its doctrinal
foundation. Perhaps an even greater debt is owed to those midcentury
civil rights leaders for creating one of the nation's most compelling
cultural narratives: a scripture-like account of suffering, Exodus, and
redemption that has inspired every campaign for social justice since that
time. The quasi-mythologized history of civil rights in the 1960s has
created the sense of the eventual inevitability of victory over the most
extreme forms of irrational bias and the achievement of formal equality.
This narrative now attaches to LGBT rights, as evidenced by how frequently LGBT equality is being described as the last, or the next, or
today's, preeminent civil rights issue.2 Indeed, it was this background
narrative that gave such rhetorical power to President Obama's phrasing
of his support for LGBT equality in his second inaugural address, a passage that cements the place of LGBT rights squarely in the civil rights
heritage, in implicit equivalence to its forebears. 3 But the march-ofprogress narrative, while not entirely untrue, is deeply misleading.
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In this chapter, I will explore what it means, for better and for worse, to
be (arguably) this generation's emblematic civil rights campaign. What
does the label tell us about the civil rights paradigm itself? If the achievement of marriage equality is the great civil rights achievement of this
generation, what does that suggest about a future for equality more
generally? How have new forms of, and technologies for, movementbuilding affected the idea and practice of civil rights? Does the civil
rights paradigm have a future? Or are we on the cusp of reaching the
civil rights version of the end of history? 4
This chapter addresses three aspects of the social meaning of civil
rights: legal doctrine and legal institutions, especially as they relate to
statutory mandates for equal treatment; social movement strategies,
with a focus on the professionalization and corporatization of a civil
rights campaign; and the tension between the discourse of social hierarchy and tthat of civil rights.
The gay story began with what many saw as an upstart, even faux, civil
rights movement as compared to the traditional civil rights movements
that were thought to be the real thing. Until recently, LGBT rights advocates struggled to join the informal alliance of constituency-based rights
groups, to get a place at the civil rights table and entree to the diversity
industry that flourishes among large employers, and to build their own
niche as part of the base of the Democratic Party. Those goals have been
achieved, along with a broad public recognition that the LGBT movement counts as a civil rights struggle.
As other movements in the American civil rights tradition have each
brought new insights, approaches, and problems to the fore, so too has
the LGBT movement. Over time, the movement itself has changed,
acquiring greater resources and responding to changes in the broader
political climate. LGBT organizations have utilized increasingly sophisticated technologies to achieve fundamental social movement objectives
of framing issues, mobilizing a constituency, forging alliances, and interacting with political parties and state actors.
LGBT legal rights work began in earnest after the ascent of ReaganBush era conservatives whose elections were fueled by the coalition of
social issues and probusiness policies. For many of the current leaders-in all civil rights movements-that Reagan-Bush political culture
forms the baseline for goals and expectations.5 This context of backlash
and retrenchment contributed to the growth of multidimensional advocacy: LGBT rights advocates have moved, or been forced, into a variety
of lawmaking venues- state and federal courts and legislatures, elections, and advertising. The result is a melding of new and old models
of persuasion in which themes developed in nonjuridical contexts may
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migrate to courts and legislatures. The hyperinvestment in litigation
during the height of the Warren Court era has ceased. Advocates now
routinely develop campaigns to eliminate discriminatory laws consciously using litigation as only one component of an array of techmques.
Underlying the chapter is an understanding that the social meaning of
civil rights in the United States is extraordinarily rich, with issues being
framed and reframed in a continuous iterative process. Every marginalized group seeks pathways and portals into greater power, whether
through institutions of the state, the market, or civil society. The discourse of civil rights has been productive in both jurisgenerative and
culture-generative terms.
Examining the meaning of civil rights through the prism of the LGBT
rights movement provides a window into strengths, weaknesses, and
dynamism of the struggle for social justice in the United States. What
we learn is that LGBT advocates have contributed to the overall project
of formal equality under law primarily by developing an extraordinary
strategic and tactical dexterity, uniquely so at the state level and in their
alliance with the business sector. Particularly as to the latter, however,
there are major trade-offs that have yet to become manifest. Meanwhile, because of a broader retrenchment in civil rights law generally,
the possibility of advances in substantive equality law-either statutory
or constitutional-has shrunk. Even as LGBT rights groups make breakthroughs in achieving goals such as marriage equality, they will have
to contend with conservative pressure to dismantle overarching protections such as the disparate impact principle or heightened scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause. For the future, the big question for
this movement-and all other social justice movements in the United
States-is whether it will deploy its talents and resources to meet the
more difficult challenge of dislodging embedd ed, structural forms of
discrimination and social hierarchy.
I. The Law: Equality and Containment

I got nothing but homage an holy thinkin for the ol songs and stories
But now there's me an you.
-Bob Dylan6

The project that civil rights movem.ents and arguments framed under
the rubric of equality do best, and for which the law is perfectly suited, is
ending exclusions and categorical inequalities. What civil rights movements and equality arguments more broadly do not do so well is dismantling hierarchies? The fundamental critique of formal equality is
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that its very achievement perpetuates more deeply embodied patterns
of stratification, in part because the existence of civil rights laws tends to
legitimate the hierarchy that remains. Whether constitutional or statutory, formal equality rights are differentially deployed by differently situated subjects in a complex stratified society.
To date, LGBT equality has been overwhelmingly framed as being
about ending exclusions-currently and most dramatically the exclusion
from marriage, but prior tO that, a series of other categorical exclusions:
from legal shelter for the exercise of sexual intimacy, from protection of
one's parental rights, and often from employment. So in that structural
sense at least, LGBT rights should be an easy fit for a civil rights paradigm. And indeed there is truth in this parallel construction: the LGBT
movement does offer its own narrative of progress in ending exclusions.
Gay sex is no longer criminal in the United States, even in the most conservative jurisdictions. Several million Americans have achieved at least
a bounded liberty to live honest lives that are more economically and
physically secure than was imagined possible fifty years ago. Prospectively, a demographically driven tectonic shift in public opinion suggests
that more progress is on the way.
Yet it is also true that the LGBT equality movement has not yet
attained the two traditional markers of formal equality in law. One is
adoption by the Supreme Court of an equal protection analysis under
which laws differentiating on the basis of a specific characteristic are presumptively unconstitutional under a heightened scrutiny analysis. The
other is national legislation that regulates the private as well as the public
sectors and that prohibits discrimination based on the given characteristic in a variety of contexts. Neither has occurred in the field of LGBT
rights.
From a political point of view, we must ask whether this institutional
reluctance by both the Supreme Court and Congress stems from something more than hostility to a particular and relatively "new" minority.
Doubtless some part of it derives from controversies specific to homosexuality and gender identity, but it also reflects a shrinking of the vision
of equality. Mapping civil rights legal doctrine from the perspective of a
constituency that seems to stand on the cusp of crossing the finish line
into formal equality can tell us much about how the dialog between law
and politics has constructed the evolving social meaning of "civil rights."
LGBT groups are poised to follow in the footsteps of older movements
based on race and gender, but the parameters of what is possible have
narrowed.
In both constitutional and statutory law, the Supreme Court has cut
back on the promise that law would serve as a tool to achieve racial,
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and to a lesser extent gender, justice. These examples of retrenchment
are easy to overlook in the LGBT rights context because, for this group,
they stunt forward progress, which is less dramatic than forcing a group
backward, as has occurred with people of color and women. Since Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act in 1964, an increasingly conservative
Supreme Court has in effect discounted the value of achieving equivalent protection by interpretations that have undermined the efficacy of
the underlying statute.8 Together, these changes have redefined equality
under law in more limited ways, even if the number of constituencies
protected under civil rights law has expanded.
The shrinkage of the civil rights paradigm is evident in comparing the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 to its closest analog in the field of sexual orientation or gender identity that has gotten to a floor vote in Congress. The
Senate adopted a version of the Employment Non-Discrimination Act
(ENDA) in November 20139 but the bill died in the House ofRepresentatives.10 In this section, I will describe how ENDA and the current law on
the standard of review for sexual orientation discrimination under the
Equal Protection Clause illustrate ways in which constrictions of existing
civil rights law are channeling future law. Ironically, the strongest protection against discrimination for LGBT persons may come not from a
twenty-first-century civil rights bill but instead from a dynamic reading
of the fifty-year-old Title VII.
A. A Cabined Vision

As its name indicates, the ENDA legislation covered only one of the

realms-employment-that fall within the scope of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act. Congresswoman Bella Abzug introduced omnibus legislation in
1974 that would have added sexual orientation protection to a range of
issues covered in the Civil Rights Act, but Washington-based advocates
decided in 1993 that redrafting the bill to cover only employment would
increase the possibility of legislative success, because the workplace was
the context that drew the greatest level of popular support for an antidiscrimination law. 11 More recently, hoping to build on the momentum
from the Supreme Court's ruling on same-sex marriage, rights groups
introduced a new version of the omnibus approach. Its future appears
dim, however, as long as Republicans control Congress.
Despite the increased numbers in public opinion polls voicing agreement that LGBT persons should not be fired based on that characteristic,12 the needle has not moved for twenty years on advancing federal antidiscrimination legislation in this area. In addition to the power
of social conservatives who view homosexuality with distaste, forward
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progress is stymied by hostility toward civil rights and government regulation more generally.
Compare the United Kingdom, which enacted a new civil rights law
in 2010. The Equality Act unified dozens of laws and policies into one
comprehensive statute, eliminating fragmented coverage for race, gender, disability, and sexual orientation. 13 The new British law is designed
to modernize and clarify, rather than expand, the reach of the civil rights
paradigm, in an effort to render the overall concept more accessible to
the public and to eliminate areas of confusion for employers and other
institutions that must comply. Civil rights law in the United States has
expanded since 1964 only through a series of one-off measures, each
increasing the complexity of the legal edifice of antidiscrimination. 14
Despite the political modesty of the British law, enacting its equivalent
here seems impossible in the current political environment.
The second telling characteristic of the version of ENDA that passed
the Senate is that it explicitly forbade claims based on disparate impact
theory. 15 The disparate impact doctrine allows proof of discrimination
without the need to prove the defendant's intent to discriminate. While
disparate impact claims in the context of sexual orientation or gender
identity have so far been rare, 16 the insistence by business interests on
the inclusion of its prohibition in ENDA 17 reflects a much larger campaign against the underlying concept.
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 18 the Supreme Court held that proof of
the disparate impact on racial minorities of facially neutral employment
rules constituted a violation of Title VII. Its effect was a powerful boost
to the continued efficacy of that statute after employers discarded once
explicitly discriminatory policies. More than one scholar has characterized Griggs as the Court's most important civil rights decision aside from
Brown. 19 The disparate impact principle comes the closest of any aspect
of antidiscrimination law to reaching structural patterns of stratification.20 In other words, at least in theory, disparate impact claims have
the potential to achieve more than formal equality, something more like
concrete steps toward disestablishing hierarchy.
Since Griggs, the battle over disparate impact has become a central
point of back-and-forth dispute between those who seek to expand the
concept of civil rights and those who seek to shrink it. The Supreme
Court has ruled that disparate impact does apply to claims filed under
the Fair Housing Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,21
but it has precluded disparate impact claims under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act, 22 Section 1981,23 and the Fourteenth 24 and Fifteenth25
Amendments. In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,26 the Court severely
limited disparate impact by its ruling on allocation of burden of proof
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and the scope of the business necessity defense. Congress responded to
Wards Cove with the Civil Rights Act of 1991,27 which effectively reversed
most of the Court's decision, returning the burden of proof to the defendant and requiring the defendant to show that practice with disparate
effects was job related and consistent with business necessity. 28 In one of
the most recently enacted antidiscrimination laws, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, the issue aros·e again. Congress barred disparate impact claims pending review by an Advisory Commission.29
In light of this ongoing battle, it is a mistake to consider the disparate
impact exclusion in ENDA as turning on gay-specific issues or as of trivial significance. The enactment of a prohibition on disparate impact in
LGBT civil rights legislation would contribute to a precedent against it
in future legislative debates beyond LGBT issues.
A third weakness of the version of ENDA that passed the Senate was its
overly broad exemption for religious organizations. In contrast to Title
VII, which allows religious employers to give preference to employees based on religion (but not based on other characteristics), the 2013
iteration of ENDA would have given such employers a blanket exemption from antidiscrimination requirements based on sexual orientation
and gender identity and prohibited the denial of federal contracts on
the ground of noncompliance. The acceptance of this provision as part
of the negotiations with Senate leadership produced a split among the
LGBT rights groups; ultimately, all the LGBT groups opposed the version of ENDA that emerged from the Senate. 30
B. Equal Protection

Many people use the term "civil rights" to encompass equal protection
law as well as the statutory antidiscrimination prohibitions. In this aspect
of equality law, the Supreme Court has struck down forms of sexual orientation discrimination, most recently and importantly in the marriage
decision.31 Remarkably, however, it has done so without articulating a
clear standard of review for such classifications, leaving lower courts to
conclude that some form of a rational basis test was used, even though
there is little possibility that the outcomes would have been the same
had the traditional and highly deferential version of rational basis been
the operative standard.32
The Court's treatment of this next, last, or most contemporaneous
civil rights issue signals that, like the scope of antidiscrimination statutes,
the future likely holds only the possibility of additional one-off invocations of constitutional equality. The Court has become allergic to any
extension of a more stringent standard for scrutiny beyond the groups
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to which it has traditionally been applied.33 I read the Court's message
in the gay cases as indicating that the Justices accept that they will have
to address whether sexual orientation exclusions violate the Constitution but are determined to do so without articulating standards for equal
protection scrutiny that will have broader application.

c. Sex Discrimination Claims: A Return to the Future?
With the failure to enact national legislation prohibiting employment
discrimination, advocates have turned to the prohibition on sex discrimination in Title VII to reach adverse workplace actions against LGBT
persons. To date, the progress is uneven but promising. The majority of
circuits have ruled that adverse actions that result from sex stereotyping based on gender nonconformity can constitute sex discrimination
against LCBT people. 34 Courts increasingly accept that antipathy toward
homosexuality or transgender status is vulnerable because it hinges on
stereotypes of masculinity or femininity. 35 These rulings reopen the
possibility of using sex discrimination theories, regardless of whether
new legislation is enacted.
The EEOC has led the movement forward on this front by issuing
decisions finding that gender identity and sexual orientation discrimination are both covered under Title VII as per se sex discrimination. 36
As a result, the EEOC accepts claims of both forms of discrimination
for investigation and conciliation and has also initiated or supported litigation on these theories. 37 Thus administrative agency enforcement of
Title VII as it applies to discrimination based on either sexual orientation or gender identity is already occurring nationwide, and hundreds
of persons have sought redress through this channel. 38
In many respects-the availability of disparate impact claims and a
more targeted religious exemption-Title VII is a stronger law than was
ENDA. 39 Thus, ironically, the best hope for the future of civil rights protection for LGBT Americans, at least in the workplace, may well lie in
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, a law that is older than most of the lobbyists
who are working on this issue.
II. The Law Reform Movement: Mobilization in an Era of Retreat

While there are lots oflessons that we have learned from chapters one and two of the
civil rights movement, we're in a new day. We need a little boost. There is so much to
be learned from [the LGBT forces].
-Judith Browne Dianis, quoted in San Frarzcisco Magazine, 201240
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One cannot understand the ways in which legal claims for LGBT equality signal both continuity and change in the civil rights paradigm without understanding the historical context and legal culture in which those
claims were formulated, debated, and adjudicated. Lawyers who brought
LGBT rights claims beginning roughly in the 1980s had the advantage
of well-established constitutional law doctrines and equal rights statutes
that were in their infancy for an earlier generation of civil rights lawyers
working in the 1950s and 1960s. Ironically, however, the LGBT rights
lawyers who sought to build on the legal foundations set in place by
earlier social justice lawyers discovered that the foundations themselves
were eroding. The adaptations made by the legal wing of the LGBT civil
rights movement offer a window into changes in strategy and innovations in tactics that other civil rights movements can learn and utilize.
LGBT rights strategies emerged on a large scale only after-indeed,
long after-the end of the Warren and early Burger Courts. LGBT rights
litigation got off the ground not in the afterglow of Brown v. Board of Education,41 but in the midst of a rights counterrevolution. The result was
a strange disconnect. Many of us grew up with civil rights movement
lawyers as heroes and with an aspirational understanding of the potential for using law to achieve justice that grew out of experiencing the
1960s during childhood. When baby boomers (including the first generation of women in significant numbers) began attending law school,
public interest law was already a recognized field. Some of us studied
with civil rights lawyers who had become law professors. We took
courses designed to train us as advocates for disadvantaged groups, an
opportunity that did not exist when the older generation had been in
law school. Upon graduation, many of us secured jobs with public interest and civil rights groups or worked with civil rights units of government agencies-organizations that were available for young lawyers to
join, rather than to have to invent.
The legal culture into which we graduated, however, had changed dramatically in a conservative direction. The single most prominent issue in
legal politics grew out of a backlash movement rather than a civil rights
movement: the continuing effort to reverse Roe v. Wade,42 a goal adopted
as official policy by the Department of Justice after President Ronald
Reagan took office.43 As the Reagan administration brilliantly used the
power of judicial appointment to deepen the conservative nature of the
federal bench that had begun under President Nixon, 44 a new consensus emerged among progressives: that federal courts had become unreliable, at best, as allies in struggles for equality. In response to Reagan's
policies and appointments, traditional civil rights groups were drawn
to Congress, where Democrats controlled both chambers from 1986 to
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1994.45 Congress, rather than the courts, became the site for expansions
of rights to new groups and for legislation effectively reversing Supreme
Court decisions that had narrowly interpreted civil rights statutes. 46
Advocates seeking to establish equality protections for LGBT persons
adopted the adjustments made by the older groups and developed new
ones. The federal courts almost literally closed to equal protection
claims based on sexual orientation after the Supreme Court upheld the
legitimacy of a state law that criminalized same-sex intimacy. In Bowers
v. Hardwick, 47 the Court torpedoed what was then the movement's legal
priority-eliminating sodomy laws, upon which so much antigay discrimination was based. Although grounded in liberty rather than equality analysis, that decision prevented any significant victory for a class
understood as being defined by criminal conduct until the Court's decision in Romer v. Evans ten years later.
LGBT advocates turned to state courts as an alternative. When Hardwick was decided , a deliberate shift to litigation strategies based on state
constitutional claims had already occurred among progressive lawyers
engaged with issues such as school financing. 48 Building on this base,
LGBT rights lawyers began identifying and litigating challenges to state
sodomy laws in state courts. The successes in the campaign to invalidate
sodomy laws eventually became the most successful use of state constitutions to expand rights. Half of the sodomy laws that had been in existence at the time of Hardwick were eliminated, which paved the way for
the Supreme Court's repudiation of Hardwick in the 2003 Lawrence v.
Texas decision. 49
On the national level, LGBT rights lawyers joined other civil rights
groups in seeking relief in Congress, but to a lesser extent. Their major
success was the inclusion of HIVI AIDS as a presumptively covered disability in the Americans with Disabilities Act adopted in 1990.50 Most of
the Washington-based LGBT lobbying addressed issues that arose from
the first decade of the HIV/ AIDS crisis.5 1 The movement's greatest congressional setback was the enactment of Don't Ask Don't Tell legislation
following President Clinton's failed attempt to allow openly gay persons
to serve in the military.52
What the LGBT legal groups did much more extensively than traditional civil rights groups was to focus on state legislatures. During
the 1980s, this strategy was defensive-driven primarily by the need to
respond to proposals for coercive restrictions on persons with HIV/ AIDS
that arose as amendments to state public health laws. 53 LGBT organizations often formed alliances with public health officials, who understood that prevention and treatment efforts would be more successful
if patients and those at risk trusted them. To a large extent, the strat-
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egy worked; the kinds of quarantines and forced testing that many had
feared did not materialize.54
A second, positive rather than defensive, factor drew LGBT rights
advocates to state legislatures: campaigns to add protection based on
sexual orientation-and later gender identity-to state antidiscrimination laws. The initial adoption of laws prohibiting discrimination based
on race and religion had also begun with state legislatures. The pace
of enactment of sexual orientation protection between 1990 and today
resembles that of the race discrimination laws between 1945, when New
York adopted the nation's first such law, and 1963, just before the federal
statute was enacted.55 With their attention appropriately directed to
national civil rights laws, the traditional racial justice constituency
groups had little ongoing engagement with state legislatures. As a result,
the discourse of civil rights in state legislatures since the 1980s has
focused almost exclusively on LGBT issues, together with contests over
abortion laws.
The turn to the state level of lawmaking-in both courts and legislatures-has been a distinguishing characteristic of LGBT rights lawyering, and it has served the movement well. The mutual familiarity
between state lawmakers and LGBT rights advocates that has developed
since the 1980s has probably contributed significantly to legal progress
in moderate to liberal regions of the United States. On the biggest issue
of family law- marriage equality-the extent of legislative success was
dramatic. Of the twelve jurisdictions where same-sex marriage was
authorized under state law at the time of the Supreme Court decision
requiring the federal government to accept those expanded definitions
of marriage for the purpose of federal benefits, the change in law
occurred by legislative action in ten.56 Marriage equality was forced by a
judicial decision in only two states.57
Some scholars, most prominently Gerald Rosenberg,58 continue to
assert an old critique of civil rights lawyers, now adding to it the lawyers
in marriage equality cases: that they have been blind to the lack of
social progress achieved by litigation and the risk of backlash it generates. In fact, civil rights groups long ago began to develop multidimensional forms of advocacy that are not dependent on litigation.59 The
LGBT rights movement provides th e strongest refutation of Rosenberg's
arguments. Although some marriage equality litigation undoubtedly has
triggered backlash in the short term, advocates have adeptly managed a
complex overall strategy, relying on organizing and education and coordinating lawsuits with lobbying in state legislatures and even with anticipated referenda.60 Litigation is no longer seen as the rifle-shot path to
equality but rather as merely one device in an increasingly high-tech set
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of tools. Litigation, in other words, has become radically decentered in
civil rights strategy.
In this environment, LGBT lawyering groups have developed an
extraordinary level of sophistication with regard to nonjuridical modes
and technologies of advocacy. If the emblematic movement tactic during the late 1980s and early 1990s was an ACT-UP (AIDS Coalition to
Unleash Power) sit-in or demonstration,, the core tactic now is polling.
Today, LGBT groups commission their own polling, the results of which
often shape their messaging strategies, which in turn suggest the parameters of "story banks" that solicit and authorize the collection of
accounts of certain kinds of experience s, stories that one often finds
summarized in the opening portions of the complaints that initiate litigation, in legislative testimony, and in media feature stories.61 Until
recently, a nonprofit group's media strategy consisted of efforts to attract
media attention and coverage of its issues; today it is likely to be an
intentional and data-driven set of techniques to change public opinion,
the success or failure of which can be measured.
Use of new technologies of social change is not unique to the LGBT
civil rights movement,62 but LGBT groups have been early adopters of
mechanisms generated by broader technological change. One reason is
necessity: the frequency of antigay ballot initiatives has forced LGBT
groups into the electoral arena more often than other civil rights
groups. 63 This experience has required LGBT advocates to develop
more sophisticated methods for persuading voters-not simply judges
or legislators-to reject antigay arguments.
Direct electoral political battles over LGBT rights issues culminated
in the unsuccessful effort to defeat Proposition 8 in California in 2008.
Approximately 53 percent of a total of 13.4 million voters supported a
state constitutional amendment to prohibit same-sex marriage. 64 Each
side raised and spent more than $40 million, making it second only
to the presidential contest that year in the amount of money spent on
an election campaign. 65 The scale of fundraising and the nature of the
political expertise required to compete in that kind of electoral environment creates an immediate need for the capacity to play to win in the
big leagues, and its urgency simultaneously discourages any instinct to
challenge the structures of wealth that distort the electoral system. just
as civil rights groups learn from each other, so, of course, do conservatives, and this history of repeated ballot initiatives may be predictive of
continuing antiequality campaigns on other issues, such as immigration.
Combined, these interventions outside the courtroom have helped
shape new constitutional meanings of LGBT equality. In an ironic full
circle return to Rosenberg's criticism, high-stakes court challenges on
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the issue of marriage have become virtually a no-lose proposition. Messaging campaigns do not explain all of this success, and there were some
aspects of the marriage equality campaign that fell short. The litigation
to invalidate Proposition 8 succeeded but only for California; it did not
produce the nationwide ruling that plaintiffs had sought. 66 And even
in requ iring all states to allow same-sex marriage, the Supreme Court
declined to adopt heightened scrutiny in analyzing the constitutionality
of sexual orientation discrimination more generally.67 But public opinion shifts surely did pave the way for the remarkable number of lower
cour t opinions that struck down exclusionary marriage laws in the wake
of Windsor, 68 despite the lack of guidance in that opinion. 69 In the spring
of 2013, Time Magazine declared on its cover that "gay marriage [has]
already won.''7 For the marriage equality campaign, it would be only a
sligh t exaggeration to say that the Supreme Court became a very, very
important opinion poll.
These nonlitigation skills are not unique to LGBT groups, but multidimensional advocacy has been formative in its impact on relatively
newer rights organizations like the LGBT groups and on a younger generation of leaders in all groups. The by-products of new technologies
of advocacy and the blurred lines between legal advocacy and election
campaigns will shape the future dimensions of civil rights practice in
American political culture.

°

Ill. Social Change: Civil Right s + Corporate Social Responsibility
= Corporatist Civil Rights
Struggles for human rights always begin with brave men and women who stand
up, isolated, against the forces of oppression. But, in the United States, victory really
arrives on the glorious day when the people with money decide discrimination is bad
for business.
- New York Times, Feb. 26, 201471

Law is not an autonomous realm, least of all when one seeks social justice reforms. Other dimensions of movement advocacy interact with the
kinds of legal work described in the prior section. The meaning of constitutional principles and the aspiration to equality are shaped by many
actors-not only courts and legislatures, or even only those in the legal
p rofession more broadly.
One distinguishing m ark of the LGBT civil rights movement is the
extent to which the corporate business sector h as become an important
nonjuridical voice. More so than in other civil rights movements,72 gay
advocates have negotiated directly with employers to obtain internal
policies against discrimination and have enlisted corporate support to
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stress economic reasons for greater equality. Out of these efforts, a major
coalition has emerged: an alliance between LGBT rights and corporate
interests that has become one of the most effective movement resources
for combating the arguments of moral conservatives.
Again, historical context is everything. The LGBT civil rights movement grew up under and into a Reagan-Bush-Clinton-Bush-Obama corporatist political culture. Throughout that period, the political and economic dynamics of globalization weakened the power of government to
regulate multinational enterprises and to mitigate the localized externalities of downward pressure on wages and benefits. The balance of power
between business on the one hand and labor and environmental interests on the other shifted dramatically from what it was in 1964. It should
not be surprising that the significance and presumed legitimacy of business interests would be baked into any overall strategy for achieving civil
rights that essentially began during this era.
The alliance with corporate interests in the LGBT rights movement
grew out of the effort to eliminate workplace discrimination. Outside
of municipalities, usually in either large urban or university-dominated
areas, most of the early successes in securing protection came through
negotiations with large corporate employers rather than from legislation.73 As more employers agreed to adopt antidiscrimination rules, the
Human Rights Campaign began a Corporate Equality Index that itself
has become a major factor in further driving adoption of these policies,
fostering a competition among human relations and diversity professionals as they sought the 100 percent score awarded to entities that satisfied each of the HRC's indicia of "corporate equality.''74
The larger political context for this effort was the rise of a Corporate
Social Responsibility (CSR) concept within the business sector roughly
coexistent with the rise of the LGBT rights movemem.75 CSR consists
of voluntary, nonenforceable practices by which companies use methods of self-regulation to integrate social and environmental concerns in
their business operations and in their relations with stakeholders.76 The
power of internal corporate law has grown as firms have been able to
bargain with public authorities and to relocate in search of less restrictive legal regimes. Implicit in the CSR concept is recognition that corporations comprise a privatist layer of sovereignty, with internal law that
crosses traditional political boundaries of state and nation.
Antidiscrimination agreements for LGBT employees are a classic CSR
strategy. Especially in sectors such as technology and tourism, corporations have long viewed the LGBT population as an important source
of skilled labor or an important market segment for their products,
or both.77 Today, with popular support for LGBT equality increasing,
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88 percent of Fortune 500 companies have adopted policies that prohibit discrimination and provide benefits for LGBT employees?8 LGBT
employee groups exist at nearly three hundred large employers?9
The corporate-friendly approach has brought cascading benefits to
the LGBT civil rights movement, at least among elites. Most significantly, it has produced a mutually legitimating discourse that can be
deployed in multiple settings. Advocacy groups repeatedly invoke a
"business leads the way" theme in efforts to persuade Congress or other
legislatures to enact antidiscrimination protections. 80 When the leading
corporate actors in a state, region, or nation have endorsed equal treatment, it is much easier to depict companies that continue to discrirninate as laggards or outliers. Corporate support extended to marriage as
well. Amicus briefs were filed by a number of large corporate employers
in both the challenge to the "Defense of Marriage Act" and the challenge
to state laws prohibiting same-sex marriage. Employers argued that
businesses were harmed by the unnecessary complexities in personnelrelated laws caused by their inability to treat married same-sex couples
in the same way as married different-sex couples under federallaws. 81
A Wikipedia entry lists almost 125 corporations that have issued statements in support of same-sex marriage. 82
The power of corporate support for LGBT rights burst into public
view in 2014 when Arizona Governor jan Brewer vetoed legislation that
would have allowed p ersons with religious objections to same-sex marriage to decline service to gay customers. 83 Behind her decision was a
business-led lobbying effort that stressed the potential of antigay laws
to harm prospects for economic development.84 The episode illustrated
the value to LGBT rights advocates of using corporate interests to peel
off economic from social conservatives. Indeed, LGBT rights, including
marriage, seems to have become a reverse wedge issue that once fueled
support for conservative politicians but is now weakening the free
market-traditional values coalition on which the Republican Party has
depended.
There are three major costs to this alliance, however. First, it is contingent on a discourse of cultural and political sameness-that is, that the
achievement of LGBT equality would change very little in the broader
society, in family dynamics and certainly in the economic structure.85
As Patricia Cain has noted, every civil rights movement has relied on
sameness arguments to allay fears about the effects of eliminating legal
stigma, 86 but such arguments, by their very nature, tend to de-radicalize
a social movement and distance it from broader efforts to rectify injustice.
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Second, the mutual legitimation effect of an LGBT-corporate alliance
strengthens a discourse promoting privatization of social costs and risks.
In family law, for example, the tendency to shift the cost associated
with vulnerable populations (unemployed homemakers, children, the
elderly) to individual caretakers has long been criticized by feminist the orists but was largely unexamined in LGBT advocates' proposals for new
family status forms of domestic partnerships and same-sex marriage. 87
More generally, the effort to allocate to individuals the expenditures that
flow from increasingly unregulated corporate discretion in hiring, firing,
and compensation of employees has become a major theme in conservative politics in the United States.88 This development conflicts with all
but the narrowest conception of equality.
Lastly, the man-bites-dog narrative that results when well-known conservatives, such as Theodore Olson, endorse LGBT rights issues tends
to garner an outsize amount of media attention and public interest.
This can provide a powerful mechanism for breaking through media
noise and clutter to convey a message that equality is a demand with
broad support, but it can also be used to reinforce old stereotypes that
the LGBT community is almost exclusively composed of affluent white
males.

IV. The Future: Toward Antihierarchy
For years groups seeking equality for gays drew inspiration from the civil-rights
era...[After the adoption of Prop 8}, Gay campaigners concluded that their approach
had been wrong. With their talk ofdiscrimination, they had been appealing to voters'
heads.. .[The new strategy] involves persuading voters that their existing values allow
them to accept gay marriage... because same-sex couples are asking to join the institution, rather than to change it.
-The Economist, Feb. 201489

The future of the civil rights paradigm turns on what "civil rights"
means in a political and legal environment in which formal equality has
been incorporated into institutions of governance and cultural authority, although structural forms of subordination continue and even

worsen. The gains of race and gender civil rights movements have
reshuffled those hierarchies, benefiting most the women and people of
color who are socially advantaged in terms of class. Those least likely
to benefit have been persons with intersecting vectors of social disadvantage, for whom the indicia of social inequality have hardened or
condensed at the bottom of the social pyramid. The prospect that formal equality will fail to achieve social equality, which is so evident with
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regard to race and gender, 90 looms for the LGBT civil rights movement
as well.
Liberal equality discourse may provide an essential tool in a long-term
effort to more fundamentally alter patterns of social stratification. But
there is an inevitable temptation to declare victory, paired with a tendency to run out of steam (not to mention donors), when a civil rights
movement has achieved a dramatic success such as marriage. The big
question for LGBT advocates is whether, when that point is reached on
these issues, "today's civil rights movement" will take on the project of
challenging the economic and social hierarchy associated with sexuality.
The paradoxical effect of securing formal equality can be to
strengthen the subordination of those at the bottom of the pyramid.
Progress in ending sex discrimination, for example, can reinforce (and
not merely pass by) the oppression of low-income women and women
of color by creating a mutually reinforcing dynamic of invisibility.91 If
harms disproportionately affecting LGBT people of color or who have
low incomes are not challenged as such and if privileged sectors of the
LGBT community tum their attention away from a seemingly completed set of goals, the least powerful groups will become even more vulnerable. The entrenched nature of discrimination against some women
and some LGBT people not only will remain but also will worsen.
There are ideological consequences as well as material harms associated with the condensation of social hierarchy. The resilience of stratification along lines of race and poverty, in the face of civil rights progress,
creates a naturalization effect-a sense that there are intractable, irremediable causes associated with the very nature of the people who suffer
the worst that explains why they have not succeeded.
Let me close by briefly sketching two possible futures for the social
meaning of "civil rights." The first model is civil rights as a cultural commodity. LGBT equality is a global brand, grounded in the most desirable market demographic: young adults (gay and straight) who are in
the process of developing public policy loyalties, as they do product
loyalties, that they will continue to favor for the rest of their lives.
LGBT equality is a stakeholder-governed, public-private partnership. It
is both consumer friendly and a consumer durable. It combines value
and growth. It is market-friendly equality, embedded in the concepts
associated with CSR.
The second model of civil rights is grounded in egalitarianism and
the project of dismantling hierarchy. It is made visible by demographic
data documenting the LGBT individuals at greatest risk of harm, such as
low-income parents who-even if entitled to lawfully marry-routinely
engage with a variety of hostile public and private institutions. Such per-
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sons are at high risk of HIV infection, of police harassment, of incarceration, and of inadequate educations-all for reasons that are not limited
to, but are related to, their sexuality or gender identity.9 2 They are concentrated not in the well-known gay strongholds of D.C., Fort Lauderdale, and San Francisco but in San Antonio, Memphis, and Virginia
Beach. 93
One does not have to strain to identify intersectionality in such situations. Relatively advantaged LGBT people experience modified, usually mitigated systems of stratification, often sheltered by race or gender
privilege. Those without such shelters are trapped in complex hierarchies, mutually constituted by multiple vectors of subordination. Exclusions can be attacked one by one. But it is not possible to engage any
hierarchy-whether sexual, racial, or other-without addressing this
complexity. Heteronormativity is a layered set of interlocking hierarchies, not just a collection of exclusions. It is not merely straight-it has
a race, a class, and even a geography.
One of these models of civil rights-perhaps even a mixture of
both-will comprise Civil Rights 3.0.
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Toward a jurisprudence of the Civil
Rights Acts

Robin L. West

What is the nature of the "rights;' jurisprudentially, that the 1964 Civil
Rights Act1 legally prescribed? And, more generally, what is a "civil
right"? Today, lawyers tend to think of civil rights, and particularly those
that originated in the 1964 Act, as antidiscrimination rights: our "civil
rights," on this understanding, are our rights not to be discriminated
against, by employers, schools, landlords, property vendors, hoteliers,
restaurant owners, and providers of public transportation, no less than
by states and state actors, on the basis of race, gender, ethnicity, age, sexuality, or disability. Contemporary civil rights scholarship overwhelmingly reflects the same conception: our civil rights are quasiconstitutional rights to be free of discrimination in the private as well as
public world. 2 But this conventional lawyerly understanding-basically,
that "civil rights" are "antidiscrimination rights"-is clearly inadequate,
certainly with respect to civil rights generally but also, and more
tellingly, even with respect to the rights created and then protected by
the 1964 Act itself.
First, on the general point: some of the "civil rights" sought or held
across our history have not been antidiscrimination rights of any sort
at all-labor rights, welfare rights, free speech rights, and the constitutional rights of criminal defendants have all, at various times, been

Towa rd a jurisprudence of the Civil Rights Acts

championed as "civil rights," and these rights are neither logically nor
jurisprudentially tied to any conception of antidiscrimination. 3 But furthermore, even the "civil rights" that are defined and then protected
against discrimination by the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as well as by various
Civil Rights Acts both before and subsequent to it, are not, in circular
fashion, simply our rights not to be discriminated against on the basis of
impermissible characteristics. Rather, the "civil rights" of which we cannot be discriminatorily deprived, whether originating in the 1964 Act or
elsewhere, are, after all, rights to something: to vote,4 to physical security,5 to enter contracts, 6 to own, buy, or sell property,7 to legal recourse
in the aftermath of a wrong committed against us, 8 to write a will,9 to
be considered for or to hold down a job and to be paid fairly for our
labor,10 to the use of a restaurant or a hotel or a city bus," to a public education,l2 and to marry whom we love. 13 And these are just some
of the public goods that have been recognized at various times as "civil
rights," of which we cannot be deprived by discriminatory action.
Even if just that much is correct, then the "civil right" protected by all
of our Civil Rights Acts, including the 1964 one, is considerably more
complex, jurisprudentially, than the conventionally legalistic and formulaic equation of "civil rights" with "antidiscrimination rights" suggests. Minimally, the "civil right" recognized or protected by the various
Civil Rights Acts is almost invariably a multilayered right, or a "right to
a right": it is a right to not be discriminatorily deprived of some underlying right. Only the first right in that phrase "a right to a right" is the
antidiscrimination right. The second "right," though, is the underlying
civil right of which we cannot be discriminatorily deprived, and it is
both itself complex and highly variable. It might be a common law right,
such as a right to enter contracts or sell property, or a statutory right,
such as a right to vote, or simply a right to a social or public good, such as
employment or educational opportunities, or the protection of a trustworthy police force against private violence. And while we have generated a library of writing, and j urisprudence, and judicial opinions on the
nature of the first "right" in that phrase-the right not to be deprived of
various rights on the basis of race, sex, and so forth-we have devoted
much less to the second: the nature of the underlying right of which
we cannot be deprived. So what is the jurisprudential nature of that
right? What is a "civil right," jurisprudentially, both with respect to the
rights protected against discrimination by the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and more broadly? Again, and more generally, what is a "civil right"?
Oddly, I believe, and in spite of their unquestioned importance in
our contemporary public life, we are woefully short on a jurisprudential
understanding of civil rights, both with respect to the Civil Rights Act
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of 1964, whose fiftieth anniversary we celebrated last year, and more
broadly. Although we have recently seen an explosion of scholarship on
the history, or histories, of both the civil rights movement of the 1950s
through 1970s and the Civil Rights Acts they produced, 14 there has not
been, either during or following our various "legislative moments" ushering in civil rights laws, a body of scholarly work engaged in reflective
debate over the jurisprudential nature of the civil rights they sought to
win and then to protect. We simply do not have a scholarly jurisprudential canon that seeks to encompass not only the nature of the antidiscrimination norm that our various Civil Rights Acts codify but also
the nature of the substantive underlying rights that all of those rights
against discrimination protect. Legal scholars have, for better or worse,
focused on judge-made law, and particularly judge-made constitutional
law, when engaging in the work of discerning the overarching principles
of rights-based jurisprudence. Nowhere is this clearer than in the areas
of law and life touched by the Civil Rights Acts themselves. I will return
to this problem below. Here, I just want to note that for whatever reason,
our scholarship on civil rights has shortchanged the complexities of
both the Civil Rights Acts and civil rights movements and their product-civil rights-more broadly construed. We have focused our
jurisprudential scholarship almost entirely on the rights to nondiscrimination our Civil Rights Acts created. But we have neglected the need
to understand the nature of the underlying rights of access to the social
goods, systems of law, or institutions-contractual freedom and powers,
property ownership, education, employment opportunities, public
accommodation, family life, and so on-that those nondiscrimination
rights were designed to protect.
This is a neglect that matters, beyond the obvious problem that the
neglect itself fosters confusion, with disputants and debaters often talking at cross-purposes.l5 There are at least two deeper worries. First, the
lack of a jurisprudence of the Civil Rights Acts that centers the underlying civil rights, and notjust the antidiscrimination norm, likely reflects
as well as contributes to a lack of appreciation of the civil society and
of the law that facilitates it that "civil rights;' historically and today,
both depend upon and produce. We have a well-developed jurisprudential scholarship on the nature of rights, including natural rights,
human rights, legal rights, and constitutional rights. 16 And we have a
well-developed body of scholarship concerning civil society-but it is a
peculiarly legally denuded civil society that, thus far, we have studied:
it is the "civil society" of voluntary bowling leagues and private associations, often by definition set apart from or in opposition to the legal
society of the courthouse and City Ha11. 17 We do not have much, if any,
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scholarship seeking to understand the civil society structured, and facilitated, by positive law, and we have virtually none centering the nature
of our rights to participate in it.
But second, the lack of jurisprudential study of the underlying civil
rights protected by our various Civil Rights Acts throughout our history
has quite possibly skewed, and perhaps truncated, our inherited civil
rights traditions, as well as possibilities for their creative regeneration.
Civil rights, as well as the civic and participatory life they facilitate, can
be threatened not only by discriminatory private practices of the sort
prohibited by the Civil Rights Acts but by much else as well. Our natural rights to participate in family life can be threatened not only by
discriminatory state marriage law that grants rights to form families or
marriages to some but not others but also by private or intimate violence within those marriages that goes unaddressed by states, by a punitive criminal justice system that overincarcerates marriageable men for
trivial or victimless offenses, and by a lack of community support for
our caregiving obligations. Our civil rights to a healthy and physically
secure life can be threatened not only by sexually discriminatory medical treatment or racially discriminatory policing and profiling but also
by a lack of affordable health care, a lack of trustworthy police protection against private or neighborhood violence, and an unhealthy and
polluted planet. Our rights to decent employment opportunities can be
denied us not only by intentional discrimination or neutral rules with
discriminatory impacts but also by a lack of skills and skills training, jobs
outsourcing, plant relocations, capital strikes, and high unemployment.
Our rights to education are frustrated by a lack of preschool readiness
and lack of community support for parents of newborns, infants, and
toddlers as much as by racially discriminatory admissions or school districting policies. To secure these rights, then, to family life, education,
employment, and physical security (assuming for the moment we have
such rights), we do indeed need to enforce laws against discrimination.
But we need to do much else as well. The scholarly focus of the last
fifty years on the nature of discrimination and its unlawfulness, rather
than on the full array of obstacles that stand as barriers to the enjoyment
of civil rights, and without insisting on the point that discrimination is
but one such obstacle among others, has shrunk our understanding and
appreciation of our own civil rights tradition, as well as its regenerative
potential.
This chapter seeks to begin such a conversation. In Part I, I introduce,
or reintroduce, and then endorse a definition of civil rights put forward
by Thomas Paine more than two hundred years ago-well before the
idea of "nondiscrimination" had taken hold-in his famous and indeed
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iconic pamphlet Rights of Man. 18 "Civil rights," Paine argued in that
world-changing document, are, first, "natural rights"-by which he
meant that they are rights that attach by virtue of our humanity, 19 what
we today sometimes call "human rights" and what were then sometimes
called "fundamental rights." But, he went on to explain, natural rights
and civil rights are not coterminous, for two reasons. First, while natural rights attach to a man by virtue of his humanity, civil rights, Paine
argued, are those natural rights that distinctively attach not just by virtue
of his humanity but also by virtue of his "member[ship] in society."20
That is what makes "civil" rights civil. Second, and relatedly, "civil rights"
are that subset of natural rights that a man cannot enforce on his own:
rights, in Paine's own language, "to the enjoyment of which his individual power is not, in all cases, sufficiently competent." 21 Unlike the natural
rights "of the mind;' or of conscience, or of behavior that does not harm
others, Paine argued, civil rights distinctively require the presence of the
state for their perfection and enforcement. 22 Civil rights, in other words,
unlike other (noncivil) natural rights, are not rights from, but rather are
rights to: "civil rights;' distinctively, are rights to state action, to state law,
to state institutions, to a functioning government, and basically, to community. Paine's definition, I will argue, penned well before the idea of a
legal or constitutional right against discrimination had taken hold, may
provide a better account of both our oldest and our most contemporary civil rights than the modern idea of civil rights as simply rights of
nondiscrimination. But more to the point, Paine's account highlights just
the feature of civil rights-the necessity of the state, and of law, to the
perfection of the rights at the heart of civil society-that we have most
failed to center in our scholarship.
Paine's quite formal definition, however, does not give us much help
in developing the content of our civil rights, beyond his fecund and
prescient suggestion that they must include rights of "security and protection."23 Beyond reintroducing Paine, therefore, my second general
goal in the first part of this chapter will be to marry, or synthesize,
the formal definition of "civil rights" he provided with the modern and
very substantive account of the content of "human rights" propounded
by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen over the last thirty years in
their exposition of the "capabilities approach" to rights and human welfare. 24 The capabilities approach, as developed by Sen and Nussbaum, I
believe, fills the gap in a way that is resonant with Paine's overall political philosophy: we have human rights, Nussbaum and Sen argue, to
enjoy those human capabilities that are most conducive to our individual flourishing-including, for example, our "capability" for a healthy
and long life, for sociability, for intimacy, for play, for cultural and intel-
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lectual engagement, and for interaction with our natural environment. 25
Protection of these capabilities and the human flourishing they nurture may, sometimes, require that the state leave us alone and let us
develop and enjoy our capabilities according to our own lights, without interference from an overly intrusive community or censorial state
actors. Often, though-more often, in fact-the individual flourishing
that Sen and Nussbaum identify as the end of human welfare requires a
state actively promoting those fundamental capabilities that produce it.
States, therefore, sometimes have an obligation to promote and protect
those capabilities, as well as an obligation to sometimes leave them be,
and individuals have rights-human rights-to states that do both.
The various human capabilities Sen and Nussbaum identify that
require active state promotion and protection, rather than state restraint,
suggest the premises of a moral argument for Painean civil rights as well
as a foundation for at least some of the interests protected against discrimination by our Civil Rights Acts, of both centuries. At the same time,
a (modified) Nussbaum-Senian "capabilities approach" to welfare and
rights suggests a moral argument for those civil rights we might believe
we should have but do not yet fully enjoy: rights to decent work that is
safe, meaningful, and fairly compensated; rights to greater community
support for parents caring for young children or grown children caring
for sick or dying parents; a high-quality education that prepares us for
citizenship as well as gainful employment; a trustworthy and effective
police force that protects us against violence without violating our rights
of privacy and dignity; and so on. I will therefore try to supplement
Paine's bare-boned account of the political logic of civil rights-how
and where they fit, so to speak, in the pantheon of natural, fundamental, legal and constitutional rights-with Nussbaum and Sen's rich, substantive account of human welfare and what states are obligated to do
to promote it. This blended account, I will conclude, suggests what is
distinctive about "civil rights" against the backdrop of both our legal
rights and human rights. Against the former, civil rights are those legal
rights that promote fundamental human capabilities and protect our
enjoyment of them against unjust impediments, including public and
private discrimination. Against the latter, civil rights are those natural
rights that, more specifically, attach by virtue of membership in society, which a man cannot enforce on his own and therefore require active
state involvement for their protection, much as Paine argued two centuries ago.
Putting this together, I will ultimately argue in the first part below that
"civil rights" are rights to be free of unjust impediments-such as, as per
the 1964 Act, public or private discriminatory practices-to the under-
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lying rights we all should enjoy to some set of legally constructed or
legally protected social goods or institutions: private property, contractual freedom and powers, dignified and fairly compensated labor, public accommodation and transportation, high-quality public education,
civil marriage, family life, and religious practice, among others. These
civil rights and the underlying rights both facilitate participation in civic
life and permit us to enjoy our most fundamental human capabilities.
So my claim will be that "civil rights," jurisprudentially, are those rights
that give us access to the legal apparatus of civil life, which in turn facilitates the enjoyment of basic, universally shared human capabilities. I
will sometimes call my account a Painean- Nussbaumean, or Painean for
short, account of the jurisprudential nature of a civil right. In the first
part of this chapter, I will argue that the Painean account illuminates
features of the Civil Rights Act and shows its continuity with other civil
rights we possess or should possess, as well as with civil rights movements from our history.
In Part II, I elaborate a bit on my constructed Painean conception of
civil rights by contrasting civil rights, so understood, with what I believe
is an emerging and new paradigm of constitutional rights, which I have
called elsewhere "exit rights." 26 These relatively new and newly constitutionally recognized "exit rights," I will argue briefly here and have argued
at length elsewhere, are not classically individual rights, justified on traditionally liberal grounds; they are not simply rights to enjoy some measure of privacy, or religious freedom, or freedom of conscience, or to
individuate ourselves in some other way, within civil society. Rather,
exit rights-which include, inter alia, the rights to own and use a gun in
self-defense, to procure an abortion, to die, to homeschool one's children, and to not purchase health insurance, as well as, possibly, the rights
of religious corporations or nonprofit entities to exemptions from the
mandate of antidiscrimination laws-are radically libertarian rights to
effectively ''exit" civil society, the social contract, or some substantial
part of it. Our "civil rights," understood in the Painean sense, by contrast,
can fairly be called "rights to enter" that compact or to garner the benefit
of it, and to do so, specifically, through accessing some aspect of its legal
architecture. The exit rights increasingly protected by the Constitution,
as construed by our courts, are rights to exit the same civil society to
which civil rights protect entrance. Constitutional rights and civil rights,
then, contrary to the claims of a number of constitutional law theorists,
are not only not the same thing and not mutually constitutive of our
"fundamental law," but they also are more often than not, these days, on
a collision course.
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The contrast between civil and constitutional rights that I will explore
in Section II below is at heart aesthetic and ethical. Our relatively new
array of constitutionally inscribed "exit rights" have, I will suggest, a
tragic arc. As in the last act of a classic or Shakespearean tragedy, their
exercise often culminates with characters splayed dead across the stage:
individuals exercising their rights to die, to kill, and to abort are, after
all, severing earthly as well as communitarian coils; they are all dealing
in death. Even when not lethal, however, the exercise of an exit right
culminates almost invariably in the spectacle of an isolated individual,
shrouded in his various constitutional rights to be left alone, with the
community from which he is so willfully estranged in shatters. The
intruder is killed by the homeowner, rather than captured by a trustworthy constable; the fetus is expunged, rather than borne into a supportive
community; the child is educated in isolation at home, rather than at a
public school and in a community of peers; the suicidal patient is dead,
rather than cared for in hospice. Civil rights have, by contrast, what I call
a "comedic arc." As in Shakespearean and classical comedy, the exercise
of a civil right culminates in a communal ritual or event, such as a couple's wedding celebration, where they are joined by their community's
representatives of faith and state, or a new day in a well-functioning
and integrated schoolroom or workplace, or the cure of an illness and
restoration to health, financed by a community of coinsureds who have
spread and shared risks, or the joyous arrival of a new birth accompanied by responsible attendant care and not threatened by the specter of
a lost job. In the last act of a comedy, the state as well as the community
and its worth are reconfirmed, and the individual's role within it, as well
as his distinctiveness from it, is celebrated. Part II below draws the obvious inference that centering comedic civil rights rather than the tragic
constitutional rights we have obsessed over for the last thirty years, in
our understanding of rights and in our ongoing attempts to take them
seriously, might give us a more balanced jurisprudence and a sliver of
hope for a more balanced community likewise.
The conclusion revisits the Trayvon Martin killing and its aftermath in
light of some of these distinctions.
I. Tom Paine's Civil Rights

According to an influential and much-quoted definition provided in
Thomas Paine's canonical late-eighteenth-century essay Rights of Man,
"civil rights" are those natural rights that are owed by a government to
the people-all of them-by virtue of their membership in civil society.27 "Civil rights," Paine held, are a subspecies of "natural rights"-a
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claim repeated and embraced, indeed insisted upon-by proponents
of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, three-quarters of a century after Paine
wrote.28 Natural rights, in tum, are rights we enjoy solely by virtue
of our humanity; we hold them regardless of the accident of the geographic details of our birth. We hold them against our own sovereign,
whether or not he recognizes them, and would hold them likewise
against any sovereign. And we aU hold them, Paine thought-slaves and
American Indians no less than free men. 29 That "natural rights" underpinning of our civil rights and civil rights tradition is no historical relic;
it is, rather, a vital connection between both the reconstruction and revolutionary era use of the phrase and our modern antidiscrimination law
today. From the very beginning, civil rights have been grounded in natural rights, meaning they are owed everyone, without regard to race, sex,
disability, and so on-again, they are owed by virtue of one's humanity.
By virtue of their origin as natural rights, civil rights have always connoted some version of an antidiscrimination norm.
Civil rights were not, however, viewed by Paine and his contemporaries as coterminous with the natural rights man possesses by virtue
of his humanity, when both phrases were part of the ordinary vocabulary of lawyers and constitutionalists. Rather, they were a subset, with
two characteristics differentiating them from the larger class of natural
rights, of which, again, they are a part (all civil rights are natural rights,
all natural rights, however, are not civil rights). First, civil rights, unlike
other natural rights, are rights that attach by virtue of one's "member[ship] in society," rather than solely by virtue of one's humanity. But
second, although civil rights originate as natural rights, Paine explained,
unlike some of those natural rights, such as rights to the mind and conscience or rights to behavior that does not harm others, "civil rights" are
those rights that cannot be perfected by individuals standing alone, so to
speak, or outside civil society and law:30
Natural rights are those (rights] which appertain to man in right of his existence. Of this kind are all the intellectual rights, or rights of the mind, and
also all those rights of acting as an individual for his own comfort and happiness, which are not injurious to the natural rights of others. Civil rights
are those which appertain to man in right of h is being a member of society.
Every civil right has for its foundation, some natural right pre-existing in the
individual, but to the enjoyment of which his individual power is not, in all
cases, sufficiently competent. Of this kind are all those which relate to security and protection.3l

Civil rights, then, to the founding generation, at least if Paine's understanding was representative, were natural rights that require, distinctively, civil society, including both positive law and legal institutions
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for their perfection. Unlike other natural rights, we cannot enforce civil
rights on our own. We need the affirmative assistance of positive law. So
defined, "civil rights" included, for Paine, quintessentially, those rights
pertaining to protection of the physical security of the individual. The
security of and protection of the physical body are examples, then,
of foundational rights that are only imperfectly, at best, enforceable
through self-help. We "trade in" our natural rights to self-protection and
security, so to speak, for the "civil right" of the protection of our physical
security by the state.
How does Paine's account of "civil rights"-penned long before the
Civil Rights Acts of either of the two centuries following and before
the idea of antidiscrimination as an actionable wrong had gained traction-as "natural rights" that "appertain to man in right of his being
a member of society" but "of which his individual power is not, in all
cases, sufficiently competent" 32 stand up, as a jurisprudential account of
civil rights, both those passed into law fifty years ago and those in various statutory provisions before and since? Better, I think, than our current lawyerly equation of "civil rights" with "antidiscrimination rights."
At least echoes of Paine's definition can be heard not only in the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 but also in virtually all of the various Civil Rights Acts
and movements of both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Thus,
according to the framers and advocates of the seminal Civil Rights Act
of 1866, "civil rights" include rights to enter and enforce contracts; to
buy, hold, rent, and sell property; to sue, be parties, or give evidence in
judicial proceedings; and to enjoy the protection of the state and its laws
pertaining to the security of persons and property33-all of which readily fit Paine's description of civil rights as that subset of natural rights
that should attach by virtue of membership in society and that require
legal definition and institutions to perfect. These "civil rights," as they
were then called (in part to distinguish them from "political rights," such
as rights to vote or serve on juries) clearly required positive law for their
perfection-the power to make and enforce contracts requires contract
law, enjoyment of property obviously requires property law, rights to
sue and give evidence require the law of procedure, rights pertaining to
the security of persons and property require the criminal law, and so
forth. As such, these civil rights, which had long been granted by law
to white men through the combined effect of common law or statute,
should, according to the framers of the nineteenth -century Civil Rights
Act of 1866, be granted to African Americans as well. 34
The Civil Rights Act of 1871, one of the "enforcement acts" passed in
the wake of the Reconstruction Amendments and popularly known as
the Ku Klux Klan Act, explicitly added personal security from various
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private conspiracies to commit, among other wrongs, acts of domestic
violence to the list of civil rights to be enforced by the federal government, rather than state militias.35 Here too, the extension fits Paine's
understanding. The civil and natural right to be protected against private violence had been granted to some by the criminal laws prohibiting
it and their enforcement by state authorities, but that protection had
not been extended to the protection of the freed slaves against private
conspiracies contemplating violence (such as lynchings) against them;
thus the need for the Ku Klux Klan Act. The civil right to protection
against private violence, according to the framers of that Act, must be
extended to freed slaves. For the authors of the constitutionally doomed
Civil Rights Act of 1875, "civil rights" also included the right to use public
accommodations such as hotels and restaurants, to employ public transportation, and to enjoy and participate in public amusements such as
in theatres. 36 Here as well, these rights to participate sociably in these
public spaces of civil society, which attach by virtue of membership in
that society, require law for their creation and enjoyment, and the Act
of 1875 created a nondiscrimination right to enjoy those participatory
rights. The 1875 Act as well, then, fits Paine's definition. The major Civil
Rights Acts of the nineteenth century all put into law an inclusive, universalist, and profoundly Painean impulse: to ensure that civil rights-to
contract, own property, sue for private wrongs, enjoy the state's protection against violence, and make use of public accommodations-that
had been granted to some would be guaranteed to all, conditioned solely
on one's membership in civil society rather than on one's racial heritage
or one's earlier identification as free or slave.
In the twentieth century, the phrase took on new meanings but nevertheless held close to the jurisprudential core of Paine's definition. Virtually all of our twentieth-century civil rights-both those recognized in
law and those still fought over-can easily be described as natural rights
that attach, or should attach, by virtue of both one's humanity and one's
membership in civil society but that cannot be enforced by an individual
standing alone. Thus, as told in Risa Colubotf's groundbreaking scholarship from ten years ago,37 but as intimated as well in much of William
Forbath's early work,38 the idea of "civil rights" in the post-Lochner era
included, foundationally, labor rights, including not only rights to be
free of peonage and involuntary servitude, derived directly from th e
Thirteenth Amendment, but also, eventually, the right to join a union
and to strike, as well as rights to minimum wages and safe work conditions.39 Participation in the labor economy as a free and equal citizen, Coluboff shows, was viewed as key to a shared civic life, according
to the New Deal-inspired, Justice Department- housed lawyers of the
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1940s Civil Rights Section, who were responsible for giving content and
meaning to the "civil rights" they were charged to enforce.40 This usage
continued in popular discourse throughout much of the century: as late
as 1968, Martin Luther King himself spoke of rights to jobs, to strike, to
organize, and to unionize as "civil rights," and scores of labor activists
since have followed suit.41
In a now much-studied history, during the middle and second half
of the twentieth century, the content of "civil rights" shifted from labor
rights per se to rights of minorities to enjoy employment and educational opportunities free of discrimination, and it was during this time
that the lawyerly identification of "civil rights" with "antidiscrimination rights" apparently took hold, at least according to historians of the
era.42 Here as well, though, the underlying civil rights-to employment
and education opportunities-no less than the underlying nineteenthcentury civil rights of contract, property, security, and access to civil justice-are fairly described as natural rights owed to individuals by virtue
of their membership in civil society and cannot be enforced by individuals standing alone. Fair employment and decent education both are
social institutions that are heavily dependent upon an array oflaws, both
statutory and common, for their realization. In the last few decades,
by dint of at least occasional if not common usage, the phrase "civil
rights" is sometimes understood as including various statutorily or constitutionally created rights that facilitate family life, such as the "right
to marry" without regard to sexual orientation;43 the right to family or
medical leave from work necessitated by the birth of a child or the illness of a family member, as protected by the Family Medical Leave
Act (FMLA);44 the right to be free of intimate violence, as protected by
the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA); 45 rights derived from various sources to a high-quality as well as integrated public education, as
imperfectly echoed in statutes such as No Child Left Behind (NCLB)46
and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA);47 as well as a
right to health care, the existence of which is strongly suggested by the
Affordable Care Act (ACA).48 Here too, the underlying natural rights-to
family, parentage, marriage, safe intimacy, quality education, and access
to health care-are owed to all of us by virtue of societal membership.
And here as well, they are rights that cannot be enforced by any individual without the aid of considerable positive law. They all look like
Painean civil rights.
Thus, all of these early, mid-, and late twentieth and early twenty-firstcentury civil rights laws, or, in some cases, still unfinished civil rights
campaigns, recognize, create, advocate for, or protect civil rights that
loosely fit Paine's definition. Most, although not all, protect those civil
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rights against some form of race, sex, disability, age, or sexuality discrimination. What they all do, though, is protect various civil rights
against some sort of unjust social ill-either discrimination, poverty,
joblessness, lack of insurance, private violence, or unequal allocations of
unpaid intimate labor, with its consequent disparate impacts in workplaces-that in turn hampers enjoyment of underlying civil rights. In
all of them , the underlying "civil right" protected against these pernicious forces is a right to engage or participate in some aspect of civil
society-employment, education, marriage and family life, access to
health care, physical security and the mobility that goes with it, contract exchanges, and ownership of property-that is in turn facilitated
through legal processes. And in all of them, again echoing Paine, the
underlying right that is being protected, extended, or guaranteed is not
simply natural, although it is that- a right that should attach to one by
virtue of one's humanity-but it is also, distinctively, civil-it attaches or
should attach by virtue of one's membership in society.
Let me try to extract four definitional principles of the jurisprudential
nature of a "civil right" from this application of Paine's definition of
civil rights to the examples surveyed above, of the rights protected by
our various Civil Rights Acts. First: a civil right is a natural right, meaning it is a right that attaches by virtue of one's humanity. In contemporary terms, we might restate the same point in this way, drawing on Sen
and Nussbaum's universalist account of human well-being: civil rights,
like all natural rights, protect or nurture our fundamental "human capabilities"-the capabilities we have, by virtue of being human, for long
and healthy lives, for cultural and intellectual engagement, for play, for
interacting with our natural environments, and so on-enjoyment of
which are the preconditions, universally, for living a good life.49 Some
of those human capabilities, of course, are nurtured by familial direction during childhood and then furthered and directed by individual
effort. They require nothing more than benign neglect from the state
for their flowering. Some of them are also, though, furthered by social
institutions and the laws that structure them, and some of them are fully
dependent on those social institutions and laws.50 Thus, our capability
for health and longevity is furthered not only by a sensible diet and
plenty of exercise growing up in a healthy household but also by access
to health care throughout life.51 Our capability for mobility and physical freedom is furthered not only by strong limbs developed by natural and healthy maturation but also by protection against violence and
the policing that provides it; our capability for intimacy not only by the
flowering of private lives that seek it and the emotional health that sustains it but also by the promise of a family life that will be protected by
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sound policing against external threat and internal abuse; our capability for sociability not only by a natural capacity for language but also
by access to our legally structured public accommodations and public
spaces; and our capability for a stimulating mental life in adulthood not
only by being left alone to discover (or not) Pythagorean theorems on
our own but also by a high-quality public education, with sound curriculum and pedagogy and the law that structures it. The "civil right," in all
of these cases, is the right to access those institutions and to enjoy the
laws that structure them, which protect and nurture these natural capabilities. The various Civil Rights Acts, in turn, provide that those rights
cannot be discriminatorily denied.
The 1964 Civil Rights Act itself, of course, directly and explicitly guarantees rights to some of the legal structures that facilitate various capabilities, notably, for employment opportunities, education, sociability,
and community. These capabilities are quite directly furthered by fair
jobs offered at nondiscriminatory wages, the hospitality of restaurants
and hotels and the convenience and mobility of public transportation,
decent educational opportunities, and the buying and selling of property to allow for both mobility and choice of residence and also the
enjoyment or production of consumer goods. The same relation holds,
though, for our newer civil rights. The Affordable Care Act directly protects, through a complex regime of rights and responsibilities, the individual capability to live a healthful life,52 while NCLB and the IDEA-53
protect, again through rights, the fundamental capacities we all share
for exploring the world and enjoying a lively mental and cultural life.
The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)54 encourages our capabilities
for both work and family, and state gun safety laws and the Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA)55 aim to do the same for our capabilities for
intimacy, mobility, physical security, safe sociability, and freedom from
fear. All of these are human capabilities that are essential to a good life,
on Nussbaum and Sen's account, and all of these capabilities are protected through the social and civil life that law and society both aim to
structure. Our civil rights can be understood as the rights to enjoy the
fruits of all of that law, and our Civil Rights Acts can be understood as
laws that guarantee that those civil rights will not be discriminatorily
denied.
My second principle also tracks Paine: "civil rights" are natural rights
that attach not only by virtue of man's humanity but also by virtue of
his "member[ship] in society." Briefly: civil rights center our rights to
participate in community rather than rights to be free from it. Professor Rebecca Zeitlow is entirely right, for just this reason, to refer to the
antidiscrimination rights created by the 1964 Civil Rights Act as "rights
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of belonging."56 Antidiscrimination rights that attach by virtue of one's
"m ember[ship] in society," as Paine put the point, are "rights of belonging," in Zeitlow's near-biblical usage.
The point can, however, be substantially broadened beyond Zeitlow's
intended meaning. It is not only the antidiscrimination rights created
by the 1964 Act that can be fruitfully described as "rights of belonging"
for two reasons. First, the underlying civil rights protected against discrimination by both the 1964 Civil Rights Act as well as the various Civil
Rights Acts that came after it are themselves "rights of belonging." They
are all rights to "belong to" or participate in various communities: communities of employers and employees, of landlords and tenants, of buyers and sellers, of students, of teachers and administrators, of neighbors,
and of officials in polling places. The Acts protect the civil rights of
workers, buyers, sellers, tenants, voters, citizens, students, teachers, producers, and consumers to participate in these various communal workplaces, neighborhoods, markets, schools, city halls, courthouses, sites
of public gathering and transportation, and voting sites and to do so
through accessing the legal forms, rules, and entitlements that structure those locales. As Zeitlow argues, the nondiscrimination right those
Acts create brings people together in real space and time. 57 They do not
just create an abstract right in an individual to be free of an invidious
discriminatory intention in the minds of state actors: the antidiscrimination rights originating in the Civil Rights Acts prohibit policies that
adversely impact actual rates of participation and encourage or mandate affirmative actions and related remedies that aim directly for more
inclusive workplaces and neighborhoods. But the same is true of the
underlying civil rights themselves. The civil rights protected against discrimination by the Civil Rights Acts, in other words, and not just the
antidiscrimination norm itself, concern the terms of our actual communal interactions with each other; they are not about the terms of our
individual relationship with the minds of state actors. They aim to bring
us together contractually, educationally, civilly, and so on. The aim of
those laws in toto, then, is a participatory community, by virtue of not
only the antidiscrimination norm but also the underlying rights. All of
those rights seek to build trust between classes of strangers once indifferent or implacably hostile, and all do so, toward the end of strengthening the community's civic bonds.
Zietlow's provocative metaphor-that the civil rights of the Civil
Rights Acts are "rights of belonging"58-can be extended in a second
direction as well. Other rights won or fought for as "civil rights" in our
history, outside the parameters of those Acts, and whether protected
against the pernicious effects of discrimination or some other social ill,
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can also be described as "rights of belonging." The civil right to form a
labor union and to decent wages for safe labor, for example, prompted
by the labor struggles of the 1910s, 1920s, and 1930s, were "rights of
belonging," aiming for a more decent, fair, and democratically participatory workplace. Those rights contrasted-and in ways that parallel
the contrast between the constitutional and statutory antidiscrimination
norms-with the bare and sterile right to "individual liberty" presupposed by rights to contract: contract rights, at best, create freer individuals, unbound by paternalistic states and empowered, at least in theory, to
set terms and conditions of their own individual employment by virtue
of their power to exit.
The Family and Medical Leave Act directly aims to strengthen actual
communities in the home and in the workplace by pooling the costs of
early infant care or the care of sick family members, and the ACA likewise strengthens ties of responsibility among those who share risks in
insurance pools. Gun control laws aim to build on mutual trust rather
than rely on mutually assured destruction-styled individual antagonism
to protect us each against the threat of violence posed by each other,
and VAWA aims to protect physical security similarly, toward the end of
enhancing the protection of women's mobility and safety in the communities of home and civil life. NCLB- and IDEA-styled laws aim for
stronger communities, both in schools and in neighborhoods that indirectly benefit from the floor of quality they establish, rather than leaving
parents and their children to their own individualistically fashioned
means, needs, and desires. Some of these laws can be (and have been)
fairly described as antidiscrimination laws-VAWA corrects prior discriminatory policing policies, FMLA corrects an indirect form of gender
discrimination on the job, and IDEA corrects for prejudicial educational
policies against children with learning disabilities. But they obviously
cannot be simply described as antidiscrimination laws, and they might
not be best described in that way. VAWA most directly targets violence
against women, not discrimination against them; IDEA aims to educate,
not eradicate invidious distinctions; and FMLA likewise directly aims
to support parents, rather than abolish discrimination against women
on the job. All of these laws, whether they can fairly be described as
antidiscrimination norms, directly aim to strengthen civic, communal,
or neighborly bonds.
Third: civil rights distinctively aim to protect those individual fundamental capabilities that are facilitated by law and that, as per Paine,
cannot be perfected or enforced by the individual standing alone. The
"civil right" is a positive right of access to the laws, legal structures, legal
forms, and legal entitlements that in turn protect or nurture funda-
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mental capabilities that cannot be protected without societal and civil
interaction, encouragement, or involvement. So the civil rights acts of
both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries empower individuals who
would be otherwise barred by dint of private discrimination from various social institutions that depend upon civil society, and its law, for
their very definition: buying and selling property, contracting for and
then occupying hotel rooms, eating in restaurants, and working at jobs
under the same terms as white coworkers.
Likewise, the Accordable Care Act protects the human capabilities
of health and longevity through pooling risk and thereby ensuring
improved health, which is facilitated not by individual effort but by an
intricate and interpersonal jurisprudence interweaving statute, contract,
and property law. Gun safety laws and the Violence Against Women
Act protect the individual capabilities of safety, intimacy, and mobility
by seeking to limit the isolating fears and inhibitions associated with
excessive private violence and do so through a set of laws and legal
institutions, rather than through arming everyone or engaging in exhortations toward individual empowerment. The Family and Medical Leave
Act protects individual capabilities for both work and family life, not
through cheerleading heroically individualized parenting-exhorting us
all to "lean in"-but through mandated employer-provided assistance
with the costs of child care. The underlying individual capabilities in all
of these cases require legal structures, law, and social institutions, not
just unimpeded individual initiative. Without the ACA, our ability to
live a healthy life is frustrated by poverty that prevents the purchase of
insurance; without FMLA, our ability to care for dependents and remain
employed-our ability to participate in both family and work life-is
hampered by our inability to share the burden of caring for newborns;
without gun control laws, our ability to move freely through our neighborhoods is hampered by our fears for our own physical security; without education laws, our abilities to participate in high culture as well as
in an educated workforce and public sphere is severely limited by ignorance and illiteracy. We cannot do any of this on our own, basically, and,
per Paine, that is where and why civil rights enter the picture.
Finally, civil rights are aspirational rather than positivistic. They are
not a listing of what the state has provided through law. Rather, they are
rights the state should protect, even if it does not. The positivistic civil
rights we have, in other words, are an imperfect and incomplete recordation of the civil rights we are owed. Thus, while we have perfected,
more or less, the right to contract, which the 1866 Civil Rights Act aimed
to guarantee to freed slaves as well as white men, we have clearly not
perfected, in our labor law, a fully recognized legal right to good and
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decently paid labor.59 We may have a "civil right," then, to a decentjob
at decent wages, but we clearly do not have a legal right to one. Quite
the contrary: the antidiscrimination right to employment opportunities
exists against the backdrop of an employment-at-will regime that in fact
guarantees very much the opposite. Likewise, we may have a "civil right"
to a high-quality education, as evidenced in part by the rhetoric and justifications given our rights to "individualized educational plans" if we
suffer disabilities, our rights "not to be left behind" if we suffer impoverished school placements, and the inclusion of a constitutional right to a
good education in most state constitutions, which guarantees some measure of intrastate-although not interstate-equality. But we do not have
a secure and legally recognized legal right to a high-quality education
across the board. We may have a civil right to health care, as evidenced
in part by a right we now have to purchase insurance at reasonable rates
under the Affordable Care Act, but that is obviously a highly contingent
as well as contested and vulnerable right: we do not have a robust legally
recognized right to either health or health care. We have various legal
rights under the Violence Against Women Act, but we do not yet have
anything like a full recognition of a civil right to be free of intimate violence. Yet the civil rights to employment, education, safe intimacy, and
health are nevertheless the aspirational rights that we "have," even if only
imperfectly secured by these statutes.
Now, let me contrast this conception of civil rights-Paine's understanding, basically-with the conventional and truncated understanding
of a civil right that I believe wrongly dominates our civil rights conversations. Civil rights, as I believe they should be defined, facilitate forms
of individual participation in the civic community that promote fundamental individual capabilities, such as our capabilities for intimacy,
work, physical security, health, engagement in mental and cultural life,
and neighborliness, and they do so through guaranteeing access to the
laws that structure the civic institutions that promote or protect them.
Rights to contract, property, employment, and so on facilitate participation in aspects of civic life that enhance our individual capabilities for
work, family, health, and sociability. Civil rights to nondiscrimination
guarantee th at access to those rights is equally shared, regardless of race
and gender. This much of the Paine an view is consistent with what I have
labeled the conventional view.
The differences, however, are significant. First, and as I have stressed
throughout, the Painean conception, unlike the traditional, centers
rather than ignores the content of the underlying civil rights protected
by the antidiscrimination norm: rights to contract, employment opportunities, education, and so on. Second, the Painean conception is aspira-
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tional, meaning rooted in natural as well as positive law: the civil rights
we have are those rights we should have, not just the rights we have
already won. Our civil rights are not exhausted by the rights to contract, property, employment, and educational opportunities protected
by extant Civil Rights Acts but also include rights to marriage, physical
security, safe intimacy, health and longevity, participation in family life,
and our capacity for meaningful work, all of which are intimated but
nevertheless only imperfectly protected by existing law. Third, and as
I will elaborate below, civil rights, so understood, are neither constitutional rights nor quasi-constitutional rights: their recognition might
be necessary to further particular constitutional guarantees, but their
meaning, their reach, and their jurisprudential implications are not
defined or limited by those guarantees or the constitutional texts that
provide them. They are determined by our nature, not by our law, constitutional or otherwise. Fourth, "civil rights" so understood are rights to
the state support, state law, and state institutions that are necessary to
their enjoyment. Under the Painean view as I have constructed it here,
this positivity is a central feature of those rights definitionally rather
than an awkward and contingent feature that clumsily contrasts with
the overwhelming negativity of the constitutional rights with which civil
rights are often grouped under the traditional view.
Last, the barriers to the full development of our capabilities that relate
to community participation and that require law for their perfection, on
the Painean conception, do not end with discrimination, either public or
private. Poverty, poor education, poor health care, and vulnerability to
violence are also barriers. Laws that seek to counter those barriers, no
less than laws that seek to counter discrimination, on this understanding of the rights at the heart of "civil rights;' are core, not peripheral,
examples of Civil Rights Acts. Collectively, civil rights laws all guarantee
rights to which we are entitled by virtue of our membership in society.
Some, but not all, do so by providing "rights to those rights" against private or public discrimination. They all, though, confer rights to participate in civic structures that are products oflaw: public education, public
markets in insurance, secure and safe unarmed communities protected
by a trustworthy police force, and structured and legally mandated support in the aftermath of a child's birth. Laws that do so, such as the
VAWA, ACA, NCLB, IDEA, FLSA, and FEMA, whether or not they aim at
discriminatory public or private conduct, are also, quintessentially, civil
rights laws.
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II. Constitutional and Civil Rights: One Contrast
Are civil rights, both those protected by the Civil Rights Acts and civil
rights more generally, best understood as constitutional or quasiconstitutional rights? A number of commentators over the last ten years,
including Bruce Ackerman in his Holmes lectures on the subject, have
suggested, or argued, as much.60 It is easy to see why this collapsing of
civil and constitutional rights is a prudentially attractive suggestion: if
the passage of the Civil Rights Act can be regarded as an extended constitutional moment and civil rights, therefore, as constitutional rights,
then neither the courts nor subsequent congresses should trim them,
cut them back, repeal them, or find them unconstitutional for any but
the gravest of reasons. Constitutionalizing them, in effect, gives them
some measure of permanence as well as stature against potentially hostile future configurations of congresses and courts. It is also a doctrinally
logical suggestion, particularly if we think of civil rights as antidiscrimination rights: understood as antidiscrimination rights, civil rights, like
the Court's equal protection doctrine, are attempts to give content to
the general promises of equality embedded in the Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment. And antidiscrimination is now the heart of the
Court's equal protection doctrine. So: if civil rights are antidiscrimination rights, and antidiscrimination rights are constitutional rights,
then, ergo, civil rights must be constitutional rights, or at least quasiconstitutional rights, as well.
It is important to note that the doctrinal syllogismjust spelled out does
not work: even if the framers of the Civil Rights Acts were reinterpreting section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment in devising rights of antidiscrimination, it by no means follows that that is all they were doing. And
indeed, it is not all they were doing, as I hope I have already shown.
There are, however, prudential reasons as well to resist what is essentially a rhetorical and strategic conflation of civil rights on the one hand
with constitutional rights on the other. The major reason is simply this:
even if constitutional and civil rights are overlapping categories-some
civil rights are also constitutional rights, and vice versa-and even
though civil rights also target the inequality prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment, which of course they do, nevertheless, there are
vast differences between civil rights, at least on the Painean conception
I have outlined above and particularly our contemporary constitutional
rights. Those differences are simply obscured, or muted, if we blur the
distinctions between them. Once we include within the scope of "civil
rights" the underlying rights those civil rights acts protect-if, that is,
we examine civil rights in the Painean sense as to include the rights
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protected against discrimination rather than just the antidiscrimination
right itself-it is clear that civil rights contrast, far more than they compare, with constitutional rights and particularly with the newly discovered constitutional rights that have been recognized, argued for, or contemplated over the last twenty or so years. Painean civil rights and constitutional rights so understood are not only, then, not co-constitutive of
constitutional law. They are also, increasingly, on a collision course, and
it might be wise not to obscure that fact. Let me just draw out this contrast.
The civil rights I have focused on in this chapter-both the historic
nineteenth-century civil rights to enjoy property, contract, physical
security, and public accommodations, and rights to sue for wrongs, and
also our modern civil rights to a high-quality publicly funded education, family and medical leave, access to health insurance, trustworthy
police protection against intimate, private, or neighborhood violence,
rights to marry, and rights to decent labor and employment opportunities-are all rights to be included in a participatory public life. As noted
above, Professor Zeitlow calls the antidiscrimination rights the Acts created "rights of belonging"; I would say, I think more inclusively, that
the civil rights protected by those antidiscrimination rights are rights
toenter. They are rights to enter schoolhouses, workplaces, homes, marriages, neighborhoods, and so on. Understood as such, civil rights contrast-not compare-with a group of constitutional rights that cover
much of the same lived geography; that have been sought, recognized,
or argued for over the last thirty years; and that I have elsewhere called
"rights to exit": the still-contested but increasingly recognized constitutional right to homeschool one's children; 61 the constitutional right to
die 62 and the right to not buy health insurance; 63 the Second Amendment right to own a gun and use it in self-defense; 64 the ever-embattled
constitutional right to procure an abortion; 65 and, most recently, the
right of religious schools to exemptions from antidiscrimination law
for the hiring of their "ministerial" teachers66 and the right of religious
employers to exemptions from the ACA to protect the sensitivities of
conscience. 67 The contrast between the civil right to enter and the constitutional right to exit can be drawn most sharply one by one. Thus,
the civil right to public education, in contrast to the constitutional right
to withdraw one's children from school and homeschool them, reflects
values of shared sacrifice and common purpose, both in the ways in
which it is funded and in the content of what is conveyed. The civil right
is a right to enter a public world of education, while the constitutional
right is a right to exit it. The civil right to unpaid leave during a child's
infancy is aimed at permitting a parent to enter a familial and parental
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relation rather than providing a constitutional right to exit such a relation through abortion. It imposes a responsibility on the community
of shareholders, customers, and co-employees for the shared burden of
the costs of the care required to nurture newborns or sick family members, rather than an individual right to avoid those costs by aborting the
fetus. Again, it is a right to enter a world of shared responsibility for parenting, while the constitutional right is a right to exit both the biological relationship with the fetus and with other potential caregivers. The
civil rights to physical security implied by VAWA and decent gun control
laws create a community of trust and shared interest among community members who have laid down their arms and a state's police force,
rather than a distrust of either the competency or the desires of the
police to provide that protection, reflected in the Second Amendment's
right to arms. The civil right is a right to enter that social compact of
protection for forbearance, while the constitutional right is a right to exit
it. The civil righ t to health care spreads the burden of sickness and illness
over a community through the mechanism of shared risk rather than
on an individual's constitutional right to either self-insure, self-help, or
commit suicide. The civil right to health care is a right to enter a civil
world of shared risk, cross-subsidizing insurance, and, at the end of life,
communal hospice care, while constitutional rights to die and to refuse
insurance arc rights to exit just those worlds. And of course, the civil
rights to nondiscrimination-the rights of belonging, as Zeitlow dubs
them-protect rights to enter employment and education institutions,
while the "freedom of the church" now being pressed by scholars and
to some extent by courts protects the rights of churches and the schools
and hospitals they sponsor to exit those laws, through blanket exemptions and various "ministerial exceptions." In each of these examples, the
civil right, unlike the constitutional one, not only envisions a community constituted by the civil right to enter but also rests on an assumption of trust and common purpose between the individual holder of the
civil right and his co-citizens-parents, teachers, neighbors, and taxpayers sharing the burden of educating children; employers, coworkers, and
customers of an enterprise as partners in the financing and support of
new parents; a community of insured individuals and medical professionals sharing the burdens and risks of sickness of each member-and
between neighborhoods and police empowered to minimize violence in
responsible and humane ways.
In other work,68 I have put forward the claim that these constitutional
"exit rights" represent the first wave of an emerging new paradigm
of constitutional individual rights. Unlike earlier First, Fourteenth, and
Fourth Amendment rights valorized during the first two-thirds of the
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last century, this new generation of rights-rights to homeschool, to own
and use a gun in self-defense, to procure an abortion, to die, to refuse
health insurance, and to exempt oneself from antidiscrimination law by
referencing one's conscience or ministerial role-are rights that facilitate not just the liberty of individuals within the confines of civic life but
also a quite extreme form of "exit" from civic life and from the community and the state that structure it. They guarantee exit from some
aspect of the social contract that defines civil society. The constitutional
right to own a gun and to use it in self-defense is a right to not participate in-to exit-the traditional liberal social compact by which we disarm-relinquish our right to self-help-in exchange for the sovereign's
duty to protect us from private violence. It envisions an erected wall of
distance, difference, and lethality not only between the individual gun
owner and the intruder who endangers his life and interrupts his solitude but also between the individual gun owner and the state and its
police force who have failed to protect him, the community from which
intruders come, and neighbors who must be kept at bay. It is a right to
exit that part of the social contract constituted by the trade of one's right
to self-help in exchange for the civil right to protection from private violence. The constitutional right to die is a right to exit not just life itself
and all of its biological ties but also the social compact by which that
life is protected against self-abnegation. It protects the most isolated,
solitary, noncommunitarian act an individual can possibly make against
the paternalistic interventions of community, family, medicine, or state.
The abortion right, as well, obviously older but consistent with these
newer rights, is a right to exit an unwanted relationship not only with
the fetal life within but also from the community, family, or state that
seeks to protect it. Both killing oneself and aborting fetal life do, after all,
like killing an intruder in justified self-defense, sever earthly coils. The
right to homeschool one's children with no supervision from a school or
school board, recognized by some lower courts as well as by school districts in several cash-strapped states, is similarly a "right to exit" from the
civic and shared project of intergenerational public education with its
shared liberal norms of tolerance, pluralism, and feminism. The homeschooling parent seeks to exit the shared communal project of education as well as, oftentimes, its shared goal: a civic life informed by norms
of tolerance, gender and racial equality, and individual, but civic, autonomy. The right to not buy health insurance, heartily insisted upon by
Chief Justice Roberts as well as numerous com.m entators is likewise a
"right to exit"-this time, from the shared societal project of pooling
health risks through the mandatory purchase of insurance. All of these
newfound rights (the oldest of the group being the abortion right) are
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echoes of the much older Lochner-era contract right, which, within the
context of employment, confers an explicit right to "exit," at will, the
employment relation.
In all of these cases, the individual's constitutional exit right is, in form,
a negative right protecting individual liberty against an intrusive state.
But they are not only that. Exit rights protect not just an individual's
liberty within a community but, more radically, an individual's willed
separation from the community or from some threatening part of it: a
moralistic state with its intrusive sonograms and impediments to reproductive choice; a totalitarian state with its threatening black helicopters;
an incompetent state with its ineffectual police force and poor educational pedagogy; a liberal state with its offending teachers preaching
noxious norms of inclusion and respect; or a nanny state with its mandatory insurance policy and its forced sharing of risk and coshouldering of
costs. In every one of these cases, the constitutional right found by the
Supreme Court or ardently desired by advocates is not only not a civil
"right of belonging," quasi or otherwise. It is the antithesis of one. The
constitutional right protects the individual's right to exit the very community that the civil right, at least on the Painean conception, protects,
nurtures, and seeks to promote. Civil rights and constitutional rights are
not mutually constitutive. They are on a collision course.
Let me draw out one further contrast. Part of what is distinctive about
exit rights-rights to homeschool, to kill oneself, to abort a pregnancy,
to refuse to buy health insurance, to exercise lethal self-help against violence-is their tragic hue. They protect a radical separation of the self
from others or, at best, an extreme alienation from the civic national
community: the homeschooled child is homeschooled precisely in
order to maintain or erect a strict separation from that community;
the health insurance holdout wants nothing to do with an obligation
to support co-citizens in a mutual web of obligation toward a mutual
goal of a healthier community; the gun owner risks his own death and
that of loved ones as the price he willingly pays for his rights of selfdefense against hostile outsiders and an ineffectual (or worse) police
force; the "free contractor" from the Lochner era deals with unhelpful
co-contracting employees or employers through the right to exit at will;
the suicidal individual and the woman obtaining an abortion are both
dealing in death. And, in each case, the constitutional exit right separates
the individual from some feared part of the physical, biological community: from a fetus that may threaten a woman's life or well-being, a
threatening intruder that endangers a homeowner's life, a public school
teacher with liberal norms of forced ideological inclusion and equality, and, most poignantly, the suicidal individual from his own pained
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body. All of this recalls, if nothing else, classical definitions of tragedy: in
the last act of Shakespearean or classical tragedy, the characters wind up
dead on the stage, with the community or state f rom which they came
torn asunder. In constitutional tragedies, those dead individuals as well
as those who killed them are shrouded in rights.
Painean civil rights, by contrast, are comedic rather than tragic. The
last act of a comedy typically culminates in a community ritual, such as
a wedding celebration or the birth of a child, that reaffirms the value of
a shared, communal life, both for the individuals involved and for the
larger society. Our civil rights are "comedic" in precisely this way. If Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act is working properly, then the last scene of the
last act of that legal drama is a workplace that is actually integrated, not
a society of atomistic individuals who have rights against irrational state
classifications. If Title IX is functioning properly, then in the last act,
universities and colleges are healthier communities: women are actually playing on sports teams and African Americans are actually participating in classrooms. When the Family Medical Leave Act is working
properly, actual workers tend to dependents in their real-life families,
creating stronger communities in both homes and workplaces. The parent nurtures the newborn child, or the adult child cares for the parent, without fear of losing her place in the workforce. When civil rights
to education are secured, then the classroom is public, in all senses of
the word-publicly funded, publicly supported, open to all comers, and
serving the public that funds it. It educates for citizenship and fulfilling lives. When labor rights are enjoyed, workplaces are healthier, better
paid, and more participatory. With the civil right to marry secured, the
couple weds, in a ritual of communal reaffirmation, toward the end of
a communally recognized shared life. With the civil right to gun safety
and gun control, the neighborhood is safe, and the individual and her
community are supported and healthy. In the last act of comedy, not just
individuals but also the communities in which they live are on stage, celebrating the civil rights that unite and support them.
There is, it is important to note, nothing Dionysian or even romantic
about any of this. These rituals are made possible by law, and lots of
it-not by an inherently sociable nature. All of these rituals-a marriage,
the opening of a school, the integration of a workplace, the care of a
newborn, the policing of a neighborhood-are not just dependent upon
but fully constituted by law and legalism. The workplace is a product of contract, property, and labor law; the parent's nurturance of a
newborn without fearing loss of employment is a product of an act of
Congress; the safe neighborhood is the end result of the social compact that exchanges, at its core, the natural right of self-help with the
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mutual obligations of a communally funded and manned police force;
the healthy individual owes her health to the pooling of risk, itself facilitated by a set of tax and spending acts of Congress; and civil marriage, as
commentators on all sides of the debates surrounding its expansion have
noted, 69 is a product of law and legalism, not of faith traditions. There
is nothing particularly romantic, and certainly nothing anarchic, about
any of these rights. Health care is not something we enjoy by nature's
bounty; it is something we enjoy if we have structured our community and its laws in a way that is conducive to pooled risk. Education is
not something that a child will pick up willy-nilly if we would but leave
him to his own devices; it is a highly structured product of law, bureaucracy, deliberation, compromise, and pedagogy. Safe neighborhoods are
not the spontaneous flowering of a natural Homo sapiens community in
Walden Pond; they are the deliberate outcome of a self-motivated contract through which we exchange our own natural rights of self-defense
for a web of communal protection. Our own health is not something
we will enjoy in a state of nature; quite the contrary, our lives in such a
state would be both nasty and short, even without the brutishness of others. It is something that is produced through effective law facilitating the
production and distribution of effective medicine and medical care. An
integrated workforce and access to fair labor is not the natural product
of a primitive instinct to bargain or unstructured, spontaneous contracts
without need of public enforcement. Rather, it is the product oflegalistic
constraints on those instincts. Civil rights speak to our capabilities, our
respect for community, and our recognition of how law is in service to
those communal instincts. They speak to law's virtue and law's necessity,
not to law's mendacity or irrelevance. T hey are, in short, rights to law,
not rights to be free of it. We would not enjoy the goods they promise or
the capabilities they protect-health, education, welfare, safe neighborhoods, decent work, family, and marriage-without law's presence.
Ill. Conclusion: Civil Violence, Civil Rights

In contemporary usage, we tend to conflate civil rights and the idea of
civil rights with the antidiscrimination laws that protects those rights.
This is a mistake. Antidiscrimination laws protect us from unequal
enforcement of our civil rights, particularly where that unequal enforcement is due to racial discrimination or classification on the basis of irrational criteria. Our civil rights, though, are not simply the rights we
have to that nondiscrimination. Rather, they are rights to participate in
our community in all of the ways peculiarly facilitated by law, which
we have a right to enjoy free of the discrimination that would deprive
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us of them. By conflating the antidiscrimination norm with the civil
rights that norm protects, we have unnecessarily truncated the natural
development of our understanding of the contribution our very civil law
makes to our very civil society, and to the aspects of the good life that
civil law facilitates, and for which law is so architecturally central.
By way of conclusion, look again at the killing ofTrayvon Martin, the
trial of George Zimmerman for that death, and its aftermath. The failure to find Zimmerman guilty of second-d egree murder70 may or may
not be attributable, in part or whole, to either intentional or unintentional racism on the part of the jury, the judge, the community, the prosecutors, the expert witnesses, the police force, and the defense team. If
it was, then there may have been a violation of not only the antidiscrimination norm in the abstract but also Martin's civil rights, both as I
have defined them here and as traditionally defined, primarily to security and protection. But whether that is the case or not, there is another
violation of Trayvon Martin's civil rights revealed by that tragedy that
is not fundamentally a function of racism-although it is certainly exacerbated by it. "Stand your ground" laws,71 as well as newly broadened
self-defense laws that expand the scope of permissible violence in altercations,12 basically expand the scope of justified lethal force to include
all scenarios in which a combatant is in fear for his life, regardless of
who or what triggered the fight that put him there. You can, that is,
stalk someone so long as your "stalking" is itself legal, pick a fight with
him, find yourself losing that fight, consequently fear for your own life,
and then fire a gun with the intent and hope to kill, all in justified selfdefense. That is what Zimmerman did. Martin's mistake was to fight his
stalker, and effectively.
Zimmerman's justified lethal violence, because it was lawful "selfdefense," was not criminal. That which is not criminal is legal. So, when
we expand self-defense law with stand-your-ground laws and simultaneously protect rights to carry weapons, we have in effect changed the
terms of our civil, or social compact: some measure of public, "civic violence" is now fully permitted that was fully criminal a very short time
ago. When we embrace broad defenses that shrink the sphere of criminal lethal violence, we not only expand the scope of permissible individual self- help in altercations; we also shrink the sphere of the pacific
civility that is expected of us in our public as well as private spaces. If
a combatant is permitted to carry a gun, start a fight, and then "stand
his ground," regardless of what he did to trigger the assault, virtually
every fist fight, regardless of how it began, becomes, potentially, a justified homicide. The sphere of peaceful coexistence-of community-is
gravely reduced.
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It seems to me that on Paine's understanding, this entire body of newly
made law, with state statutory and U.S. constitutional underpinnings
both, far more clearly than the jury verdict acquitting his killer, is a massive violation of Trayvon Martin's civil rights. By virtue of its enactment, Martin's civil right to the enjoyment of his physical security and
his equally civil right to the state's protection of his physical security are
what was not protected that night on his walk back from the store to his
father's apartment. The core civil right, Paine urged, is the right to the
state's protection of one's physical security. That protection, to which we
have a right, is and must be provided by the state; it is the paradigmatic
right that we cannot perfect on our own. The authors of the 1871 Ku
Klux Klan Ace3 realized this. The authors of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment recognized this. The authors of the late
twentieth century's Violence Against Women Act recognized this. The
authors of our various Criminal Codes recognize this. Yet somehow, we
have lost track of the civil rights underpinning of our right to be protected by the state against private violence. Instead, we shrink the scope
of the right to be protected while constitutionalizing various rights to kill
each other. I am not urging a massive enlargement of our overly punitive criminal justice system. But it hardly follows from the sad fact that
our criminal justice system is unjust that what we should do is return the
streets to the armed. The result of the abandonment of the civil right
to protection against violence, and the civil duty of the state to provide
it, whether through the defunding of police forces or the expanding of
"self-defense" principles, is and will continue to be carnage-in homes,
schools, and on public streets.
That carnage, no less than discriminatory law enforcement, is a central
civil rights issue of our age. It should not need to rear its head only in
the aftermath of spectacularly tragic public killings of innocents. There
is now no question but that this breach of our civil rights-the failure of
the state to protect all of us against private violence-affects blacks more
than whites, and black youth far more than white youth. It is young black
men and boys, more than white men, who are targeted not only by ordinary crime but also by vigilante neighborhood watch groups staffed by
white men carrying guns and whose death-dealing acts of killing can
then be tallied as justifiable homicide. The "civil right," then, of which
young black men are deprived, is not only the right to be free of discriminatory policing, discriminatory profiling, and discriminatory sentencing policies, but it is also the civil right to live out their lives without fear
of intimate and neighborly-and, as it turns out, fully legal-violence
every time they walk from their homes to their neighborhood stores.
Both they and all the rest of us are deprived of that right by virtue
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of neutral-sounding expansions of our self-defense laws, stand-yourground laws, open carry laws, and constitutionally grounded gun rights,
all of which, collectively, have a horrifically adverse impact on minority
communities. But the existence of the civil right these laws offend does
not depend on such a showing. The thoroughly positive right to thoroughly positive, state-provided protection against thoroughly private
violence is a-maybe the-quintessential civil right: it is a right that
can only be realized through the enactment of positive law and its fair
enforcement. It is the civil right to the protection of the state against
the private violence occasioned upon him by George Zimmerman, as
accomplished here through the state of Florida's quite intentional
shrinkage of their criminal law of homicide, which was denied Trayvon
Martin.
A civil right, again, is a civil right to law-in this case, to laws criminalizing private violence. That civil right cannot be realized through
negative rights to be free of law, nor can it be realized by rights to be
free of state or private discrimination. It cannot even be seen, in fact,
as a civil right as long as we remain besotted by our negative constitutional rights to be free of the state, leavened only by our insistence that
the state not irrationally discriminate between us. Neither of the two
dominant understandings of rights that circulate in our contemporary
legal culture-our understanding of our beloved negative constitutional
rights that shrink the role of the state in our lives or our limited understanding of our equally cherished civil rights to nondiscrimination-no
matter how seriously we regard them, will be much help on this one.
All the constitutional rights and antidiscrimination rights in the world
would not have helped Trayvon Martin against George Zimmerman's
fully legal lethal force. For that, we need to regenerate interest in and
commitment to the rights to civil society, including Martin's vital civil
rights to physical security and mobility, envisioned by early and forgotten architects of our classical civil rights tradition.
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On Class-Not-Race

Samuel R. Bagenstos

Throughout the civil rights era, strong voices have argued that policy
interventions should focus on class or socioeconomic status, not race.
At times, this position-taking has seemed merely tactical, opportunistic,
or in bad faith. Many who have opposed race-based civil rights interventions on this basis have not turned around to support robust efforts
to reduce class-based or socioeconomic inequality. That sort of opportunism is interesting and important for understanding policy debates in
civil rights, but it is not my focus here. I am more interested here in
the people who clearly mean it. For example, President Lyndon Baines
Johnson-who can hardly be accused of failing to support robust racebased or class-based interventions-advised Dr. Martin Luther King
after Congress passed the Voting Rights Act that the race-neutral, classbased Great Society programs had to be counted on to eliminate race
inequality from that point forward. 1 William Julius Wilson famously
argued that our policies should focus on "the truly disadvantaged" of all
races and spelled out a rather aggressive approach to promoting economic development in American cities.2 And Richard Kahlenberg and
Richard Sander have urged that universities should get rid of race-based
affirmative action in admissions but replace that policy with preferences
for members of disadvantaged socioeconomic groups.3
Calls for class-not-race interventions are likely to grow stronger over
the next few years. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Fisher v. Uni-
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versity ofTexas atAustin4 -which did not formally change the law governing affirmative action in higher education admissions but did highlight
the vulnerability of the policy with the current Supreme Court-has
been read by some commentators as auguring a decisive turn toward
class-based affirmative action.5 The Supreme Court's decision upholding Michigan's state constitutional prohibition on race-based affirmative
action in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action6 predictably
led to renewed calls for class-based preferences? This, then, seems an
opportune time to examine the class-not-race position that underlies
them.
There is a lot that can be said about the beyond-race interventions
favored by class-not-race advocates. And I say a lot of it elsewhere. 8
Here, I want to focus on a single aspect of the argument. I want to
develop an understanding of what sincere advocates of the class-notrace position mean and offer an initial assessment of whether that position is a sensible one.
It seems to me that sincere advocates of the class-not-race position are
making one of two distinct arguments. The first argument is basically
a strategic one. That argument accepts that racial inequality is a fundamental problem that we must attack. It argues, however, that for a variety of pragmatic reasons, race-targeted approaches are not likely to be
the most successful ways of attacking them. There is much to this argument, but it seems to suffer a basic flaw. Problems of race inequality go
well beyond problems of economic or class inequality. And there is a lot
of reason to believe that efforts to respond to class inequality that do not
take race into account either will not help or actually will exacerbate race
inequality. I discuss those points in Part I below.
These points lead to the second distinct argument that advocates of
the class-not-race position may be making. That argument is that race
inequality is not in fact the fundamental problem that we should attack
but is at best an example or a consequence of class or economic inequality. If we have a limited reservoir of enforcement resources, redistributive largesse, or public compassion, the argument implies, we should
focus that reservoir on eliminating class-based inequality. I think some
argument like this explains why many p eople influenced by traditional
left politics support the class-not-race position. But I nonetheless believe
that the argument is wrongheaded. The problem of racial inequality
overlaps with, but is importantly distinct from, economic disadvantage.
I discuss these points in Part II.
In Part III, I assess the prospects for getting beyond the class-not-race
position. Although I find some reasons for hope on this score, I am, ultimately, pessimistic.
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I. The Strategic Argument for Class-Not-Race

Many of the reasons offered for the class-not-race position are essentially strategic. These arguments assert not that class-not-race is superior
as a matter of principle or first-best policy but that approaches that target class instead of race are more likely to succeed in the political or
legal process than are approaches that focus directly on race. This is
most apparent in the context of affirmative action. Many of the advocates of class-based affirmative action-particularly after the Supreme
Court decisions making race-based affirmative action more difficult to
defend-believe that targeting class rather than race will place the practice of affirmative action on stronger legal ground. The legal-doctrinal
argument is certainly a key talking point for some of the most prominent advocates of class-based affirmative action. 9
Viewed purely as a tactical gambit to shore up the legality of affirmative action, it is unclear whether a focus on class instead of race will
work. Under current doctrine, it is a nice question whether admissions
preferences for people of particular socioeconomic statuses are constitutional when they are motivated by a desire to achieve a particular
racial outcome. The argument that they are unconstitutional involves
a seemingly straightforward application of Washington v. Davis 10 and its
progeny (which held that race-neutral practices that are motivated by
race are the equivalent of racial classifications) and Adarand Constructors v. Pena 11 and its progeny (which held that the constitutionality of
racial classifications is the same no matter which race is benefited or burdened). We know that if a school adopted a class-based preference for
applicants from higher socioeconomic classes and did so with an aim of
increasing the proportion of whites that are admitted, that action would
violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Given Adarand's holding that equal
protection analysis does not depend on which race is burdened or benefited, shouldn't the result be the same when a school adopts a preference
for applicants oflower socioeconomic classes, with an aim of increasing
the proportion of minorities who are admitted? 12
But the Court has never been called on to add up the Davis and
Adarand lines of cases in this precise way. And there are substantial reasons to think that it will balk before ruling race-motivated but classbased affirmative action unconstitutionai. 13 One is that in its cases invalidating affirmative action programs, the Court has looked carefully to
ensure that race-neutral means could not achieve the same ends. 14
Although that analysis does not logically compel the conclusion that
race-neutral affirmative action programs are constitutional, a contrary
conclusion would stand in great tension with it. Moreover, Justice
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Kennedy's pivotal concurrence in the Parents Involved case 15 suggests that
he would vote to uphold class-based affirmative action programs. In that
concurrence, Justice Kennedy explained his decision to provide the fifth
vote to invalidate race-based student assignment plans in K-12 schools.
He indicated that race-neutral efforts to achieve diversity and overcome
racial isolation would be constitutional-and indeed probably would not
even be subject to strict scrutiny. 16 As a pure predictive matter, then, it
seems unlikely that five justices on this Supreme Court would invalidate
class-based affirmative action.
Other strategic arguments for the class-not-race position are political
rather than legal in nature. William Julius Wilson emphasizes many of
these points in THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED. 17 Policies that aim overtly at
protecting or advancing the interests of particular disadvantaged racial
groups may be especially politically vulnerable. This may be because of
implicit or overt racial bias in the political process, including the phenomenon of selective sympathy and indifference.18 It may be because
of a general support for color-blindness among the public and political
leaders-a sense that race should not matter. (Query how much overlap
there is between these two positions.) Or it may be because of simple
majoritarianism. Policies that obviously provide benefits to a minority
of the population may be politically vulnerable to efforts by the majority
to get some of those benefits for itself.
As Wilson makes explicit, these arguments tie rather directly to arguments among social policy experts regarding targeted versus universal
social-welfare policies. 19 Many experts argue that social-welfare policies
are more politically durable when they are framed in universal terms. 20
Means-tested programs like welfare (or, perhaps now, food stamps) are
understood to be more vulnerable than universal social insurance programs like Social Security. There are a couple of reasons for this. One,
again, is simple majoritarianism-if everyone feels they can benefit
from a program, it will be easier to persuade them to support it than
if they are paying for the benefit of someone else. Another is a sense
of desert. Universal programs are more easily understood in solidaristic
terms as a reciprocal covenant among all citizens. As a result, solidaristic
and reciprocal principles of distribution make sense-one deserves to
receive benefits because one is a citizen and has contributed to the system.21 But the public expects one to prove desert for targeted benefits
more specifically-if an individual is receiving government benefits to
which other individuals are not entitled, the public expects the beneficiaries to demonstrate that they really deserve them. As a result, targeted
programs are administered in a much more stingy fashion than universal ones. And scandals regarding alleged waste, fraud, and abuse arise
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far more easily in targeted programs and are far more likely to delegitimize those programs than they are to delegitimize universal programs
of social insurance.
This is a very controversial issue in the social policy world. Professors

Schuck and Zeckhauser make a strong theoretical argument that targeted programs more efficiently achieve their aims and therefore are
more likely to draw political support than are less efficient universalist
ones. 22 Basic public choice theory also suggests that targeted programs
will generate fervent support from their beneficiaries, while the broad
spreading of the costs will dampen opposition from those who do not
receive the benefits. 23 (This point seems more plausible when the beneficiaries are not as socially and politically disempowered as the beneficiaries of race-based interventions, however.) And the empirical evidence on targeting versus universalism is mixed. Social Security is, to
be sure, far more politically stable than was welfare. But when we look
at smaller programs for classes of poor people, the targeted ones (that
focus on people with disabilities or children in poverty) have, on occasion, seemed more resilient than the broader universalist ones. 24
In the race-versus-class context as well, the strategic argument for
universalism is not obviously correct. For one thing, class-based interventions (like class-based affirmative action) may readily come to be
understood in the public mind as really targeted toward m inorities. 25
That is particularly true because in many cases, the alternative to racebased interventions is not universal social insurance; it is a policy that
really is targeted at disadvantaged people, just a bit more broadly than
at minorities. Think about welfare in this regard and the general axiom
that programs for the poor are poor programs. One reason programs for
the poor are politically vulnerable is that they are often associated in the
public mind with racial minorities. Efforts to target class-based disadvantage as a way of eliminating racial disadvantage often are understood
as being "really" about race and provoke political resistance accordingly-a point George Romney, U.S. Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development from 1968 to 1973, learned when his efforts to achieve
economic integration in housing provoked fierce resistance from white
suburbanites who feared that racial integration would be the result. 26
William Julius Wilson's critique of the Great Society is apt here. Wilson
argued that the Great Society's reliance on means-tested antipoverty
programs associated it with minorities and made it politically vulnerable.27 Unless efforts to focus on class rather than race take the form
Wilson's effort does-by employing truly broad-scale economic development programs- they will likely remain politically vulnerable as targeted programs. And the truly universal proposals urged by Wilson and
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others have virtually no hope of being achieved in our current political environment, in which austerity sets the terms of economic policy
debates.
Class-based policies, then, may not be especially politically strong.
And there may be circumstances in which programs targeted at racial
minorities are quite strong politically-precisely because they appeal to
a shared commitment to equal opportunity. To the extent that racefocused programs are understood as overcoming the particular injustice
of discrimination or the legacy of slavery and segregation, many people
will see that disadvantage as not being the fault of the beneficiaries
(unlike poverty in general). In those circumstances, candid use of race
will be politically superior to the use of class as a proxy for race.
I do not doubt, however, that class-focused approaches are likely to be
more defensible, legally and politically, than race-focused ones in many
cases. But this brings us to the deeper problem with the strategic arguments for class-not-race. Recall that the premise of the strategic argument is that race-based injustice is a distinct and important concern that
the law should address; the argument for class-not-race is that class is
a more legally and politically stable way to address that concern than
is targeting racial injustice directly. But that argument depends on class
disadvantage being a good proxy for race disadvantage. And it is not. In
other words, even if class is a more stable way of addressing the problem, it does not address the problem very well. In part, that is because
there are so many more poor white people than poor minorities that any
help to poor people in general dilutes what minorities get (assuming a
sort of constant budget of compassion). But there is a more fundamental
reason class disadvantage is not a good proxy for race disadvantage. The
strategic argument assumes that racial disadvantage is a subset, a specific
application, of class disadvantage-or at least that there is a large overlap
between the two categories. There is certainly some overlap, but racial
disadvantage is in fact quite distinct. Racial disadvantage in the United
States involves economic deprivation, to be sure, but it also involves
stigma and stereotypes with a variety of consequences for the day-today lives of even economically advantaged members of racial minority
groups. 28
And efforts to focus on class disadvantage may actually reinforce the
structures that promote racial disadvantage. We know this, in part, from
history. The New Deal took what was well understood as a class-notrace approach. It led to substantial economic development. But because
of the lines of eligibility its programs drew-lines that were formally
race-neutral- it also entrenched racial hierarchy and subordination. 29
As insightful recent work by Jessica Clarke and KT Albiston argues,
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these problems are not confined to history.30 They argue that formally
gender-neutral efforts to expand women's opportunities in the workplace, like the Family and Medical Leave Act, have actually entrenched
gender hierarchy in workplaces. Deborah Malamud makes the same
point about class-based affirmative action. 31
I do not mean to deny that class-based approaches might be a possible
second-best solution to the problem of racial disadvantage. Legal and
political developments may substantially limit the prospect of relying
on race-based approaches, so class-based ones might be the best available way of achieving those ends. But the same legal, and especially
political, developments are likely to limit the utility of class-based
approaches in achieving racial justice. If the class-not-race position is a
purely strategic one, it is a deeply problematic one.
II. The Substantive Argument for Class-Not-Race

I have argued that class-based interventions are not likely to be an especially effective way of overcoming race-based disadvantage. But what if
race-based disadvantage is not what we think of as the essential problem? What if the basic problem is class-based disadvantage? While raceand class-based disadvantage overlapped in the past, one might argue,
there is a substantial disconnect between the two problems now, and it is
class, not race, on which our policy interventions should focus. I call this
the substantive argument for class-not-race. This argument is implicit
or explicit in many critiques of race-based affirmative action. Numerous affirmative action critics ask why the child of the Huxtables, or of
a rich African immigrant family, should get a preference over a poor
white kid from Appalachia. William Julius Wilson asks why we should
have policies that benefit the most advantaged blacks but do very little
for the least advantaged blacks-those whom he called "the truly disadvantaged." The argument is basically that racial disadvantage may have
at some point overlapped with class disadvantage but that the two have
diverged. Now that they have diverged, we should identify which of
these is the real problem. And, the advocates of class-not-race argue, the
real problem is class. The influence of traditional left-wing thinking on
this position is patent.
There is obviously something to this argument. In a nation in which
economic inequality continues to grow, and our public services shrink,
life chances and opportunities depend greatly on the socioeconomic circumstances in which one is born. 32 And this is true for people of all
races. Policy interventions that focus on ameliorating economic inequal-
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ity and class disadvantage are important tools to attack this serious problem.
But I think the substantive class-not-race argument ultimately reflects
a category mistake in treating race-based policies as ultimately aimed
at alleviating economic inequalities. Antidiscrimination law and affirmative action have of course provided economic advancement to some
women and minority group members. And that is a significant goal
of these bodies of law. Scholars tend to agree, in particular, that the
first decade of enforcement of Title VII was associated with a dramatic
increase in the earnings of African Americans relative to those of
whites. 33
But why must we choose which is the reaL problem? Both economic
inequality and racial disadvantage are, it seems to me, real problems. We
can acknowledge that members of disadvantaged socioeconomic classes
face common barriers to opportunity, whatever their race. And, as I have
argued, there are more poor whites than there are poor blacks and Latinos (though a much higher proportion of the black or Latino population
than of the white population is poor). The problems of poor people of all
races are best addressed by race-neutral programs of economic development and public assistance.
But race remains an important axis of disadvantage in America, even
of its own accord. Some of this disadvantage is economic. Even middleand upper-middle-class blacks are more likely to hold that status precariously than whites. They have less wealth on average, they are more
likely to have relatives in poverty, and they are more likely to have children who are downwardly mobile economically.34
Some of this disadvantage relates directly to continuing discrimination. Housing discrimination keeps African Americans segregated in
less desirable neighborhoods, which limits educational opportunities.35
Employment discrimination continues to limit job opportunities.36 Discrimination extends beyond economic opportunities: use of race by law
enforcement drives home the salience of race in the day-to-day lives
of members of racial minority groups, for example.37 And racial bias
in the criminal justice system has a pervasive effect on minority communities.38 In a provocative recent paper, Betsey Stevenson and Justin
Wolfers argue that "the fruits of the civil rights movement may lie"
beyond economic opportunities but "in other, more difficult to document, improvements in the quality of life-improvements that have led
to rising levels of happiness and life satisfaction for some blacks."39 As
they note, however, "these improvements have taken decades to be realized, and even if current rates of progress persist, it will take several
more decades to fully close the black-white happiness gap.''40
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Much of this continuing race-based disadvantage results from subtle,
unconscious, or implicit racial bias.41 But the disadvantage also results
from the persistence of racial stereotypes. These stereotypes and biases
make it necessary for minority group members in many jobs to engage
in constant impression management to demonstrate that they do not
conform to the stereotypes. This impression management imposes a
significant personal cost. But it also can be self-defeating, by discouraging the sort of risk-taking that leads to success in many employment settings.42 (There is obviously a similar double-bind in the case of women
in workplaces.) Even the most economically advantaged African Americans face these constraints, as the example of the fine line President
Obama has had to walk in managing racialized expectations demonstrates.43
These problems are distinct from the problems of socioeconomic
class. And we know that ameliorating economic inequality and disadvantage will not necessarily eliminate these problems of racial inequality. Rather, the most effective way we know to ameliorate problems of
racial discrimination is an affirmative focus on promoting racial integration throughout society. Intergroup contact and work on common
projects on terms of equality remain the best ways to break down stereotypes and bias.44 Although there are substantial legal and political barriers to achieving that goal-something I have lamented in my earlier
work45 -po1icies that specifically target racial discrimination and
inequality are the first-best way to respond to those problems. To say
that our policy should focus on class instead of race is to say that we
should not address these problems. And I can think of no good substantive, as opposed to strategic, argument for doing that.
Ill. Class-and-Race: The Civil Rights Act and the Great Society

I should emphasize that to be against class-not-race is not to favor the
opposite policy-race-not-class. We live in a big, complex world, one
with many axes of disadvantage. I do not know of any advocate for
racial justice who is against ameliorating class-based injustice. Nobody
seriously proposes including racial diversity as a factor in a highereducation admissions policy but refusing to consider class or economic
disadvantage. Advocates of expanded antidiscrimination law typically
strongly support antipoverty laws and broad-based economic development policies. Consider, in this regard, how race-oriented civil rights
laws, antipoverty policies, and broad-based social insurance were all crucial pieces of the Great Society. There may be tactical questions about
how and when to press different pieces of the agenda, but there is no
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reason we must choose to ameliorate disadvantages along only class or
only race axes.
Indeed, I would argue that the most effective social justice strategies
are those that, like the Great Society, combine efforts to eliminate the
effects of group-targeted discrimination with broader efforts to promote
social welfare. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 guaranteed nondiscrimination in employment, which helped African Americans gain access to job
opportunities that had previously been closed to them. But the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, Head Start, and other Great Society
Programs provided educational opportunities that made it more likely
that more African Americans could take advantage of those new job
opportunities. In my earlier work, I have argued that the Americans
with Disabilities Act's effects on employment for people with disabilities
have been significantly limited by the failure to pursue social welfare
interventions (like universal health insurance and investment in accessible transportation) that would break down deep-rooted structural barriers to employment.46 And women's workplace opportunities have been
limited by both narrow interpretations of the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act and the failure to provide child care and paid family leave; an effective solution to this problem would combine more robust antidiscrimination protections with more robust social provision. 47 To make further
progress against racial inequality will require both an aggressive effort to
enforce antidiscrimination provisions and a broader focus on economic
development and providing housing and educational opportunities.48
So why do we have this endless fight? One reason I assumed away at
the outset-bad faith. What about people who sincerely support classoriented, but not race-oriented, interventions? The essential reason, I
think, is strategic, but in a broader sense than I discussed in Part I. For
many years, one of the only commitments that united both edges of the
progressive movement-those influenced by social democratic politics
at the left edge and mainstream centrists at the right edge-was the conviction that identity politics was bad for the movement. Each faction had
a slightly different reason for, or way of articulating, its position: those
on the Left believed that identity politics undermined class solidarity
among the working class, while the centrists believed that identity politics made it difficult to appeal to "mainstream" Americans. But however
derived, the policy agenda of both the leftists and the centrists eschewed
race-oriented solutions in favor of class-oriented ones.
There is some reason to believe that political conditions now have
evolved in a way that might make it possible for each of these factions
newly to endorse race-focused interventions. Labor unions have
achieved great success in recent years by appealing to identity politics
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and incorporating race- and sex-focused goals into broader classfocused ones. It appears, then, that identity politics need not undermine
the class solidarity that those on the left of the progressive spectrum aim
to achieve. And Barack Obama won two consecutive presidential elections by assembling a coalition of racial minorities, together with a sizeable minority of whites. So identity politics perhaps need not impede
mainstream political success. In this environment, race-oriented interventions may seem less threatening to the success of progressive politics
in general, and advocates of class-not-race may be persuaded to rethink
the notion that there must be a choice between race- and class-based
approaches.
Yet there are substantial grounds for pessimism on this score. Despite
the makeup of his electoral coalition, President Obama tended to
emphasize class-focused remedies at the expense of race-focused
ones.49 And the Supreme Court's evolving jurisprudence of antidiscrimination law and affirmative action are likely to make race-focused interventions less tenable, at least for the near future. Ultimately, then, the
class-not-race position may be the best we can do, despite its problems.
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The Diversity Feedback Loop

Patrick Shin, Devon Carbado, and Mitu Gulati

I. Introduction

By most accounts, the pursuit of racial diversity in the modern U.S.
workplace is ubiquitous. The extent to which firms genuinely care about
achieving it may be debatable, but assertions of commitment to a
diverse workforce have become a familiar corporate refrain. But does all
this routine talk of racial diversity square with the legal status of workplace diversity initiatives? Arguably, there is a tension. 1 Given recent
developments, 2 it is uncertain whether Title VII permits race-conscious
hiring measures that seek workplace racial diversity, especially if such
measures do not fit the mold of traditional affirmative action plans
designed to remedy "manifest imbalances" associated with past discrimination.3
This legal issue is one that the Supreme Court will eventually be called
upon to resolve. In anticipation of that intervention, this chapter seeks
to understand the significance of workplace affirmative action from a
broader perspective that scholars have largely overlooked. We step back
from the question of whether employer affirmative action can be doctrinally and theoretically justified by appeal to the value of diversity and
examine, instead, the systemic role affirmative action plays in shaping
workplace diversity. Significantly, our inquiry is not limited to workplace affirmative action plans. We focus our attention on university
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affirmative action plans as well. We do so to investigate the relation
between workplace diversity and what we hypothesize to be a critical
determinant: the diversity of the colleges and universities that feed the
employment market. We examine, in short, the causal relation between
diversity in the workplace and diversity in the student bodies of higher
educational institutions. We describe this often overlooked relationship
to situate race-conscious hiring by employers in the context of other
important systemic factors that contribute to the production of workplace diversity. Our hope is that the framework we employ will inform
the debate about the legal permissibility of employer affirmative action
that is sure to come.
For purposes of the discussion, we assume that it is an open question
whether employers can invoke the value of diversity to justify their affirmative action policies.4 We assume further that, as recently restated by
the Supreme Court in Fisher v. University of Texas,5 the value of diversity can justify a university's consideration of race as one factor among
many in deciding which applicants to admit. 6 Given the accepted value
of diversity in the constitutional setting and the common goals of educational affirmative action and of Title VII in general,7 many have argued
that affirmative action is as desirable and as necessary in the workplace
context as it is in the university. The thinking is that, because workplaces
should be in equipoise with universities with respect to realizing the
benefits of diversity, the normative justifications for diversity and the
policy mechanism for implementing it-affirmative action-should be
transplanted from the educational context to the employment context. 8
Multiple scholars have endorsed some version of the "transplant"
argument. 9 Some support their position with reference to the persistence of historical employment inequalities in the modern workplace.
Others highlight the purposes of Title VII. Still others invoke empirical
evidence showing how the presence of diversity can reduce discriminatory bias and harmful stereotyping.
We do not argue that the transplant approach is mistaken. The benefits
of educational and workplace diversity may indeed be comparable. The
problem is that scholars who justify affirmative action in the workplace
by analogy to the educational context overlook the implications of a
crucial fact: the university and the workplace are not separate and distinct institutional settings in which diversity is or is not achieved. They
are part of a causally connected system. 10 This is no small thing. It
means that the policies and practices surrounding diversity in each context shape and influence the diversity that emerges in the other. Scholars, policymakers, and judges have largely ignored this crucial dynamic.
They continue to frame affirmative action practices in the workplace
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and those at colleges and universities as disaggregated diversity mechanisms. This limits our ability to understand fully what is at stake with
respect to overruling Grutter and/ or prohibiting affirmative action in the
workplace. In this respect, analyses of diversity-based affirmative action
in the employment context or the educational context are incomplete
unless they take into account the consequences that rules permitting or
restricting such action in either domain are likely to have for the system
as a whole. We examine these consequences by way of a model that we
call the "diversity feedback loop."
Three central features constitute our model: a supply effect, a reiteration
effect, and a demand effect. The schematic below and accompanying texts
describe how these three dynamics combine to create the diversity feedback loop.
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The basic dynamics are these:
• The university, through its admissions policy, assembles a diverse
student body (or not) that, on graduation, becomes a key supply of
labor for potential employers-a supply effect.
• The diversity that exists in the supply of labor is, at least to some
extent relocated to or "reiterated" in the workplace through the
operation of employer hiring mechanisms-a reiteration effect.
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• The employer's diversity hiring criteria exen a demand for
employees who have particular characteristics, which can influence
the criteria that universities use to determine the students they
admit-a demand effect.
The remainder of this chapter elaborates on these dynamics to demonstrate that we stand a better chance of improving the diversity of universities and workplaces if we recognize that both domains are part of the
same diversity system.ll This insight is relevant not only as a normative
matter (whether it makes sense to promote affirmative action in both
the workplace and the university setting) but also as a doctrinal matter
(whether the legality of affirmative action in the context of the workplace
should be coexte·nsive with its legality in the context of the university).
Our argument unfolds in four parts. Part II discusses the supply and
reiteration effects. These effects follow from the fact that universities
are a gateway to the workplace. Today's student bodies are tomorrow's
potential workforces. To the extent that employers rely on universities
as a source of labor, universities function as a pathway through which
diversity is supplied. The diversity of the university provides both a
limit on and a template for diversity in the workplace.
Yet when employers hire from affirmative action institutions, their
own diversity-enhancing selection measures might not mirror the measures implemented at the university admissions stage. When hiring,
employers might seek to realize a conception of diversity that differs in
significant ways from the educationally rooted ideal of a diverse student
body. Actors in these two institutional contexts might therefore "screen"
for diversity in distinctive ways. Part III explores the implications of
the possible divergence between the employer and university diversity
screens.
Part IV demonstrates how the hiring practices of employers can influence the admissions practices of universities in the educational context.
Universities operate within mu ltiple competitive markets. Among other
things, they are competing to place their students with the best employers. Students, in tum, evaluate schools, at least in part, based on their
placement rates. Universities with poor placement records are at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis those with stronger ones. This creates an
incentive for universities to supply the kind of diversity employers want.
Doing so maximizes the likelihood that employers will hire the graduates of those universities. To the extent that universities structure their
diversity initiatives to maximize the employment opportunities available to their graduates, employer diversity preferences influence the
university's admission's regime. Part IV discusses this demand effect.
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11. The

Supply and Reiteration Effects

A. The Basic Supply Hypothesis
The Supreme Court recognized long ago that the composition of the
relevant labor market can constrain an employer's ability to eliminate
patterns of racial exclusion from its workplace.12 Of course, employers
who engage in discrimination (or who practice affirmative action) can
cause their workforces to be significantly less or more racially diverse
than the available pool of qualified labor. But the fact remains that the
makeup of that pool places certain limits on the composition of the
employer's workplace. For example, if there are no Asian Americans in
the labor pool, there will be no Asian Americans in the workplace, no
matter what hiring preferences employers might use. Employers cannot
create workplace diversity out of thin air. They need a supply.
The importance of educational diversity as a source of workplace
diversity was emphasized in an amicus brief filed by Fortune 100 companies in the Fisher case. We quote directly from the brief:
But amici [Fortune 100 companies] cannot reach [the] goal [of a diverse
workforce] on their own ... When amici make decisions about hiring and
promotion, it is critical that they be able to draw from a superior pool
of candidates-both minority and non-minority-who have realized the
many benefits of diversity in higher education. There can be no question
that "[t]he Nation's future" does indeed continue to "dependO upon leaders"-including business leaders-"trained through wide exposure to the
ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples."l3

The fact that employers rely on institutions of higher education to provide a supply of diverse labor implies that the achievement of racial
diversity in the workplace will depend on not only the behavior of
employers but also the behavior of educational institutions. Thus, workplace diversity is potentially affected by the use of affirmative action by
universities at the admissions stage as well as by employers at the hiring
stage. If this is so, understanding the conditions necessary for achieving workplace diversity requires isolating the expected effects of raceconscious selection measures at each stage. To what extent would we
expect the diversity of the workplace to be affected by (1) the use of
affirmative action in education and (2) the use of affirmative action by
employers?
Our aim here is to provide a theoretical model that provides preliminary answers to these questions. But first, two specifications are in order.
Though we believe that the model we describe below applies to employers who hire from highly selective colleges and universities generally,
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for simplicity, we narrow our focus to law firms who hire their associates predominantly from highly selective law schools. We will refer to
the law firms that hire in this way as "elite law firms" and the selective law
schools from which they hire as j'elite law schools." Of course, elite law
firms do hire from nonelite law schools, and nonelite law firms do hire
from elite law schools as well. The principal reason we limit our analysis to the "elite'' context is to simplify our analysis. We note, too, that
most of the literature on racial diversity and law firms focuses on elite
law firms and suggests that elite law firms are more likely to hire from
elite law schools than from nonelite law schools. Indeed, there is reason to believe that elite law firms will hire very few people of color from
nonelite law schools. 14 Focusing on elite law firms and elite law schools
allows us to track a very real dynamic- the flow of diversity from elite
law schools to elite law firms-and at the same time describe our theoretical hypothesis: namely, that the diversity of elite law school student
bodies is a causal determinant of the diversity of elite law firm workplaces. This is true simply because whatever diversity exists in elite law
firms has to come from somewhere, and we have stipulated that elite law
firms hire from elite law schools.
The question then becomes: What affects the diversity of elite law
schools? One answer is the school's admissions policy. The diversity of
an elite law school student body is at least partly determined by the
school's positive consideration of race as a factor in admissions-that
is, its affirmative action policy. The more robust the elite law school's
race-conscious affirmative action program is, the more diverse its student body will be; and the more diverse a law school's student body is,
the more diverse its graduates will be. Since elite law firms, by our definition, hire from the labor pool formed by these graduates, it follows
that the use of affirmative action by elite law schools is causally linked
to the racial composition, and hence the diversity, of the workplace of
these employers. 15
To summarize, a law school's admissions regime affects the diversity
of the student body; the diversity of the student body shapes the diversity of the labor pool; and the diversity of the labor pool influences the
diversity of law firms. These observations together make up the supply effect in the university-workplace relation. With this preliminary
hypothesis in place, we now model how a legal rule permitting or
restricting race-conscious hiring might modulate the movement of
diversity from law school student bodies to the workplace of the law
firm.
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B. The Reiteration Effect: Default Case

We begin by establishing what we call a reiteration effect, or the basic
tendency of the level of diversity that exists in the labor supply pool
to be reproduced in the relevant workplace. As a predicate, we make
four additional assumptions. First, for reasons previously discussed, 16
we assume that, above some threshold of satisfactory academic performance, elite law firms are indifferent to grades. 17 Second, we assume that
the diversity of the group of students who achieve this level of academic performance is the same as the diversity of the student body overall.18 These first two assumptions imply that most graduates of elite law
schools, including black and Latino students, are regarded by elite law
firms as equally qualified to be hired as associates. 19 Third, we assume
that the graduates of all elite law schools who are interested in working
in elite law firms are equally willing to accept positions in all elite firms,
but that any given firm can lure any particular graduate by expending
more resources on recruiting or offering a higher salary. Fourth, we
assume that the law firm's and the law school's conceptions of diversity
are congruent (including judgments about whether a particular individual will contribute to diversity). 20
With these assumptions out of the way, it is helpful to invoke a general
axiom endorsed by the Supreme Court, albeit in the context of a rather
different issue. According to the Court, "absent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time
result in a work force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic
composition of the population in the community from which employees are hired." 21 This axiom, as applied to our model, suggests that in the
absence of employer discrimination,22 the level of workplace diversity
among elite law firms will, over time, be the same as the level of diversity that exists in law school student bodies. Whatever diversity exists in
elite student bodies will be randomly supplied to all firms, with no single
law firm having a higher or lower level of diversity than others, except
by operation of chance. 23
This general axiom might strike some readers as an overly simplistic
assumption, one that flies in the face of empirical evidence about ongoing employment discrimination. Some might argue that any model that
accepts the Court's assumption in the Teamsters case assumes away too
much. Two responses are in order. First, if we do not assume away discrimination, that variable becomes a showstopper for our desired analysis. If employers are assumed to discriminate, then workplace diversity
will be almost entirely a function of their exclusionary policies-period.
Thus, we might learn more about the structural relationship between
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educational and workplace diversity if we think about what we would
expect to happen in the absence of discrimination.
Second, and perhaps more important, imagining what we would
expect to happen in the absence of discrimination is a useful exercise
because a comparison of the expected consequences of that assumption
with real-world observations may provide a way to test whether the
assumption is true. The assumption is not an idle one. Although it would
be putting the point too strongly to say that the federal courts assume
that employment discrimination does not exist, it is fair to say that they
have not been sympathetic to plaintiffs who bring claims of discrimination.24 Our sense is that many people believe that employment discrimination is largely no longer a real problem and that if workplaces lack
diversity, this is explained by a lack of qualified candidates, not by discrimination The assumption behind this common belief is that if there
were a qualified, diverse pool of people of color, firms would hire them,
and their workplaces would become diverse. Note how this view aligns
with the assumptions of our model-namely, the elite law school's student body diversity will be supplied fully and uniformly into the workplace.
In any event, our claim is that in a world where our basic assumptions
hold true, the racial diversity that exists in the graduating student bodies
of elite law schools will be uniformly distributed among all elite law
firms, such that the level of diversity in the group of students who enter
the elite workplace matches the level of diversity in the elite law school
student pool overall. In other words, in the default conditions of our
model, workplace diversity simply reiterates student body diversity.
C. Modeling the Reiteration Effect under Four Alternative Conditions

If full and uniform reiteration is expected in our model's default conditions, what might we expect to observe if we vary both the law firm's and
the law school's behavior? That is the question we now address. We will
examine how the supply of diversity from the law school to the law firm
might vary under four specific conditions. Condition 1 assumes that the
level of law school diversity is high and that the law firm is prohibited
from using affirmative action. Condition 2 imagines a low level of law
school diversity; here, too, the law firm may not use affirmative action.
Condition 3 permits the law firm to use affirmative action and posits a
high level of law school diversity. Under Condition 4, the law firm is also
permitted to use affirmative action, but the level of law school diversity
is low. We discuss below how each of these conditions might affect the
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supply of student body diversity from the university (the law school) to
the workplace (the law firm).
1. Condition 1: High Educational Diversity, Employer Affirmative
Action Prohibited

Suppose that there is a high level of racial diversity in the student bodies
of elite law schools, such that the presence of racial minorities in these
student bodies is as high as or higher than in the general population.
(We might imagine a world in which all elite law schools were permitted under applicable state and federal law to consider the race of their
applicants as a positive factor in the admissions process, and all elite law
schools did in fact do so.) Stipulate also that law firms are not legally
permitted to take race into account in their hiring decisions-that is,
that the law requires formally color-blind hiring. What result should be
expected for law firm diversity, given the assumptions of our model?
Assuming full compliance by law firms, we should expect that, over
time, all elite law firms would come to have the same high level of diversity that is present in elite law school student bodies. That is to say,
the diversity of the student bodies will be fully and uniformly supplied
to the workplace. To understand why, recall that we are assuming, for
purposes of analysis, that there is no explicit or implicit discrimination in the labor market. Insofar as firms are not going to differentiate
among elite students (per our earlier hypothesis and explanation), we
should expect student body diversity to be supplied to and randomly
distributed among all elite law firms. We would also expect that, over
time, every elite law firm would mirror the demographic of the elite law
school student bodies from which they are populated. In short, under
Condition 1, workplace diversity would be established at levels matching the diversity of the student pool, even without the utilization of
employer affirmative action.
2. Condition 2: Low Educational Diversity, Employer Affirmative
Action Prohibited

In this condition, suppose that elite universities have low levels of racial
diversity, such that the proportion of racial minorities in their student
bodies is significantly lower than their proportion in the general population. This scenario could emerge in a jurisdiction (like California) that
prohibits the consideration of race in university admissions; the scenario could also occur if, at some future point, the Supreme Court overruled Grutter and held that affirmative action was unconstitutional in the
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educational context. Assume, as in Condition 1, that the law prohibits
race-conscious affirmative action hiring. What is the expected result?
As in Condition 1, we should expect that, under Condition 2, over time,
all elite workplaces will come to share the demographic of the student
bodies from which they draw. That is, all law firms will come to have
an equally low level of racial diversity. A formally colorblind hiring rule,
again assuming nondiscrimination, should reproduce the level of diversity present in the elite student body pool at the workplace level of the
law firm. If the level of diversity in the overall pool of job candidates is
low, then colorblind hiring sh ould produce an equally low level of workplace diversity, uniformly distributed among firms.
3. Condition 3: High Educational Diversity, Employer Affirmative
Action Permitted

In the third condition, stipulate that there is a high level of diversity
in elite law school student bodies, as in Condition l. But now suppose
that employers are permitted (but not required) to consider job applicants' membership in a minority racial group as a positive factor in their
hiring decisions, if doing so is reasonably necessary to create or maintain diversity in the workplace. 25 What outcomes should we expect?
The short answer: roughly the same level and distribution of workplace
diversity as in Condition 1, the condition with high diversity in the labor
market and no affirmative action.
This might seem counterintuitive. One might think a rule permitting
consideration of race for diversity purposes would lead to variances
among law firms in their levels of diversity. But remember that firms
are only permitted to employ affirmative action "if reasonably necessary" to ensure diversity. Since we stipulate in Condition 3 that there is a
high level of diversity in the pool of available candidates, and given our
overall assumption that this labor market is free of explicit or implicit
forms of discrimination and biases, employers should not need to take
race into account to yield meaningful diversity. A sufficiently high level
of diversity in the pool of available candidates should, under formally
color-blind hiring, be adequate to supply that same level of diversity
uniformly across all law firms. Assuming that employers are aware of the
racial demographics of the pool, it is reasonable to conclude that they
would see little need to engage in affirmative action hiring and would
refrain from doing so. 26 Combining the results from Conditions 1 and 3,
we can conclude that in conditions of high diversity in the available pool
ofjob candidates, we should not expect overall levels or the distribution
of workplace diversity across law firms to be significantly dependent on
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whether or not employers are permitted to take race into account as a
positive hiring factor for the sake of diversity.
4. Condition 4: Low Educational Diversity, Employer Affirmative
Action Permitted

Our final condition assumes that there is a low level of racial diversity in
the student bodies of elite law schools. Recall that this is also the case in
Condition 1. Stipulate now that, as in Condition 3, law firms are permitted (but not required) to consider job applicants' race as a positive factor
in their hiring decisions. The caveat, again, is that they may do so only
if reasonably necessary to create or maintain diversity in the workplace.
Under this condition, what should we expect vis-a-vis the overall supply
and distribution of diversity in the workplace?
The results will depend on the extent to which law firms give positive
weight to race in their hiring decisions. If law firms behave uniformly,
then the results of Condition 4 should be the same as Condition 2 (the
condition with low education diversity and employer affirmative action
prohibited). There are two ways in which employers could act uniformly.
First, all law firms might refrain from using affirmative action. This
would render Condition 4 indistinguishable from Condition 2, so the
same results should follow. Second, all law firms could decide to practice
affirmative action. Under the default assumptions of our model, elite law
firms are all on equal footing in terms of the likely success of their diversity initiatives. Thus, a university's student body diversity would be supplied uniformly to all elite workplaces. The overall level of resultant law
firm diversity will also likely be uniform. 27
But now, let us imagine that elite firms have different views regarding
the importance of establishing diversity in their workplaces. Assume
that some firms give high priority to having a diverse workforce, while
other firms care less about diversity as such or are committed to an ideal
of formally color-blind hiring. Suppose, in other words, that only some
elite firms consider race as a positive consideration (call these "prodiversity" firms), while other firms do not take race into consideration at
all (call these "color-blind firms"). Under these additional assumptions,
what result should we exp ect for workplace diversity among elite firms?
In our model, the amount of diversity in the elite law school student
body pool limits the diversity that can be reiterated into the workplace,
so we should expect the overall level of diversity among all elite firms to
be about as low as that observed in the candidate pooL But unlike in previous conditions, we would expect the distribution of that diversity to be
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nonuniform across firms. Prodiversity firms, insofar as they see a greater
value in establishing workforce diversity, will offer higher salaries or
expend more recruiting resources to lure job candidates who would
enhance or bolster the firm's diversity profile. Color-blind firms, who
by definition care Jess about diversity or are ideologically committed to
color-blindness, would have no reason to make the extra expenditures
necessary to attract the diversity candidates away from prodiversity
firms and so would be less likely to attract and hire them. Over time,
therefore, prodiversity firms will come to have a higher level of workplace diversity than color-blind firms. As student body diversity continues to cluster in prodiversity firms from year to year, prodiversity
firms will eventually achieve a level of diversity that is higher than the
level of diversity available in the elite student body pool, and color-blind
firms will eventually have a level of diversity that is even lower than the
already-low level available in the candidate pool.
It may not seem particularly remarkable that in Condition 4, prodiversity firms will come to achieve more workplace diversity than colorblind firms, but there are two less obvious points that bear mentioning.
First, Condition 4 is the only one of the four conditions in which we
would expect anything other than a uniform distribution of diversity
across all hiring firms. In all other conditions, including Condition 2, in
which we stipulated that employers are permitted to engage in prodiversity hiring, we would expect the diversity of the workplace to be the
same as the diversity of the relevant labor pool. Second, a comparison of
Conditions 2 and 4 shows that where the diversity of the available candidate pool is very low, then an employment rule that permits but does
not require prodiversity hiring will tend to result in a lumpy distribution
of diversity among hiring firms, such that some firms will come to have
high levels of diversity, while other firms will have minimal or no diversity. In contrast, an employment rule that requires color-blind hiring in
conditions of low labor-market diversity will tend to produce an even,
albeit low, level of diversity among all hiring firms.

D. Summary
Table 1 summarizes the results of the preceding four conditions.
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Six conclusions follow from these results. First, even when one takes into
account the diversity practices of firms- that is, whether they engage
in or refrain from using affirmative action hiring-the diversity of law
school student bodies (the diversity supply) remains crucial to the analysis. Second, a similar point can be made with respect to law: whatever
the governing legal regime with respect to whether employers are permitted to use affirmative action, the diversity of university student bodies will play an important role in shaping the diversity of the workplace.
These two points highlight the importance of affirmative action in the
educational domain. It is a significant mechanism through which diversity is supplied to the labor market.
This brings us to our third point. Our model provides only two ways
to achieve high diversity in all elite workplaces. One is to ensure high
diversity in elite student bodies. The other is to induce all law firms to
engage in affirmative action in conditions of job scarcity (creating an
amplification effect28).
Fourth, the results of Condition 1 might lead one to conclude that we
should jettison affirmative action in the employment context if we have
robust affirmative action in the educational context. The latter will necessarily be supplied to the former. That is indeed the story our theoretical model tells. But a limitation of our model is that we assume away
discrimination in the marketplace. If we add discrimination back into
the model-and not necessarily invidious discrimination but simply
implicit bias-the results under Condition 1 would change. For example, firms whose decision making reflected implicit bias would have a
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lower level of diversity than firms whose decision making did not reflect
this bias. For many proponents of affirmative action, this is precisely
what affirmative action is designed to counteract-biases (implicit and
explicit) in the labor market.
Fifth, understanding the foregoing limitation of our model is especially important in light of the Supreme Court's commitment to colorblindness and general judicial skepticism about workplace discrimination.29 This is a point we made earlier but bears emphasizing here.
Condition I is, for u s, decidedly theoretical. However, for the conservative justices on the Court, Condition 1 might be an assumed reality. That
has implications for the future of affirmative action in the context of
the workplace. If a majority of the Supreme Court concludes that wo rkplace discrimination is a thing of the past, it could conclude that, even
if affirmative action is necessary in the context of university admissions
to achieve student body diversity, it is unnecessary in the context of the
workplace, becau se the diversity of the student body would be reiterated
into the workplace.
Our sixth and final conclusion is this: in low educational diversity conditions, rules that permit prodiversity hiring will likely result in racial
clustering, and law firms will separate themselves over time into highdiversity and low-diversity workplaces. 30 This has implications for jurisdictions like California that prohibit state universities from engaging in
affirmative action. Some employees might find themselves in law firms
in which there is meaningful diversity. Most will not. Still, to the extent
that having meaningful diversity in some workplaces (Cond ition 4) is
better than having low diversity across all workplaces (Condition 2), we
should ensure that the prohibition of affirmative action in the context of
education is not extended to the context of employment.
Il l. Divergent Diversity Screens: Complicating the Reiteration
Dynamic

In modeling the supply of diversity from elite law schools to elite law
firms in Part II of this chapter, we assumed that law firms and law schools
share a common notion of "diversity." This need not be the case. A law
firm might employ very different criteria than law schools. Law schools
are admitting students to service multiple markets, including the public interest markets. As a general matter, these students are likely to be
more racially conscious with respect to both their sense of selves and
their normative commitments more generally. Moreover, as academic
institutions, law schools will likely seek to admit at least some students
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who they think will stir things up and facilitate the robust exchange of
ideas.
Law firms, on the other hand, may want very different kinds of diversity. Their corporate market context will presumably shape the kind
of-and how much-diversity they pursue. For example, while law firms
are prohibited from invoking customer preferences to justify screening
their application pool for racially palatable African Americans, it is hard
not to imagine that some firms end up (at least implicitly) doing just that.
To recognize that law schools and law firms do not necessarily employ
the same diversity screens is not to say that their diversity initiatives
must be regarded as autonomous. Indeed, we claim just the opposite.
For one thing, law firms and law schools might actually employ precisely
the same diversity criteria (e.g., looking for people who will facilitate
racial cooperation and understanding), in which case we might say that
their screens expressly converge. For another, even when law firms and
law school diversity criteria do not expressly converge in this way, the
diversity that actually arises in each context could nevertheless appear
to converge on a shared conception.
Suppose, for example, that law firms care more than law schools about
weeding out individuals with poor teamwork attributes. One might
assume that this could cause law firm diversity to diverge from law
school diversity. That is possible. But on the other hand, law firms might
find that the experience of a diverse elite law school prepares students
of all backgrounds to work productively and harmoniously in heterogeneous social settings. If this were true, even law firms that prioritize
teamwork might be happy to accept, without much further screening,
whatever type of diversity law schools produce. The general point is that
iflaw firms perceive value in the diversity produced by law schools, they
might seek to capitalize on that value by reproducing it in their workplaces.
Finally, law school and law firm diversity initiatives are not
autonomous in another way: any diversity criteria the law firm utilizes at
the hiring stage will necessarily piggyback on the diversity efforts of the
law school at the admissions stage. As argued above, the diversity of law
schools creates the diversity of the labor pool from which law firms hire.
Keeping in mind these ways in which law school and law firm diversity
initiatives are connected, we turn our focus in this section to how law
school and law firm initiatives can diverge. To appreciate how law firm
and law school diversity screening can diverge and the implications of
that divergence for the reiteration effect, let us call the set of minority
individuals who are the beneficiaries of affirmative action at the law
school admissions stage "Law School Diverse" or "LS-Diverse" individu-
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als. And let us call the set of minority individuals who are beneficiaries
at the law firm hiring stage "Law Firm Diverse" or "LF-Diverse" individuals. Some minorities might be both LS-Diverse and LF-Diverse, while
others might be neither.
Consider the ways in which the set of LS-Diverse individuals might
relate to LF- Diverse individuals. Quantitatively, the LF-Diverse group
could be larger than, smaller than, or the same size as the LS-Diverse
group. Qualitatively, the LF-Diverse group could overlap the LS-Diverse
group in whole, in part, or not at all. These various possibilities could be
combined in a number of ways. We will not attempt to march through
all of the permutations, but a few comments are in order.
For various reasons, the set of people who are the beneficiaries of
LF- Diversity initiatives might be different from those who previously
benefited from LS-Diversity initiatives. The two sets might be quantitatively different simply because universities and employers assign different weight to racial considerations in the selection process. A heavier
weighting will naturally tend to result in a larger set of individuals who
benefit from the diversity initiative.
There might also be systemic reasons for this quantitative divergence
between LS-Diversity and LF-Diversity. For example, if law schools
engage in robust affirmative action measures and succeed in creating
highly diverse student bodies, who then form the labor pool from which
law firms hire, law firms might perceive that there is less of a need for
them to use prodiversity affirmative action in order to achieve significant workplace diversity. They may assume, per our discussion in Part
II, that the diversity in the labor market will naturally "trickle up" or be
reiterated into the firm. This might be especially true of firms that conceive of themselves as nondiscriminatory. These firms would see little
need to employ affirmative action as a prophylactic against the possibility of discrimination. Under this scenario, the set of people who benefit
from LF-Diversity efforts may be low relative to the set of people who
benefit from LS-Diversity efforts.
Law firm and law school affirmative action initiatives might also yield
different sets of beneficiaries for reasons having to do with the contextdependent nature of diversity initiatives. LF-Diversity might be qualitatively different from LS-Diversity. Employers and universities might
look for different characteristics in constructing their institutional diversities. For example, employers might screen candidates for compatibility with their corporate culture in ways that constrain their prodiversity
hiring.31 In some cases, what might appear to be facially neutral screening criteria could cause LF-Diversity selections to be negatively correlated with LS-Diversity selections. A silly example: a law firm might
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screen in favor of minority candidates who, in addition to attending elite
law schools, attended prestigious private prep schools. But minority law
students with prep school backgrounds might be less likely than others
to have benefited from affirmative action at the law school admissions
stage-that is, less likely to be LS-Diverse. If so, then law firm screening for minorities who attended prestigious private prep schools could
cause LF-Diversity to be negatively correlated with LS-Diversity.
Law firm diversity and law school diversity might diverge in other
ways. Elite law firms and elite law schools might have different ideas
about the characteristics (in addition to simple racial phenotype) that
could make one person preferable to another from the standpoint of
enhancing the institution's diversity. The basic educational goals and
academic p rinciples that define the mission of elite universities (of
which elite law schools are a part) do not apply to most elite employers.32 The value of diversity in the educational context, or at least the
value that has been assigned constitutional significance, encompasses
a well-known melange of goods, including enhanced educational discourse, eradication of racial stereotypes and other types of de-biasing,
reduction of racial isolation, preparation for citizenry in a pluralistic
society, providing good modeling for minority youth, creation of a visible path for minorities leading to leadership roles in society, and so on.33
Against the background of these interests, a law school might make special efforts to enroll students from racial minority groups who are most
likely to bring an overtly "racial perspective" to classroom discussions.
This might include minority students who have th e least in common
with most other students with respect to their backgrounds and experiences, in order to activate Bakke! Grutter discourse benefits.
Law firms might also have an interest in fostering diverse perspectives
in the workplace on a different basis, such as the belief that this would
improve their ability to anticipate client or customer needs. But overriding concerns about workplace harmony might make employers wary
of hiring individuals who will have trouble fitting into the corporate culture.34 This does not mean that these institutions would seek individuals
who dis-identify with their race or embrace a color-blind sense of self.
Corporate cultures are increasingly interested in establishing so-called
affinity groups- that is, groups that are organized around specific identities (such as being gay or lesbian, a person of color, or a woman). While
these groups are less prevalent in the law firm context, elite law firms are
still interested in hiring people of color who will perform palatable or
modest forms of racial diversity work. The point is that it will be the rare
elite law firm that would hire an African American applicant because
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that person will shake up the firm's institutional culture. This is precisely
the kind of person an elite law school might admit.
More generally, the benefits that law schools as academic institutions
might seek to advance will not necessarily readily map onto the priorities of a typical (nonacademic) employer's workplace. To be clear, this is
not to say that law firms will perceive no value in diversity. The point,
instead, is that even when they perceive positive value in a diverse workforce, they may have different reasons than law schools for pursuing
diversity.
A final reason that law firm diversity screens might be different from
law school diversity screens is that the employer may be hiring from a
pool that has already been made diverse through affirmative action at
an earlier screening stage (the admissions process). This fact may have
varying implications. One possibility is that a law firm might make fine
distinctions between minority individuals within the pool who may have
been equal beneficiaries of prodiversity admissions criteria. It might do
so, for example, in order to screen out individuals who might clash with
its corporate culture.
Much of the foregoing is speculative. That should not obscure that
our analysis is theoretically grounded in the fact that law firms and law
schools operate under different incentive systems with respect to their
pursuit of diversity. The difference in their incentive structures means
that elite law firms may utilize different diversity-screening criteria than
law schools.

IV. The Demand Effect
In Part III, we explored the implications of law firms and law schools
employing different diversity screens. We assumed that these diversitypromoting criteria are stable over time and that they are independently
fixed within each context. In this part, we relax the latter assumptions
to explore the possibility that universities might adjust their admissions
policies in response to observed employment patterns, including
employers' revealed preferences about the kind of diversity they want.
Elite law schools operate in a competitive market. While their primary
mission may be educational and academic, they compete with each
other to attract exceptional students who will enrich the community,
perform to the highest academic standards, and make valuable contributions to society after they graduate. One way in which law schools
attract students is by trying to outperform their peer institutions in placing their graduates in the most desirable jobs. If they are unable to compete with other law schools in achieving placement of graduates in the
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job market, the best students will decide to matriculate elsewhere, which
will erode the affected schools' prestige and academic standing, eventually making it difficult for them to maintain their status among their
elite peers. The fact that placement rates figure significantly in the overall ranking of law schools makes this dynamic all the more significant.
The competition to place graduates in desirable jobs gives rise to an
incentive for universities to admit more of the types of students who are
sought by employers when they graduate and fewer of the types of students who are not. 35 Law schools may have multiple reasons to admit
or not admit a particular type of student. In general, to the extent that
employers actively seek graduates who possess some discernible set of
characteristics, universities will have an added incentive to look for those
characteristics in the students they admit. If law firms tend not to hire
graduates with some set of characteristics, then law schools will have less
reason to admit applicants fitting that type.
There is no reason that this demand effect should not apply to characteristics associated with enhancing workplace diversity. If elite law
firms give priority in their hiring to elite law school graduates who possess diversity-enhancing characteristics, law schools will have an added
incentive to screen in favor of those characteristics at the admissions
stage. That is to say, other things equal, 36 law schools that engage in affi.rmative action have an incentive to craft their diversity initiatives to give
preference to applicants who are likely to become LF-Diverse graduates.
The demand exerted by employers for graduates meeting their diversity
criteria could cause law firm and law school diversity initiatives to converge over time. 37 Whether this occurs will likely depend on the strength
of the law firm's diversity demand38 and the strength of the incentive for
the law school to respond to this demand. 39
V. Conclusion: Some Implications of Our Model

Our point of departure was the claim that the diversity of law schools
and of law firms is intertwined. What happens in one setting affects the
other. We then moved on to show some of the specific ways in which the
two contexts interact, including a discussion of how law firm diversity
initiatives might modulate the flow of diversity from law schools to law
firms and how those initiatives might in turn loop back to influence the
behavior oflaw school admissions committees. We conclude by suggesting several implications of our account for the development and promotion of workplace diversity.
First, the existence of diversity in the supply of labor that feeds into
the employment market is a necessary condition of workplace diversity.
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Workplace diversity cannot be created from thin air. And insofar as law
school student body diversity depends on educational affirmative action,
it follows that educational affirmative action is a necessary condition of
workplace diversity. In other words, in addition to constituting a law
school's entering class, law school admissions constitute the future law
firm application pool from which law firms hire.
Second, there is a quantitative and a qualitative dimension to this supply function. Quantitatively, the more aggressively prodiversity the law
school's admissions criteria are, the more diverse its contribution to the
hiring pool will be. Qualitatively, the stronger the convergence between
the kind of diversity in which a law firm is interested and the kind of
diversity a law firm seeks to advance, the greater the likelihood that the
law firm will rely on the law school's graduates as its employment pool
and thus the greater the likelihood that the law school's diversity will be
reiterated into the law firm.
Third, by and large, we ought not worry about law schools engaging
in "too much" affirmative action. Law firm behavior in this regard will
be disciplined by the competitive markets in which they operate. But
the same goes for the behavior of universities. Diversity initiatives in
the educational context are, after all, voluntary. Universities have no reason to engage in affirmative action beyond a level that balances educational usefulness with whatever demand for diversity actually exists in
the employment market.
Finally, we should query whether the story we tell about the demand
effect means that law firms may be exerting too much pressure on law
schools to conform their conception of diversity to the model that happens to prevail in the workplace. Law schools might have good reasons
to offer admission to the iconoclastic, overtly racialized student with
a penchant for challenging hierarchy and complacency with the status
quo. But law firms might be more reticent in offering that student a
job-and that might affect the law school's willingness to offer admissiOn.
Similarly, law firms and law schools might have a very different sense
of how much diversity is enough. ''Critical mass" from a law firm's perspective might look quite different from "critical mass" from the perspective of the law school- and the former might end up shaping the
latter. To put this another way, if law firms have a diversity saturation
point or a diversity ceiling, law schools have an incentive to adjust their
affirmative action efforts to keep the diversity of their student bodies
below that level. The concern, in sh ort, is that the demand effect can
influence both the quantitative and the qualitative supply of diversity
throughout the loop. This suggests that we ought to begin a conversa-
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tion about whether there are ways to effectuate a counterbalancing force
so that a law school's quantitative and qualilative commitments to diversily not only are shaped by but also shape how law firms articulate their
vision of a diverse workplace.
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motivated- based on bias, prejudice, or preferences that operate to the
disadvantage of racial minorities. We do not count the use of prodiversity racial
preferences as discrimination. We recognize that this is a contested question in
the legal context of Title VII interpretation.
23.

We might add that any observed statistically significant disparities in levels of
diversity between firms could presumptively be attributed to discrimination
(either intentional or not) or to positive employer preferences for diversity.

24.

See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart]. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs
in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & PoL'v REv. 103, 115 (2009)
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(arguing that empirical data on low success rates for employment discrimination
plaintiffs "raises the specter that federal appellate courts have a double standard
for employment discrimination cases, harshly scrutinizing employees' victories
below while gazing benignly at employers' victories"); see also Kerri Lynn Stone,
Shortcuts in Employment Discrimination Law, 56 ST. Lours U. LJ. lll, 159-62 (2011)
(summarizing recent scholarship on judicial hostility toward employment
discrimination claims).
25. The qualification in our hypothetical rule permitting consideration of race only
if"reasonably necessary" is not based on current Title VII law. But if the Supreme
Court were to recognize a diversity-based justification for affirmative action in
hiring, we believe the Court would impose some limitation of this sort, if not an
even more restrictive one.
26.

In Condition 3, if an elite firm mistakenly believes that consideration of race is
necessary for workplace diversity, the firm will end up with a level of diversity
that is either equal to or higher than the level of diversity in the pool of available
students. If the firm's prodiversity hiring results in a level of diversity that is equal
to that in the pool, then the firm's "unnecessary" consideration of race should
have no effect on the overall distribution of diversity among firms. If the firm, as
a result of its positive consideration of race, produces a higher level of diversity in
its own workplace than is present in the overall applicant pool, this might tend to
cause an increased level of diversity relative to the firms that perceive (correctly,
according to our assumptions) that consideration of race is not necessary.

27.

One might think that the answer would depend on the ratio of elite students
in the available labor pool to available positions. If there are at least as many
employment positions available as there are elite students looking for jobs, then
the uniform application of affirmative action preferences by employers should
not disrupt the full and uniform propagation of the low level of diversity that
exists in the elite student pool to the workplace. However, if there are fewer
employment positions available than elite students in the pool, affirmative action
will cause minority workers to be hired at a greater rate than nonminority
workers, which will result in a level of workplace diversity that is higher than
the level of diversity in the candidate pooL In this case, one might argue that
the diversity of the pool would not only propagate to the workplace but also
be amplified. While this is theoretically possible, it seems equally possible that in
conditions of job scarcity, employers would either consciously or unconsciously
scale back their affirmative action hiring so as not to exceed a certain "saturation"
point for workplace diversity. If so, then there would be no amplification effect.

28.

See supra note 27.

29. See Stone, supra note 24, at 159-62.
30. We say this is likely-not certain-in our model because clustering would not
occur if all employers act in perfect unison with respect to their permitted use of
prodiversity preferences.
31. For purposes of this discussion, we still assume, as in Part II, that employers
regard all graduates of elite universities as comparably qualified for positions in
their workplaces, but we introduce the possibility that employers might consider
characteristics other than objective qualifications in constructing their workforce.
32. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 570 U.S., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2418 (2013) (stating that "[t)he
academic mission of a university is 'a special concern of the First Amendment"'
(quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978)).
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33. See generally Devon W. Carbado, lntraracial Diversity, 60 UCLA L. REv. 1130 (2013).
34.

Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory,
112 YALE LJ. 1757 (2003) (book review) (surveying the literature on the extent to
which corporate workplaces are often structured to achieve homogeneity).

35.

Significantly, law schools are very much aware of where their students end up.
For at least the past two decades, largely because of law school rankings but also
to facilitate alumni relationships and giving, schools have been keeping fairly
accurate records about where their graduates end up.

36. We readily concede that other things may not be equal. For example, if LFDiversity is insufficient to fully activate the educational benefits that might be
possible with other modes of diversity, then universities might give priority 'to
achievement of those educational benefits even at the cost of marginally lower
employment of graduates. But our point is that employer demand for a particular
type of diversity will exert a pull in that direction, not that the value of LfDiversity will necessarily trump all other law school values.
37. We would not predict complete convergence because satisfying employer
demand is only part of (and concededly, perhaps only a small part of) the
educational benefit of a diverse student body. See discussion in Part III above.
38. At least two factors could shape the strength of this demand: the law firm's
substantive commitment to diversity and the employer's symbolic commitment
to diversity. With respect to the substantive commitment, an employer might be
committed to diversity because it thinks (a) it is the right thing to do, (b) diversity
will improve workplace efficiency and productivity, and (c) it provides access to
markets. With respect to the symbolic commitment, an employer might simply
want to signal ("showcase") diversity to avoid the teputational costs of not doing
so.

39. The strength of this incentive would tum on (a) how important employment
rankings are to the overall ranking of the institution, (b) how much attention
students pay to employment rates and/ or rankings, and (c) whether jobs are
scarce. As to the scarcity of jobs, we note that in conditions of full employment,
the demand effect will be weak unless employers actively avoid hiring students
who are LS-Diverse-a possibility that is factored out by our initial assumptions
of Part II. The demand effect will be most pronounced when law firms implemem
diversity initiatives in conditions of job scarcity. In those conditions, LF-Diverse
students will be hired at a disproportionately higher rate than all other students,
giving rise to an incentive for law schools to admit more students fitting that
profile.
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Is the Future of Affirmative Action Race
Neutral?

BrianT. Fitzpatrick

The outlook does not appear particularly bright for affirmative action
programs in the United States that grant preferences based on race to
blacks, Hispanics, and others in hiring, university admissions, and bidding on government contracts. These programs continue to be unpopular with the public and face increasing hostility in courts of law. 1 In
their place, courts and commentators have been promoting an alternative form of affirmative action that I will call "race-neutral affirmative
action." Race-neutral affirmative action seeks to change the racial composition of those who benefit from employment, education, or government spending not by granting preferences based on race (what I
will call "racially explicit affirmative action") but by granting preferences
based on characteristics that are correlated with race. That is, as I will
define it, the purpose of race-neutral affirmative action is the same as
the purpose of racially explicit affirmative action-to increase the num bers of c~rtain racial groups who benefit from these opportunities. But
the means are different: race-neutral affirmative action uses correlates of
race rather than race itself.
Perhaps the best-known race-neutral affirmative action program in
the United States is the Texas Ten Percent Plan at the University of Texas,
which grants automatic admission to any in-state applicant who gradu-
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ated in the top 10 percent of his or her high school class. 2 For applicants
admitted under this plan, the Texas legislature eschewed all other criteria in favor of high school class rank because the racial segregation that
still exists in Texas high schools leads class rank to correlate with applicants who are black and Hispanic better than other traditional admissions criteria such as SAT scores. 3 For the same reason, other universities
have adopted preferences for poor, bilingual, and first-generation applicants, as well as for students who have "overcome diversity" or "demonstrated cultural awareness."4 Although many of these preferences have
merits of their own, when they are motivated in whole or in part by
their ability to generate racial diversity, I call them race-neutral affirmative action.
As 1 noted, courts have become increasingly hostile to racially explicit
affirmative action, and many commentators have turned to promoting
this sort of race-neutral affirmative action instead. 5 Indeed the United
States Supreme Court recently vacated a lower court's approval of a new,
racially explicit affirmative action program at the University of Texas in
part because the Texas Ten Percent Plan alone had been so successful
there.6 The Court will consider the question again this corning year.
In this chapter, I examine the rise of race-neutral affirmative action in
the United States and assess the costs and benefits of trying to diversify
through race-neutral means. I conclude, first, that, although courts have
been promoting race-neutral affirmative action, they have yet to confront serious questions about whether it is any more constitutional than
racially explicit affirmative action. In my view, it is hard to square raceneutral affirmative action with the Supreme Court's cases that prohibit
programs that have both the purpose and effect of racial discrimination.
Second, even if the courts decide not to adhere to these past cases, it is
unclea~ whether race-neutral affirmative action is any less problematic
than racially explicit affirmative action. Although race-neutral affirmative action may be less divisive and less stigmatizing to its beneficiaries,
I suspect it will be so much less efficient at bringing about racial diversity that it will require institutions to make much greater sacrifices to
other aspects of their missions. Indeed, the race-neutral programs that
are likely to be the least divisive and least stigmatizing are probably also
those that are the least efficient at diversifying. For both of these reasons,
I am not sure race-neutral affirmative action is the panacea that many
seem to think it is.
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I. The Rise of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action

As is well known, in the late 1960s, employers, governments, and universities began efforts to increase opportunities for racial minorities
by granting preferences to blacks and Hispanics who applied for jobs,
university admissions, and government contracts? These efforts were
highly controversial from their inception-both politically and
legally8-but they received qualified legal blessings from the United
States Supreme Court in 1978 in education, 9 in 1979 in employment, 10
and in 1980 in government contracting. 11 As the federal judiciary
became more conservative in the 1980s, the legal foundation of racially
explicit affirmative began to weaken,12 but it has thus far survived, if only
by the narrowest of margins.13 Nonetheless, many observers believe it is
only a matter of time before the legal foundation crumbles altogether. 14
Indeed, even jurists supportive of racially explicit affirmative action have
said it should come to an end in the next several years. 15 Courts hostile
to racially explicit affirmative action have cited the availability of raceneutral affirmative action as one reason for their hostility. 16
In some ways, the political fortunes of racially explicit affirmative
action have improved over time even as its legal fortunes have declined.
Although the Republican Party made these programs a prominent target
in the 1980s and 1990s, the party has now largely abandoned its opposition.17 In light of the increasing racial diversity of the population of
the United States, I believe the prospects for the opposition to resume
are dim. Nonetheless, the programs remain unpopular with the public. 18
Consequently, antipreference activists have gone around the political
parties in a number of states and directly to a plebiscite for votes to
ban their governments (but not private parties) from using racial preferences.19 These efforts have almost always succeeded and are likely to
continue. 20 To date, there are now six states where state governments
and state universities have been prohibited from using racially explicit
affirmative action by direct democracy: California (1996), 21 Washington
(1998),22 Michigan (2006), 23 Nebraska (2008),24 Arizona (2010), 25 and
Oklahoma (2012).26 Two other states have enacted these prohibitions
through other means: Florida (1999)27 and New Hampshire (2011). 28
Where racially explicit affirmative action has been banned, the states
faced a choice: forgo efforts to increase opportunities for racial minorities or practice race-neutral affirmative action-that is, to find correlates
with race and to replace preferences for race with preferences for those
correlates. In many instances, state universities chose the latter course. 29
As I explained above, one of the best-known examples is the University
of Texas (which lost the ability to use race by court decision30), which
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elevated high school class rank in its admissions decisions over any other
criteria because it was better correlated with black and Hispanic applicants.31 Other states-such as Califomia and Florida-also rely heavily
on this correlate with race.32 Class rank is better correlated with race
than other traditional admissions criteria in these states because the high
schools are still so racially segregated. 33 Other universities have used or
considered using preferences for other correlates with race, including
family income, residence in urban areas, and bilingualism. 34 There is no
reason similar correlates cannot be used to replace racial preferences in
employment and even government contracting (a popular example in
the latter context is preferences for smaller business). 35 Although there
have been periods of transition, these correlates have proven largely
successful in achieving levels of racial diversity in universities similar
to those achieved with racial preferences. 36 It is harder to find data on
employment and government contracts, but there is some evidence that
race-neutral affirmative action has been less successful at diversifying in
these contexts. 37
Many commentators believe that the trend in favor of race-neutral
affirmative action will continue, compelled by the public, by the courts,
or by both. 38 Indeed, many commentators believe that racially explicit
affirmative action will eventually meet its demise and that the only
future for affirmative action in the United States is the race-neutral variety.39 On this point, it is interesting to note that race-neutral affirmative
action apparently is now being used in other countries, even those that
never had the appetite for the racially explicit variety.40
Some commentators have celebrated this future while others have
decried it.41 As I explain below, I am not persuaded that race-neutral
affirmative action should fill the void that may be left by the demise
of racially explicit affirmative action in the United States. As 1 explain,
not only are race-neutral programs with racial purposes as legally dubious as racially explicit programs, but it also may very well be the case
that race-neutral affirmative action is no less problematic than racially
explicit affirmative action.
II. Is Race-Neutral Affirmative Action Constitutional?

Many commentators believe that race-neutral affirmative action can
overcome the legal infirmities that still dog racially explicit affirmative
action.42 As I have written in the past and as I explain in this section, I
think the legal advantages of race-neutral affirmative action have been
seriously overstated. 43
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Racially explicit affirmative action is legally infirm because using racial
classifications to burden or benefit individuals must pass the Supreme
Court's "strict scrutiny" test in order to satisfy the Equal Protection
Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Under this test, affirmative action must
be supported by a "compelling government interest" and be "narrowly
tailored" to support that interest.44 Although the Supreme Court has recognized a few compelling interests in this context-for example, correcting for an institution's own past discrimination45 and reaping the
educational benefits of racial diversitl6 -the Court continues to make
it hard on racially explicit affirmative action. 47 For example, in Fisher v.
University of Texas,48 the Court sent a racially explicit affirmative action
program back for further litigation over whether the university had
proven that marginal educational benefits continued to accrue at the levels of diversity it was seeking.49 The Court will consider the question
anew this coming year.
Some commentators believe that strict scrutiny can be avoided altogether with race-neutral affirmative action because it does not rely on
racial classifications,50 but I think this view is mistaken. In a number
of cases, the Supreme Court has held that race-neutral classifications
must satisfy the strict-scrutiny test when they have the same purpose
and effect as racially explicit classifications.51 As the Court put it in one
case, "[a] racial classification .. .is presumptively invalid and can be upheld
only upon an extraordinary justification. This rule applies as well to a
classification that is ostensibly neutral but is a...pretext for racial discrirnination."52 Almost by definition, these holdings would encompass raceneutral affirmative action. 53
Other commentators believe that the legal parity between raceneutral-but-racially-motivated classifications and racially explicit classifications should not include race-neutral classifications that are motivated to help blacks and Hispanics as opposed to hurt them.54 But, as it
has with so-called benign racially explicit classifications,55 the Supreme
Court has already applied strict scrutiny to race-neutral classifications
that seek to aid blacks and Hispanics in its voting-district gerrymandering cases.56
In my view, there is only one way in which race-neutral affirmative
action is on firmer legal footing than racially explicit affirmative action:
the narrow-tailoring inquiry in the strict scrutiny test for race proxies is
easier to satisfy than it is for racially explicit programs.57 Other than that,
however, race-neutral affirmative action would seem to have to overcome all the same legal barriers that racially explicit affirmative action
does, including the barrier for which the Supreme Court remanded in
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Fisher: to show that marginal increases in racial diversity continue to further a compelling interest.
With all this said, it should be emphasized that the Supreme Court
is much like the stock market in at least one respect: past performance
is no guarantee of futu re success. The Court's personnel changes over
time, and precedents are not always followed. Moreover, justices are free
to change their minds. Constitutional law is, to a large extent, politicallaw,58 and, if race-neutral affirmative action maintains its popularity
with the public, the Supreme Court may look for ways to facilitate it.59
There is some reason to believe this transition is already underway.60
Ill. The Social Desirability of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action

Perhaps courts will give a green light to race-neutral affirmative action
despite the precedents I marshaled in the previous part. Does that mean
that race-neutral affirmative action should fill the void that many commentators believe will be left by racially explicit affirmative action's
demise? I am not so sure. As I explain in this part, it may very well be
that race-neutral affirmative action is just as problematic as the racially
explicit variety.
A. The Advantages of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action

There are some reasons to believe that race-neutral affirmative action
will be less problematic than racial preferences. Many commentators,
for example, favor race-neutral affirmative action because they believe
it can achieve the same amount of racial diversity as racial preferences
but without as much racial divisiveness. 61 The assertion here is that the
same people who find racially explicit affirmative action immoral or
otherwise objectionable do not get as exercised about preferences of
other sorts-even if those preferences are correlated with race and were
selected for that very reason. Indeed, there does seem to be empirical
support for the notion that the public favors at least some race-neutral
programs more than racially explicit ones, such as the Texas Ten Percent Plan and preferences based on family income.6 2 In many of these
surveys, however, it may have been hard for the public to know whether
the race-neutral program was or was not motivated by its racial effects
as opposed to some end independent of racial diversity. Some commentators are skeptical that the public will support these programs if it is
aware of the racial motivations. 63 On the other hand, the motivation
behind the Texas Ten Percent Plan should have been apparent to any
observer,64 and that does not seem to have detracted from its popular-
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ity. Thus, I tend to agree that race-neutral affirmative action is probably
less divisive than the racially explicit variety.
Other commentators believe that race-neutral affirmative action will
not burden individuals aided by it with the same stigma that is associated with preferences based on race.65 The notion here is that the
same people who might think less of blacks or Hispanics because they
may have been admitted to a university or received a government contract or job in part because of their race will not think the same way if
they received the same benefits because of other criteria-even if, again,
those other criteria are correlated with race and selected for that very
reason. This claim is harder to prove, and I am not aware of any empirical evidence either for or against it. Nonetheless, for the same reason
that race-neutral programs tend to be less divisive and more popular
with the public, it may very well be that the beneficiaries of these programs are not held in lower regard.
Some people also believe that race-neutral affirmative action is a less
problematic way to generate racial diversity because it avoids the messy
business of figuring out who belongs in one racial group or another in
order to determine who should benefit from a racial preference and who
should not. 66 Although this business may have been messy at one time,
in recent years, racial preferences have largely operated on the "honor
system," where individuals self-declare their race. 67 Thus, it strikes me
that any advantage here may be insignificant.
B. The Disadvantages of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action

Although race-neutral affirmative action may offer some advantages
over racially explicit affirmative action, I believe it also comes with disadvantages. The biggest problem with race-neutral affirmative action is
that it is much less efficient at generating racial diversity than racial preferences are. 68 By definition, proxies or correlates for race will sweep in
individuals of all races, including those for whom greater representation
is not sought, usually whites and Asians.69 How much less efficient raceneutral affirmative action is depends on how good the correlates for race
are. Some correlates-such as residence in urban areas-may be highly
correlated with race. For example, Wayne State Universily Law School
in Michigan has adopted an admissions policy that gives preferences to
applicants from Detroit, which is almost 90 percent black and Hispanic,
in order to maintain diversity in the face of the ban on racial preferences in Michigan.7° But other correlates such as family income and
high school class rank are very inefficient-blacks and Hispanics make
up much smaller percentages of individuals from impoverished fami-
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lies or who graduated at the top of their high school class; 71 these correlates are not very good, but they are used because they are better than
SAT scores. This loss in efficiency has a serious and negative implication:
in order to achieve desired levels of diversity with race- neutral affirmative action, universities, employers, and governments may have to forgo
other criteria that are important to their missions. For example, under
the Texas Ten Percent Plan, in order to achieve the same racial diversity
it had when it used racial preferences, huge portions of the University of
Texas had to be admitted on class rank alone; 72 the state finally permitted the University to cap Ten Percent admissions at 75 percent of each
freshman class.73 All of the other characteristics that a university might
think are important to assemble in a successful student body-good test
scores, extracurricular activities, leadership skills, perseverance, and so
on-must be relegated to the remaining 25 percent of the student body.
That strikes me as an incredible sacrifice to institutional mission.
Some commentators believe another disadvantage to race-neutral
affirmative action is that it undermines transparency in government
because race-neutral affirmative action obscures the racial motivations
behind legislation.74 This may be one reason race-neutral affirmative
action is less divisive than racially explicit affirmative action: th e public
simply may not realize that race-neutral affirmative action is motivated
by racial diversity at all; perhaps if the public knew that, it would not
support race-neutral affirmative action either. On the other hand, as I
noted above, when I think it has been clear to the public that raceneutral programs were racially motivated, as it was with the Texas Ten
Percent Plan, the public still supports the programs more than it does
racial preferences. Of course, the Texas Ten Percent Plan is only one
example, and it may be true as a general matter that it is difficult for
the public to see the ''affirmative action" side to race-neutral affirmative
action. Certain schools of political science might see this as a cost to
race-neutral affirmative action.
Some commentators also oppose race-neutral affirmative action
because they think its success is a product of-rather than an antidote
to - discrimination against blacks and Hispanics.75 For example, university preferences based on class rank achieve diversity only to the extent
that school segregation persists. Preferences for urban residents do so
only to the extent that neighborhoods are segregated by race. Preferences for family income do so only to the extent that blacks and Hispanics are stuck in greater poverty than whites and Asians. For these
commentators, race-neutral programs "lock in" racial segregation and
disadvantages based on race rather than break them?6 This argument
has some rhetorical appeal, but I am unsure if race-neutral affirma-
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live action does any less to free blacks and Hispanics from, for example, poverty and segregation than racially explicit affirmative action. If
racially explicit affirmative action in education, employment, and government contracting mitigates poverty and segregation by increasing
the wealth and improving the aspirations among blacks and Hispanics as
many commentators suggest,77 then why would race-neutral affirmative
action not do the same so long as it places the same n umbers of blacks
and Hispanics into these opportunities? In other words, I am not sure
this should count as a "cost" of using race-neutral affirmative action to
bring about racial diversity.
C. Assessment

Although the empirical evidence is somewhat undeveloped, raceneutral affirmative action may well be able to generate the same racial
diversity as racially explicit affirmative action without two serious downsides: racial divisiveness and stigmatization. At the same time, however,
it may impose a cost of its own: because it is a less efficient means to
achieving racial diversity, it may force institutions to sacrifice other ends
important to their missions. A rigorous assessment of these costs and
benefits is a difficult endeavor that certainly goes beyond the scope of
this book chapter, if it is possible at all. That is, it may be impossible to
discern (at least in any coherent way) which is worse: fostering racial animosity and social stigma or undermining the institutional missions of
our universities and governments.
Nonetheless, there is one feature of the above discussion that leads
me to suspect that it is unlikely that race-neutral affirmative action will
be any less socially problematic than racially explicit affirmative action.
This feature is that the advantages offered by a race-neutral affirmative
action program are likely to be directly correlated with its disadvantages. In other words, the race- neutral programs that will be the least
divisive and least stigmatizing are probably the same ones that rely on the
weakest correlates for race and will pose the greatest costs to institutional
missions. I think this might be the case for two reasons. First, weaker
correlates benefit whites and Asians more frequently; thus, from simple
self-interest, individuals from these groups (the groups mostly likely to
find such programs divisive and to impose social stigma on others) may
well prefer weaker correlates. Second, because they are so inefficient, it
may be less apparent from weaker correlates that they were adopted for
racial reasons. This could lead to more support from whites and Asians
if racial motivations behind legislative programs are what triggers opposition to them.
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Indeed, as I noted, preferences based on family income and, in the
university setting, high school class rank (such as the Texas Ten Percent
Plan) tend to be popular with the public, but these criteria are at the
same time poorly correlated with race. In regions with segregated
schools like Texas, the racial composition of individuals with top high
school rankings will be little different than the racial composition of
high school-aged students in the region overall; although this may make
class rank a better correlate with race than other traditional university
admissions criteria, it is still a weak one. Family income is a somewhat
better proxy for race-the racial composition of families in poverty is
more skewed toward blacks and Hispanics than is the overall population78-but even this correlation is not particularly strong.
If I am correct about this, and only those race-neutral programs that
require institutions to make the greatest sacrifices to their missions will
offer corresponding advantages over racially explicit affirmative action,
then it is easy to see how race-neutral affirmative action may be no less
costly to society than is racially explicit affirmative action.

IV. Conclusion
Many advocates of racial diversity have pinned their hopes on raceneutral affirmative action to take the place of racially explicit affirmative
should it meet its political or legal demise. But I do not see race- neutral
affirmative action as the panacea that some do. Although race-neutral
programs appear to have the support of increasingly conservative courts
and of many commentators, these judges and commentators have not
yet wrestled with what I believe are serious constitutional questions
posed by these programs. Moreover, even if these questions are pushed
to the side, it is not clear to me that race-neutral programs are any
less problematic: the very programs that are likely to offer the greatest
advantages over racial preferences may very well pose the greatest costs.
As a result, if the future of affirmative action is indeed to be race-neutral,
it may not be a particularly happy one for proponents of increased
opportunities for blacks and Hispanics.
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students and not enough rich ones. See Tr. of Oral Arg. at 43-44 (Ali to,].) ("Well,
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offederal policy in an executive order issued by President Kennedy in 1961. Exec.
Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R 448 (Mar. 6, 1961). Four years later, President Johnson
directed federal contractors to "take affirmative action" to end djscrimination
in hiring. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 340 (Sept. 24, 1965). At the time,
"affirmative action" referred to "organized efforts by government and other
institutions to make su re that opportunities...were truly open to alL" RICHARD
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SANDER & STUART TAYLOR, jR., MISMATCH: How AFFIRMATIVE ACTION HURTS
STUDENTS IT'S INTENDED TO HELP, AND WHY UNIVERSITIES WON'T ADMIT IT 15
(2012). These actions paved the way for the "Zenith of Affirmative Action" in the
late 1960s and 1970s. ANDERSON,supra, at lll - 60.
8. SeeKENNEDY, supra note 7, at 53-54. While there is not "systemic, n ational polling
data" from the 1960s on racial preferences, "[i]solated instances in which poll
questions on affirmative action were asked in the 1960s suggest that, even in this
early period, the general public was highly opposed to preferential treatment."
ELAINE B. SHARP, THE SOMETIME CONNECTION: PUBLIC OPINION AND SOCIAL
ORDER 74-75 (1999); see also, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 7, at 75-83 (describing
competing notions of fairness "mired in debate" and the Goldwater-led
opposition to preferences, quotas, and proportional hiring); cf Richard D.
Kahlenberg, The Class-Based Future ofAffirmative Action, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT,
June 25, 2013, http://prospect.org/article/class-based-future-affirmative-action
[hereinafter Kahlenberg, Class-Based Future] ("[A)ffirmative action based on race
has been politically problematic for the left from the earliest days ... ").
9. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) ("[T]he State
has a substantial interest that legitimately may be served by... the competitive
consideration of race and ethnic origin.").
10.

See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979) (holding that
Title VII "does not condemn all private, voluntary, race-conscious affirmative
action plans").

ll. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472 (1980) (plw·ality opinion) (deferring
to congressional judgment that a remedial race-conscious contracting program
is necessary to ensure equal protection). The Court later retreated from Fullilove,
holding that strict scrutiny is the proper standard of review for race-conscious
contracting preferences. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227
(1995).
12. SeeKENNEDY, supra note 7, at 54- 69 (discussing the "affirmative action stalemate"
that has developed since the late 1970s); ANDERSON, supra note 7, at 189-205
(describing the halting narrowing of affirmative action in the 1980s and general
solidarity of Reagan appointees in opposing racial preferences). In a survey of
federal district judges in the early 1990s, approximately 78 percent agreed with
the statement, "Overall, the federal judiciary is becoming more 'conservative'
than it was in the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s." SeeKEVIN K. LYLES, THE
GATEKEEPERS: FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS lN THE POLITICAL PROCESS 28-30 (1997).
This is no doubt a residual effect of President Reagan's unprecedented
opportunity to remake the federal judiciary: Reagan made more appointments
to the circuit courts of appeals than any other President and is second only
to President Clinton for number of district court appointments. U.S. COURTS,
jUDGESHIP
APPOINTMENTS
BY
PRESIDENT,
http://www.uscourts.gov/
JudgesAndjudgeshipsNiewer.aspx?doc=/ uscourts/judgesJudgeships/docs/
appointments-by-president.pdf (last visited jan. 28, 2014); see David M. O'Brien,
Federal Judgeships in Retrospect, inTHE REAGAN PRESIDENCY: PRAGMATIC
CONSERVATISM & ITS LEGACIES 327, 327 (W. Elliot Brownlee & Hugh Davis Graham
eds., 2003) ("Reagan appointed close to half of all lower court judges, more
than any other previous president."). Most of these appointees were "opposed to
[racial] preferences" and laid the foundation for later Supreme Court decisions
"dirninish[ing] affirmative action." ANDERSON, supra, at 215-16. See
generallyTHOMAS M. KECK, T HE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE
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ROAD TO MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM (2010) (recounting the emergence of
conservative judicial activism in the late 1970s and 1980s).
13. See, e.g.• Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (sustaining the University of
Michigan Law School's affirmative action program by 5-4 vote).
14. E.g., RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE CENTURY FOUNDATION, A BETTER AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION: STATE UNIVERSITIES THAT CREATED ALTERNATIVES TO RACIAL
PREFERENCES 1, 7- 10 (2012) (hereinafter KAHLENBERG, A BETTER AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION], available at http://tcf.org/assets/downloads/tcf-abaa.pdf ("After almost a
half century, American higher education's use of racial preferences in admissions
to selective colleges may well be coming to an end:'); Kim Forde-Mazrui, The
Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action, 88 GEO. L.J. 2331,
2337-51 (2000) (questioning the legal future of race-conscious affirmative action);
Keith E. Sealing, The Myth of a Color-Blind Constitution, 54 WASH. U.]. URB. &
CoNTEMP. L. 157, 207 (1998) ("[A]n overly strict application of the race-neutral
alternatives ... [would] assure that strict scrutiny is indeed fatal in fact. There are
always theoretically workable race-neutral alternatives available, and they almost
always fail to work.").
15. Justice O'Connor, who joined with her more liberal colleagues to provide the
critical fifth vote in Grutter, famously predicted: "We expect that 25 years from
now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the
interest approved today." 539 U.S. at 343.
16. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 570 U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420-21 (2013) (holding the
court of appeals failed to determine that adding a race-conscious component
to a race-neutral affirmative action program was "necessary... to achieve the
educational benefits of diversity" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
17. For example, although Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush waged several
high-profile battles against affirmative action, George W. Bush basically
abandoned the issue-if not switched sides on it. See, e.g., Harry Stein, Now the
GOP Is for Affirmative Action?, CITY JOURNAL (Autumn 2006), http://www.cityjournal.org/html/16 _ 4_gop_affirmative_action.html
("[T]he
Republican
backtracking on preferences in Michigan reflects a quiet but steady shift in the
national party, too, with the Bush administration undercutting affirmative-action
foes-longtime GOP supporters-by embracing the 'diversity' mantra that
liberals so fervently preach."). Likewise, recent Republican presidential candidates
have not emphasized the issue. See, e.g.. Peter Schmidt, Texas Lawsuit Complicates
Presidential Race, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., July 30, 2012, http://chronicle.com/
anicle/ U -of-Texas-Admissions-Case/133203 ("Mr. Romney's campaign has yet
to make any major pronouncements on affirmative action and ... [his] record on
affirmative action is difficult to parse."). Similarly, while California Governor Pete
Wilson made enactment of Proposition 209, a direct democracy initiative
banning racial preferences by state government, a centerpiece of his
administration in lhe 1990s, no governor in recent years has done so. See B.
Drummond Ayres Jr., On Affirmative Action, Wilson's Moderate Path Quickly Veered
to Right, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1995, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/08/08/us/ onaffirmative-action-wilson-s-moderate-path-veered-quickly-to-right.html?.
18. The public gives conflicting answers when it is asked whether it supports "racial
preferences" (no) or "affirmative action" (yes). SeePEW RESEARCH CTR., PUBLIC
BACKS AFFlRMAT!VE ACTION, BUT NOT MINORITY PREFERENCES Uune 2, 2009),
http://www.pewresearch.org/ 2009/ 06/ 02/public-backs-affirmative-action -butnot-minority-preferences/. The more meaningful surveys move beyond these
vague terms and ask the public directly whether it supports using race as a factor
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in decision making. Americans have consistently opposed this practice; a recent
poll found opposition by a two-to-one margin (67 percem to 28 percem) even if
it "result[ed] in few minority students being admitted" to colleges. jeffrey M.
jones, In U.S., Most Reject Considering Race in College Admissions, GALLUP POLL NEWS
SERV. (July 24, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/163655/reject-considering-racecollege-admissions.aspx.
19. SeeKENNEDY, supra note 7, at 69-76 (discussing California's Proposition 209 and
subsequent ballot initiatives to ban affirmative action); DANIEL C. LEWIS, DIRECT
DEMOCRACY AND MINORITY RIGHTS 42- 44 (2013) (evaluating role of direct
democracy in state affirmative action bans).
20.

As of this writing, voters in six states have succeeded in banning affirmative
action through referenda. See infra notes 21-26 and accompanying text. The 2008
ballot initiative in Colorado remains the only failed statewide attempt to ban
racial preferences through direct democracy. See Reeves Wiedeman, How Colorado
Became the First State to Reject a Ban on Ajfinnative Action, CllRON. OF HJCIIER EDUC.,
Nov. 10, 2008, http://chronicle.com/ article/ Analysis-Why-Colorado-Failed/1317;
see also Sam Howe Verhovek, Referendum in Houston Shows Comple:rity of Preferences
Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1997, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/ ll/ 06/ us/
1997-elections-affirmative-action -referendum-houston -showscomplexity.html?pagewanted=aU&src=pm (reporting on failed ballot initiative in
Houston). For an accounting of state-based efforts to ban affirmative action, see
NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, AfFIRMATIVE ACTION: STATE ACTION
(Nov. 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/educ/affirmative-action-stateaction.aspx.

21.

CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31 (Proposition 209). See generallyLYDIA CHAVEZ, THE COLOR
BIND: CALIFORNIA'S CAMPAIGN TO END AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1998).

22.

WASH . REv. CODE ANN. § 49.60.400 (West 2013) (Initiative 200).

23.

MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26 (Proposal 2). The Michigan ban was upheld by the U.S.
Supreme Court. See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration &
Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equal. By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct.
1623 (2014).

24.

NEB. CaNST. art. I, § 30 (Initiative 424).

25.

Aruz. CaNST. art. II, § 36 (Proposition 107).

26.

OKLA. CaNST. art. II, § 36A (Question 759).

27.

In 1999, Governor jeb Bush banned the use of race or gender preference in
college admissions by executive order. Fla. Exec. Order No. 99-281 (Nov. 9, 2009),
available at http://www.dms.myflorida.com/contentldownload/705/ 3389/ file/
Executive0rder99-28l.pdf. This was a supplement to the state's general ban on
discrimination in public education. SeeFLA. STAT. ANN. § 1000.05(2) (West 2013).
In early 2000, the Florida Board of Regents adopted the governor's ban on
affirmative action and his proposal for a "talented twenty" percentage plan. Karla
Schuster, Regents Approve One Florida Plan, ORLANDO SUN SENTINEL, Feb. 18, 2000,
http://articles.sun -sentinel.com/ 2000-02- 18/ news/ 0002180223 _ 1_ newadmissions-admissions-rules-preferences; see also Peter T. Kilborn, Jeb Bush Roils
Florida on Affinnative Action, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2000, http://www.nytimes.com/
2000/ 02/ 04/ us/jeb-bush-roils-florida-on-affirmative -action.html
(discussing
E.O. 99-281 and the "One Florida" program).

28.

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 21-!:52 (2013) (House Bill 623).

29.

See, e.g., KAHLENBERC, A BETTER AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 14, at 26-63
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(describing states' and universities' responses to affirmative action bans);
KENNEDY, supra note 7, at 92 ("One response is to create interventions sensitive
to the racial dimensions of class stratification."); David Leonhardt, The New
Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES MAc., Sept. 30,2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/
09/ 30/ magazine/ 30affirmative-t.html (chronicling changes in the University of
California System post-Prop. 209).
30.

Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 962 (5th Cir. 1996).

31.

Seesupra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.

32.

See Fitzpatrick, Texas Ten Percent Plan, supra note 2, at 290 (noting that California
and Florida have implemented plans that guarantee admission to the top 4 and
20 percent of students, respectively).

33.

See id. at 847 ("Members of the Texas Legislature shrewdly identified class rank as
the race-neutral university admissions criterion on which blacks and Hispanics
performed better than any other... ").

34.

See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Can Michigan Universities Use Proxies for Race after the Ban
on Racial Preferences?, 13 MICH. j. RAcE & L. 277, 278-79, 292 (2007) [hereinafter
Fitzpatrick, Can Michigan Universities Use Proxies?] ("[Michigan) universities have
identified a number of criteria which would appear to correlate fairly well with
African American, Hispanic, and Native American applicants: bilingualism,
residency on an Indian reservation or in Detroit, and experience overcoming
discrimination."); see alsol<AHLENBERG, A BETTER AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note
14, at 52 (noting Michigan's preference for background factors such as "cultural
awareness/experiences, statu s as first generation college student, low economic
family background, and residence in an economically disadvantaged region");
UNIV.
OF
WASH.,
OFFICE
OF
ADMISSIONS,
FRESHMAN
REVIEW,
http://admit.washington.edu/ Admission/ Freshmen/ Review Oast visited Jan. 31,
2014) (considering personal characteristics such as "[a)ttaining a collegepreparatory education in the face of significant personal adversity, or
disability... [or] economic disadvantage" and "[d)emonstrating cultural
awareness").

35.

The Small Business Administration, for example, has a program of technical and
financial support for small, disadvantaged businesses (SDBs). 13 C.F.R. § 124.101 et
seq. (2013) (establishing eligibility requirements for SDBs); see City of Richmond
v. j.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989) ("[A] race -neutral program of city
financing for small firms would, a fortiori, lead to greater minority participation.");
id. at 526 (Scalia, ]., concurring) (noting that small-business preferences "may well
have racially disproportionate impact," but are nonetheless permissible); see also
Gilbert j . Ginsburg & Janine S. Benton, One Year Later: Affirmative Action in Federal
Government Contracting after Ada.rand, 45 AM. U. L. REv. 1903, 1917- 45 (describing
federal programs designed to ben efit SOBs).

36. Seel<AHLENBERC, A BETTER AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 14, at 26- 63 (profiling
states that have banned affirmative action in college admissions).
37. See David G. Blanchflower & Jon S. Wainwright, An Analysis of the Impact of
Affirmative Action Programs on Self-Employment in the Construction Industry 12-16,
24 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11793, 2005), available
at http://papc:rs.ssrn.com/ sol3/ papcrs.cfm?abstract_id •851702 ("[W)hcn [raceconscious) programs are removed or replaced with race-neutral programs the
utilization of minorities and women in public construction d eclines rapidly.");
MARfA E. ENCHAUTECUI ET AL., THE URBAN INST., Do MINORITY-OWNED
BUSINESSES GET A FAIR SHARE OF GOVERNMENT COf\TRACI'S? 62 (1997}
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("[D]isparities [in contracting] are greater in those areas in which there is no
affirmative action program in place."). Isolated data also suggest that states with
bans on race-conscious affirmative action have seen a decrease in minority
contracting. See, e.g., MICH. ROUNDTABLE FOR DIVERSITY & INCLUSION, AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION DENIED: MICHIGAN IN TilE WAKE Of PROPOSAL 2, at 14 (2013), available
at http://www.miroundtable.org/assets/postproptworeport_8_30.pdf (finding
"Michigan has had a very low number of minority and women-owned contracts
with the state"); james Nash, Whites Get 92%of Contracts in Post-Affirmative Action
LA., BLOOMBERG BUSINESS, May 9, 2013, 5:37PM, http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2013-05-09/ white-men-get-92-of-contracts-in-post-affirmative-action-l-a_html (reporting that white men received 92 percent of all contracts with Los
Angeles despite comprising just 14 percent of the city's population).
38. See, e.g., I<AHLENBERG, A BETTER AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 14, at 4-10
(explaining why racial preferences are legally and politically vulnerable); Gregory
Rodriguez, The White Anxiety Crisis, TIME, Mar. 11, 2010, http://content.time.com/
time/ specials/packages/ article/0,28804,1971133 _19711 I0 _1971119,00.html
(predicting that demographic changes may cause whites to "develop a stronger
consciousness of their political interests as a group"); Nina Totenberg, Supreme
Court Wades into Affirmative Action, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 21, 2012, 4:14 PM),
hup://www.npr.org/ 2012/02/21/147212858/supreme-court-wades-intoaffirmative-action-issue (noting that the decisive vote in Grutter,justice O'Connor,
was replaced by justice Alito, who "has quite consistently been hostile to the idea
of racial preferences").
39. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
40. E.g., KENNEDY, supra note 7, at 248-49 ("French authorities have quietly sought to
influence the racial demographics of college admissions...by using as criteria of
eligibility for benefits the residential location and socio-economic class position
of candidates-in other words, 'race neutral' affirmative action.").
41. Compare Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, supra note 5, at 1060, 1099
("If genuine equal opportunity is the agreed-upon e nd, class-based preference
is the obvious remedy."), with Richard H. Fallon Jr., Affirmative Action Based on
Economic Disadvantage, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1913, 1951 (1996) ("[W]e should not allow
proposals for economically based affirmative action to divert attention from the
need for other, more effective public policies to combat both poverty and racebased disadvantage.'').
42. See, e.g., KAHLENBERG, A BETTER AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 14, at 21 ("Even
opponems of using race in student assignment concede that using socioeconomic
status is perfectly legal."); John Martinez, Trivializing Diversity: The Problem of
Overinclusion in Affirmative Action Programs, 12 HARV. BLACKLETTER LJ. 49, 54 (1995)
("If we reconstrUct affirmative action programs according to neutral criteria, then
minimum rationality judicial review would apply instead of strict scrutiny... ").
43. See Fitzpatrick, Can Michigan Universities Use Proxies?, supra note 34, at 281
("[U]nder the Equal Protection Clause, not only are explicit racial classifications
subjected to strict scrutiny, but so are race -neutral classifications that have the
same purpose and effect as the explicit ones."); see also Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S.
Ct. 2411, 2433 (2013) (Ginsburg,J.. dissenting) ("[O]nly an ostrich could regard the
supposedly neutral alternatives as race unconscious."); Ian Ayres, Narrow Tailoring,
43 UCLA L. REv. 1781, 1791 (1996) ("The central problem is that the race-neutral
means still have a race-conscious motivation."); Chapin Cimino, Comment, ClassBased Preferences in Affirmative Action Programs after Miller v. Johnson: A RaceNeutral Option, or Subterfuge?, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 1289, 1297 (1997)("[W]henever
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the Court suspects a racial motivation behind an ostensibly neutral statute, the
principle against subterfuge will prohibit the government from doing covertly
what it may not do overtly."); Forde-Mazrui, supra note 14, at 2333 ("A serious
problem facing these ostensibly race-neutral efforts to increase minority
representation in higher educ:ation ... is that such efforts are themselves raceconscious state action that may violate the Equal Protection Clause." (citation
omitted)).
44. See, e.g. , City of Richmond v. j.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 485-86 (1989)
(invalidating Richmond's minority subcontracting quota because it was not
"narrowly tailored to accomplish a remedial purpose").
45.

United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167 (1987) (plurality opinion) ("The
Government unquestionably has a compelling interest in remedying past and
present discrimination by a state actor.").

46. E.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) ("[T]he Equal Protection Clause
does not prohibit ... narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further
a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a
diverse student body.").
47. Some have argued that the Court did not faithfully apply strict scrutiny in Grutter.
See, e.g. , Ian Ayres & Sydney Foster, Don't Tel~ Don't Ask: Narrow Tailoring after
Grutter & Gratz, 85 TEx. L. REv. 517, 581 n.223 (2007) ("The extreme deference that
Justice O'Connor showed to state officials is deeply inconsistent with the whole
idea of strict scrutiny as an attempt to smoke out unjustified governmental racial
preferences.").
48. 570 U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
49. After observing that the Ten Percent Plan alone had "resulted in a more raciaJly
diverse environment," the Court remanded the case because the Fifth Circuit
failed to perform the "searching examination" of whether adding a raceconscious component was "necessary... to achieve the educational benefits of
diversity." /d. at 2414, 2416 (internal quotation marks omitted); see alsoid. at 2424
(Thomas, J., concurring) ("[D]iversity...cannot be an end pursued for its own
sake."); cjSANDER & TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 288 (noting that the racial -preferences
component is "vulnerable even under Grutter" because the University of Texas is
"one of the few elite universities that already has a facially race-neutral system").
50. See, e.g., Martinez, supra note 42, at 54 (arguing that race-neutral criteria will
bypass strict scrutiny); KENNEDY, supra note 7, at 176-77 (noting that many "colorblind immediatists" are willing to countenance race-neutral plans provided they
"are silent as to race").

51. See, e.g. , Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 227- 28, 233 (1985) (holding that
a provision in the Alabama Constitution disenfranchising citizens convicted of
"crimes involving moral turpitude" violated the Equal Protection Clause because
the legislature chose crimes that affected ten times as many African Americans
as whites); see also, e.g. , Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 461-62
(1979) (invalidating several race-neutral actions by the school board, including
the "use of optional attendance zones, discontiguous attendance areas, ...boundary
changes[,] and the selection of sites for new school construction" because they
uhad the foreseeable and anticipated effect of maintaining the racial separation of
the schools" (footnotes omitted)); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 418 U.S. 189, 201 (1973)
(holding that "concentrating Negroes in certain schools by structuring attendance
zones or designating 'feeder' schools" can violate the Equal Protection Clause).
In voting-district gerrymandering cases specifically, the Court has held that race-
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neutral reapportionment plans animated by race-conscious motivations violate
the Equal Protection Clause. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 546-49 (1999};
Miller v.Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993).
52.

Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (citations orniued); accordHunt,
526 U.S. at 546 ("A facially neutral law... warrants strict scrutiny... if it can be proved
that the law was 'motivated by a racial purpose ... "').

53. See Fitzpatrick, Texas Ten Percent Plan, supra note 2, at 314-20, 334-35; Fitzpatrick,
Can Michigan Universities Use Proxies?, supra note 34, at 284. I say "almost" by
definition because it is not altogether clear what constitutes a "racial effect" in
this line of Supreme Court jurisprudence; it all depends on what the baseline of
comparison is, and the Court has used a number of different baselines over the
years. See Fitzpatrick, Texas Ten Percent Plan, supra, at 298-306 (discussing different
forms of "racial effects").
54. See Michael C. Dorf, Universities Adjust to State Affinnative Action Bans: Are the
New Programs Legal? Are they a Good Idea?, FINDLAW's WRlT Uan. 29, 2007),
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ dorf/ 20070129.html ("I would say that the justices
would not subject [race-neutral affirmative action] to strict scrutiny.").
55.

E.g. , Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-90 (1978) ("The
guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one
individual and something else when applied to a person of another color. If
both are not accorded the same protection, then it is not equal."); accord Parents
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 742 {2007) ("Th[e]
argument that different rules should govern racial classifications designed to
include rather than exclude is not new; it has been repeatedly pressed in the past,
and has been repeatedly rejected." (internal citations omitted)); City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) ("We thus reaffirm the view... that the
standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the
race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification."). But seeParents
Involved, 551 U.S. at 830-38 (Breyer,]., dissenting) (disputing that the Court has
ever "repudiated this constitutional asymmetry between that which seeks to
exclude and that which seeks to include members of minority races" (citation
omitted)).

56. See, e.g., Hunt, 526 U.S. at 546 (applying strict scrutiny to facially neutral law that
is "'motivated by a racial purpose or object,' or if it is 'unexplainable on grounds
other than race"' (internal citations omitted)); Miller, 515 U.S. at 911- 13 (holding
that Georgia's redistrict plan fails strict scrutiny notwithstanding the fact that the
plan was "race neutral on [its) face"); Shaw, 509 U.S. at 653 (instructing the district
court to apply strict scrutiny if petitioners' allegation of racial gerrymandering is
not contradicted).
57. See Fitzpatrick, Can Michigan Universities Use Proxies?, supra note 34, at 291-92.

58.

For a general treatment, see BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How
PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING
OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009).

59.

Seesupra notes 18, 50, & 54 and infra note 62.

60. In Parents Involved, Justice Kennedy leaves doubt whether he would continue
to subject race-neutral affirmative action to strict scrutiny: "[Facially neutral]
mechanisms are race conscious but do not lead to different treatment based on
a classification that tells each student he or she is to be defined by race, so it is
unlikely any of them wouJd demand strict scrutiny to be found permissible." 551
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U.S. 701, 789 (2007) (Kennedy, ]., concuning in part and concurring injudgrnent).
I have explained elsewhere why I do not think Justice Kennedy's opinion should
be understood to cast doubt on his adherence to precedents in this area, but it
is admittedly far from clear what he meant here. See Fitzpatrick, Can Michigan
Universities Use Pro.xies?, supra note 34, at 289-91 ("Although I think one could
read Justice Kennedy's further dicta here to suggest that he no longer thinks
that the Constitution is as concerned with racial gerrymandering as it is with
explicit racial discrimination,...in my view, the meaning Justice Kennedy most
likely intended was one suggesting that, if the Court adopts the 'predominant'
motivation standard... , then it will be harder for plaintiffs to make the necessary
showing to invoke strict scrutiny.").
61. See, e.g., Ayres, supra note 43, at 1790 ("[R]ace-neutral classifications seem less likely
to provoke the kind of racial enmity that would itself undermine the remedial
purpose of the legislative action."); Forde-Mazrui, supra note 14, at 2371-75 ("Raceneutral classifications are significantly less likely than racial classifications to
perpetuate racial stereotypes or racial hostility..."); Don Munro, Note, The
Continuing Evolution ofAjfinnative Action under Title VII: New Directions after the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, 81 VA. L REv. 565, 606- 07 (1995) ("[C]lass-based preferences
would provide a less controversial means of achieving minority gains in
employment.").
62.

Kahlenberg surveys the public's preference for economic affirmative action vis-avis racial preferences:
In 2003, for example, a Los Angeles Times survey found that Americans opposed (56
percent to 26 percent) the University of Michigan's racial preference policy, but those
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The judicial Repeal of the johnson/
Kennedy Administration's "Signature"
Achievement

judge Nancy Gertner (Ret.)

The Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 which has been called "one of the most
significant legislative achievements in American history,"2 has been gutted. Responsibility lies not with Congress or an executive agency. For the
most part, it lies with the third branch-the judges of the United States
courts. Federal judges, from the trial courts to the Supreme Court, from
one end of the country to the other, of all political affiliations, have interpreted the Act virtually, although not entirely, out of existence.
Many scholars have identified the pattern: plaintiffs in discrimination
cases tend to lose on summary judgment, more so than any other party
in any other type of case.3 If they manage to get to trial and, significantly,
if they convince a jury of their claims, their damage verdicts run a substantial risk of being reduced by trial judges and their counsel's fees
slashed-again more than the verdicts or fees of plaintiffs and plaintiffs' counsel in any other category of case.4 On appeal, the story is even
more striking: while summary judgment dismissals are overwhelmingly
affirmed by appellate courts, even successful plaintiffs' verdicts are
reversed more than jury verdicts in other types of cases. One has to
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pause at that statistic: it is one thing to reject a claim without giving
plaintiffs the benefit of a jury determination. That result is troubling
enough since discrimination cases involve the quintessential jury question-namely, "What is the defendant's motive in dismissing the plaintiff?" "Was the plaintiff denied a promotion 'because of discriminatory
animus?" But it is even more troubling to reject a jury's determination of
damages, or worse, overturn its verdicts in a system that ostensibly values that decision maker above all.
It is not simply that plaintiffs lose but how they lose-in decision
after decision that effectively legitimize discriminatory practices and
behavior that would have been abhorrent when the Civil Rights Act
was passed.5 In 1976, Fourteenth Amendment equal protection analysis
was narrowed when the Supreme Court restricted it to intentional discrimination in Washington v. Davis. 6 More recent cases suggest the willingness of the Court to apply the same or similar analysis to statutory
discrimination claims? But even as limited to intentional discrimination, current case law is extraordinary. It appears to restrict or even
reject a range of entirely competent evidence from which discriminatory intent may be inferred. It is ironic: just as the social-psychological
literature identifies implicit race and gender bias-in organizational settings, in apparently neutral evaluative processes, and among decision
makers of different races or gender-federal discrimination law moves
in the opposite direction, trivializing even evidence of explicit bias.8
I want to understand why. First, is it a matter of ideology, in the sense
of a system of beliefs fueled more and more by a more conservative
Supreme Court and adopted by judges across th e country? Do they simply accept the view that we are in a postracial, postgendered society? As
others and I have described elsewhere, it is as if the bench is saying in its
opinions: "Discrimination is over. The market is bias-free. The law's job
is to find the truly aberrant actor who just didn't get the memo."9 The
phenomenon that is discrimination can be reduced to a simple paradigm-explicitly discriminatory policies and rogue individuals. If a case
does not precisely reflect those facts-and few do in the twenty-first
century-they are without merit. Surely some judges, if pressed, would
agree with this position, but does it adequately explain the antidiscrimination plaintiff bias across the country, at alllevels-notjust the fact of
dismissal but the content of the decisions?
Second, is that ideological perspective in fact true? Are most federal
cases frivolous, with dismissals roughly commensurate with the numbers of insubstantial cases? According to this view, employment discrimination law has worked. The market is bias-free, leaving litigation only
for the extreme, the explicit, the aberrant cases. judges are appropri-
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ately reflecting the progress that discrimination law has reaped. Statistics about wage disparity as between women and men, blacks and whites,
about the persistence of the "glass ceiling" for women, about maternal
discrimination, to name a few, however, suggest otherwise. 10
Or, third, is it simply selection bias in the federal courts? Have decades
of narrowing discrimination law, rightly or wrongly, led plaintiffs' counsel to choose state court over federal court, thereby skewing the federal
pool. Recent studies suggest that federal discrimination filings have
declined; plaintiffs are literally voting with their feet to more responsive
state courts. II The cases remaining in federal court, according to this
view, are the least substantial ones. And even among the cases in federal
court, so the argument goes, the better cases are settled, leaving the
weak ones at the mercy of summary judgment motions and vulnerable
verdicts.12 Does selection bias fully account for the numbers of cases
dismissed, verdicts slashed or overturned, or the reasoning of the decisions in these cases? The substantive law of discrimination-the fact patterns described in the case law and then rejected by the courts as not
amounting to discrimination even on a forgiving summary judgment
standard-suggest that something else is afoot. At least as described in
opinions, many of these cases are not insubstantial for summary judgment purposes. They include, for example, narratives of the use of the
N-word, of sexual harassment, and even of stalking the plaintiff, which
a jury might accept or reject or might consider pervasive or minor-yet
they are rejected by the courts.
Fo~rth , or is it, as some federal judges have insisted, that the national
patterns reflect nothing more than their fealty to the law? They maintain
that the Supreme Court law has set a high bar for discrimination cases
and that they are just following that lead. With respect to· procedural
rules, like the standards governing statutes of limitations13 or perfecting
a claim of sexual harassment-that is, whether the plaintiff complained
to her supervisor about coworker sexual harassment, 14 they have no discretion. But the procedural tules that bar the plaintiff's claims do not
fully account for the national trends-for courts making subjective judgments rejecting sexual harassment claims because they are not sufficiently "severe and pervasive" to be actionable 15 or dismissi ng racist or
sexist remarks as merely "stray remarks," not reflecting bias. No binding
precedent obliges a court to minimize such testimony, to "slice and dice"
evidence of discrimination, and reject it out ofhand. 16
Fina]ly, are there pressures (or implicit biases) that cut across political
affiliation and ideology to affect judges in their subjective judgments
about what is or is not discrimination? One pressure is what Professor
Judith Resnik has called the pressure to be a managerial judge,l7 which
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has created a culture in which judges are encouraged to resolve cases
without trials, in which formal opinions are to be avoided, and in which
the high transaction costs associated with civil litigation may well be
seen as more important than redressing inequality. 18 Put otherwise,
under this approach to judging, courts are more concerned with false
positives, the wrongful accusation of bias, and the litigation costs accompanying it than false negatives, an unredressed claim of discrimination.
They are bound to err on the side of rejecting discrimination claims in
making the judgments the law encourages them to make.
These patterns are then reflected in, and exacerbated by, a phenomenon I have described recently as "Losers' Rules":

•

Asymmetric decisionmaking-where judges are encouraged to write
detailed decisions when granting summary judgment and not to write when
denying it-fundamentally changes the lens through which employment
cases are viewed, in two respects. First, it encourages judges to see employment discrimination cases as trivial or frivolous, as decision after decision
details why the plaintiff loses. And second, it leads to the development of
decision heuristics-the Losers' Rules-that serve to justify prodefendant
outcomes over and over again, exacerbating the one-sided development of
the law. 19

The law of discrimination becomes more and more skewed now not
only with procedural rules defining when to sue or to whom to complain
but aJ.so with substantive standards that judges simply choose to apply
in ways that disadvantage plaintiffs-doctrines like "stray remarks" that
excuse explicitly biased statements, "honest belief" in which the court
characterizes the employer as being in good faith, or judicial determinations of when harassment is "severe and pervasive."20 Make no mistake: the law does not mandate any particular outcome in these cases; no
judge is required by law to trivialize a racist or sexist remark or excuse
a pattern of conduct. But judges regularly do so, dismissing cases or
reversing verdicts, and if they do, they are likely to be affirmed by the
appellate courts.
If there are nonideological pressures that are skewing the outcomes
in these cases, how can they be changed? The disclosure of discrimination patterns on a judge-by-judge basis might well make a difference.
Take sentencing, for example. Federal judges strongly resisted the disclosure of the sentencing practices and patterns of individual judges for
fear it would unleash a political backlash. The Sentencing Commission
kept that information, but only provided it when an individual judge
requested it. Indeed, so resistant were the judges to this disclosure that
they specifically negotiated with the Sentencing Commission to protect their confidentiality.21 Looking at civil rights cases, would it mat-
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ter to a judge if statistics showed that he or she dismissed 100 percent
of discrimination cases in a two-year period as one study in the Northern District of Atlanta has shown? Or are the discrimination enforcement 'System so skewed and judicial attitudes so ossified that we should
entirely reconsider the private attorneys' general/private lawyer model
of enforcement? Should we look again at an adjudicative agency, like
the National Labor Relations Board, or an executive agency with more
robust powers than the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission?
All that is clear is that the current system-private lawsuits, judicial
enforcement- is flawed.22
I first outline the data on employment discrimination cases and the
decisional law. I then consider the various explanations for the patterns.
And finally, I provide tentative suggestions for change.
I. The Data
A. A First Step: The Georgia Study

The Atlanta firm of Barrett and Farahany commissioned a study of the
2011 and 2012 employment summary judgment orders from the Northern District of Georgia, the results of which surely bear careful consideration. 23 Of the 181 cases (in which the plaintiff had counsel), the Court
dismissed 95 percent of them at least in part and 81 percent of the cases
in full. Racial hostile work environment claims were dismissed 100 percent of the time. Data broken down per judge revealed that some judges
had dismissed all discrimination cases in th e two-year period and that
when the magistrate judge recommended dismissal, the judge followed
100 percent of the time. Data also suggested that white plaintiffs alleging reverse discrimination had a better success rate than black plaintiffs
alleging discrimination.
To be sure, there are limitations to the study; it is only a starting point.
The sample was restricted to a two-year period with a relatively small
number of cases per judge; plainly, a longer-term view is necessary to
identify meaningful trends. Researchers need to understand the entire
pool of cases, which cases are settled, and why. Are the better cases
appropriately resolved by competent counsel, or are they settled "in the
shadow of"24 a substantive law so skewed against the plaintiff or judicial
hostility so clear that any settlement is better than nothing. The bottom
line, however, is that while the numbers for dismissals in the Northern District of Georgia were higher than the national figure-namely, 80
to 100 percent dismissal rates, there is no question that it reflects that
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national pattern; study after study has shown high dismissal rates across
the country on summary judgment. 25
Research is presently underway to look at these issues across a number
of courts. We plan to evaluate six courts as Farahany and McAdams have
done in the Northern District of Georgia-namely, Alabama, other districts in Georgia, and states without analogous state discrimination laws.
In addition, we will examine Florida as well as Massachusetts, Chicago,
and San Francisco. We plan to ask the questions described at the outset
of this chapter: Are there some district courts that, like the Northern District of Georgia, have a 100 percent dismissal rate? Is this true for just
some district court judges? Are there regional differences? Do caseload
differences account for these discrepancies as between district courts or
regions? Does the fact that there is no analogous state discrimination law
affect these numbers? What if data suggest that precisely in the regions
of the country with a history of discrimination, the rate of dismissal is
the highest and the language of the decisions most forgiving? What if
those patterns are reinforced by decisions of the circuit courts?
B. Reversals of Trial Verdicts

Some may say that without carefully evaluating the merits of both the
dismissed cases and the settled cases, there is no way of knowing if
the patterns described previously are fair-whether the decisional law
is appropriately weeding out the insubstantial cases and resolving the
substantial ones. As I describe in the following paragraphs, an analysis
of summary judgment opinions surely raises concerns that this is not
so-that district court judges are drawing lines about what is or is not
discrimination in a way that fundamentally changes, even skews, the
substantive law of discrimination against plaintiffs and that substantive
law plainly has an impact on settlement practices.
But even if one assumed that settlements and summary judgment dismissals appropriately separate the meritorious cases from those that
are not, the statistics about the judicial treatment of plaintiffs' verdicts
suggest a different pattern. More discrimination plaintiffs' verdicts are
reduced on remittitur than verdicts in any other case.26 And this pattern
continues at the appellate level. Favorable p laintiffs' verdicts fare worse
on appeal than do other litigants' verdicts, as a 2009 study by Professor
Kevin Clermont and Stewart]. Schwab found. 27 The 2009 Clermont
and Schwab study of reversal rates reports that "[a]ll the circuits
showed ... anti-plaintiff effect," and grouped the Tenth, Fourth, Second,
Ninth, Eleventh, and First as having approximately the same difference
between defendant and plaintiff dismissals.28
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That jury losses are affirmed on appeal is not unusual since appellate
courts will defer to verdicts. More stunning is the fact that appellate
courts reverse plaintiffs' trial wins far more often than defendants'
wins. 29
C. Legitimizing Discrimination

While the rate of losses is important, more critical is the way plaintiffs
lose. By making pronouncements about what is or is not discrimination
or a hostile work environment, courts have legitimized practices that
would have horrified the early supporters of the Act.30
Consider cases involving the N-word. In Johnson v. Freese, a case in
the Northern District of Georgia, the Todds, African Americans, sued
the Whortons, white owners of the nightclub where they worked, for
creating a racially hostile environment. 31 The defendants moved for
summary judgment, which the judge granted on these facts (considered
in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs): at manager meetings, Mr.
Whorton directed the N-word to the plaintiffs, despite their objections.
He called a staff meeting to talk about his use of theN-word, explaining
that he was too old to change and inviting anyone who did not like it to
quit. He made comments like the following:
What do your people want? When this was a white club, my customers used
ashtrays. Ever since then- -shave been in the club, the cigarettes have been
put out on the floor. The difference between blacks and n--s is that n- -s
put their cigarettes out on the floor.
And, do "days like this [make] you wish you people had stayed in chains?"
He asked someone wearing a shirt with a monkey on it "Are the Obama
shirts in?" and complained to Mr. Todd that he could not trust African Americans ..S2

But to the Georgia federal court, this was not enough. No reasonable
jury, the court held, could find a racially hostile environment. In language that the supporters of the Civil Rights Act would have found
shocking, the court added that while "the facts simply show that the
Whortons are racist, bigoted, and/or offensive people," not all "profane
or [racist] language or conduct will constitute discrimination in the
terms and conditions of employment." None of these incidents went
beyond the "ordinary tribulations of the workplace." The decision, a
Final Report and Recommendation of a United States Magistrate Judge,
was adopted by the trial judge without comment, no objections having
been filed.
To be sure, there were weaknesses in the case. The setting was a black
nightclub with white owners, and although the court is not explicit, the
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clear message is that the owner's language could not have been particularly shocking to the employees given the language of the patrons.
Still, the plaintiff could argue that this language coming from a white
boss had a different resonance to the African American workers than
the conversation among their peers. Or they could argue that given the
numbers of comments and their content (about slavery, about President
Obama), the boss simply went too far. Summary judgment, after all, is
not supposed to be about screening the cases that-in the judgment of
the bench-are likely to lose before a jury, making credibility determinations, weighing the evidence in the favor of one party or another. It is
a lower bar-determining that there is no issue of material fact, after considering all of the inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. 33
Racist comments in the workplace had been "ordinary" and "commonplace" when the Civil Rights Act was enacted. Even if social norms
have changed in the decades since 1964 and even if language that courts
once found wholly unacceptable has become regular currency, the law
was amended in 1991 so that those judgments would be made by ajury.34
A representative jury was supposed to consider the facts. not a judge
whose last employment in the private sector may have been decades
ago, who-looking at the federal bench's composition-was likely to be
white, male, a former partner in a big law firm, or a former prosecutor.
In fact, in several cases in which allegations of the use of the N-word
went to a jury, juries found for the plaintiffs. For example, a Buffalo,
New York, jury awarded $25 million in damages to a steelworker whose
coworkers repeatedly called him theN-word and other slurs. The jury
heard evidence that the employer took remedial action, such as suspending offending employees without pay, installing lights in the parking lot after a toy monkey was hung from a noose beside the plaintiff's
car, and assigning an escort to protect the plaintiff. Nonetheless, the
jury elected to award over $25 million in damages against the corporate
defendant, including $24 million in punitive damages. 35 In 2011, a jury
awarded $300,000 to a personal trainer who claimed that other trainers at a sports club had repeatedly called him the N-word.36 The sports
club presented evidence that it dismissed the plaintiff because the plaintiff had used similar racially offensive language against Latino trainers.
Nonetheless, the jury awarded $300,000 on the hostile work environment claim. More recently, juries in hostile work environment cases
have awarded damages in the amount of $300,000 in Bennett v Riceland
Foods, Inc., 37 more than $300,000 in Weatherly v. Alabama State University,38 and $250,000 in Johnson v. Strive East Harlem Employment Group. 39
By comparison, judges on summary judgment often hold that racial
epithets did not establish a hostile work environment by characterizing
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these statements as "stray remarks" or concluding that even repeated
use of epithets is not evident of "pervasive and severe" racial hostility.
The Whorton decision, despite its unique facts and unique weaknesses, is
not an aberration.4 For example, in Oladokun v. Grafton School, Inc., 41 the
District of Maryland granted summary judgment for the defendant on
claims of discrimination against African American employees at a private school for intellectually and physically disabled children. A supervisor had told the plaintiff that "I will get you n--s out of here" and had
also said to a child client at the facility: "Don't slobber on me, slobber
on that black n-- over there," referring to a coworker. The court held
that these remarks were not "not sufficient to satisfy the hostile work
environment test" because they were "not sufficiently pervasive."42 Similarly, in Dotson v. Gulf,43 a supervisor told a longshoreman employee
in response to his leaving early for a lunch break: "You n--s just don't
want to do right." The supervisor fired the employee immediately on
the spot, though the employee was later allowed to return to work. The
court held that these "incidents of a patently offensive slur, while rude
and upsetting, are insufficient to affect the terms or condition of Dotson's ernployment."44
It is not just racist speech that is acceptable; so is sexist speech. The
"stray remarks" doctrine trivializes sexist (and racist) comments. They
are "not evidence of discrimination" at all. Or they are the speaker's
"personal opinion"-as if that eliminates their poisonous impact on the
work environment. Or they were not so "severe and pervasive" as to create a hostile environment. What kinds of sexist remarks are dismissed in
this fashion? Where plaintiffs supervisor repeatedly referred to her as,
among other things, a "dumb sh-t," "whore," "stupid bitch," and "hooker,"
the district court dismissed the case because the conduct was a type of
"general vulgarity that [the law] does not regulate." 45 No hostile work
environment was found in the case of a female deputy sheriff even
though, over a four-year period, the supervisor made inappropriate
comments, invited her to sit on his lap, and kissed her on the buttocks
(which the court describes as "allegedly kissing her on her dothed backside").46 Nor did an employee whose manager "touched her inappropriately on two occasions by putting his hand on her crotch" confront "an
objectively or subjectively hostile work environment" because there was
evidence that she herself had "used vulgar, profane language, told dirty
jokes, graphically discussed her sex life and engaged in sexual banter.''47
Nor was it a hostile environment in the case of a male coworker who
called the plaintiff "a perra, a Mexican expletive that translates to 'bitch,'
'whore,' or 'person paid for sex,' called her stupid, grabbed his crotch,
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made an offensive hand gesture that signified the 'f word/ and spit on the
floor."48
II. Tentative Conclusions

What is the reason for these patterns? First, as others have written, is
the problem ideological, the overarching sense that we are at the dawn
of the postracial, postsexist society? The 1964 Civil Rights Act, while
once important, is seen as unnecessary today. 49 Surely, this is the message communicated by the Supreme Court. Have explicit cues from a
more conservative Supreme Court (Ledbetter, etc.) percolated down to
the lower federal courts?50
Second, is it true that the law has done its job? The market works and
only needs to be tweaked at the margins, as the case law suggests. The
data are otherwise: "Every measure of economic success reveals significant racial inequality in the U.S. labor market."51 Data from 2009 show
that people of color make up 34 percent of the private sector workforce
but hold only 11 percent of senior or executive positions.52 In 2010, the
median weekly earnings for full-time employees varied significantly by
race and gender: for white men, the average was $850 a week, while for
black men, that number dropped to $633 and Hispanic men still lower,
at $560 per week.53 Social psychologists, organizational behavioralists,
and bbor economists suggest that the reason for these patterns is that
racial and gender bias-implicit or explicit-continues to play a significant role in the allocation ofjobs.
Is it selection bias-not merely the impact of the settled cases on the
pool of federal cases but also the impact of a more welcoming state court
on federal filings? 54 This would mean that the cases in fedleral court are
in fact the less substantial ones, brought by counsel who did not realize
how inhospitable the federal courts were. Whatever the validity of state
law, it would not apply to the Northern District of Georgia, for example, or in Alabama, the other state that does not have a parallel state
statute prohibiting discrimination by race.55 Second, it does not necessarily account for the facts as reflected in the decisional law-allegations
of explicit bias rejected by the courts or minimized in the outcome.
Is it simply a reflection of more unforgiving rules from the Supreme
Court-quite apart from the ideology these rules reflect? When the
Northern District of Georgia article was published, one reaction was
that these cases are dismissed because judges are simply "following the
law."56 That may well be true, when certain of the Supreme Court's procedural rules are considered-rules on statutes of limitations in employment cases and rules requiring reporting harassment to a supervisor
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before an employer can be held accountable for coworker harassment.S7
If there are no allegations within the limitations period or the appropriate person did not receive the complaint, the judge has no discretion but
to dismiss the case.58 During a yearly panel held by the United States
District Court, a lawyer asked the judges: "Why are the federal courts so
hostile to discrimination claims?" The judges insisted there was no hostility and that they were just obliged to follow the law.
But the "law" does not compel the granting of summary judgment in
many of the reported cases involving "stray remarks" or the standard for
"severe and pervasive" harassment. Employment discrimination cases
are factually complex, deal with state-of-mind issues to be proved circumstantially, and are rarely uncontested. The summary judgment legal
standards are general, rarely mandating a certain result, as would a claim
involving a statute of limitations issue or the failure to exhaust admin istrative remedies. Judges are deciding these cases not because they are
forced to do so by precedent but because they choose to do so.
Is the explanation in the pressures on the bench that cross ideological
lines, pressures that have fundamentally changed the federal bench and
have had a singular impact on employment cases? Professor Judith
Resnik has described the problem of managerial justice. 59 Judges are
encouraged to resolve cases without trials, to use alternative dispute resolution, or to mediate the cases themselves. Formal written opinions are
to be avoided; the author was told during a judicial training session that
"if you wrote an opinion," you failed. If you could not settle the case,
write your decision as a margin note on the pleading or announce it in
open court-more efficient but hardly creating a meaningful precedent.
These pressures are mirrored in, and exacerbated by, a phenomenon
I have described recently as "Losers' Rules." When the defendant successfully moves for summary judgment in a discrimination case, the
case is over, and under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the judge must "state on the record the reasons for granting or denying
the motion," which means writing a decision. But when the plaintiff
wins on summary judgment, the judge writes a single word of endorsement-"denied"-and the case moves on to trial. At the same time,
plaintiffs rarely move for summary judgment. They bear the burden
of proving all elements of the claim, particularly intent. Thus, to avoid
summary judgment, a defendant need only show favorable contested
facts in one element of a plaintiff's claim.
The result of this practice-written decisions only when plaintiffs
lose-is the evolution of a one-sided body of law. Decision after decision
grants summary judgment to the defendant or, more recently, on the
heels of the Supreme Court's decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 60
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and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,61 dismisses the complaint.62 After the district court
has described why the plaintiff loses, the case may or may not be
appealed.
The structure of summary judgment opinions distorts the precedents
further. Precedents are necessarily created in the decisional law when
judges make rules "mappings from the facts of the case ... to outcomes."63
In writing summary judgment decisions, the court is obliged to summarize the record and, in particular, to highlight the plaintiff's allegations and grant inferences in favor of the plaintiff. As a result, when the
court characterizes these facts as insubstantial stray remarks or not part
of a "severe and pervasive" pattern of discrimination, as an example, it
affects more than the outcome in the case. The decision communicates
an atmosphere of impunity. Discriminatory behavior will be tolerated
and will not expose the employer to risk. Over and over, the opinions
suggest, we will give the benefit of the doubt to the perpetrator, excusing
his conduct while subjecting the victim's perceptions to a higher standard.64
The effects of Losers' Ru1es are exacerbated on appeal. While the
standard of review of summary judgment orders is de novo, appellate
courts rarely reverse district courts' decisions. Employers prevailed in 86
percent of published appellate opinions. 65 Indeed, they are even more
affected by the pool of cases they see-the selection effects of reviewing
appeal after appeal of plaintiffs' losses. They do not see the strong cases
that settle. They may see appeals from successful plaintiffs' verdicts, but
those appeals are few and far between. In fact, their approach to appeals
from successful verdicts may well reflect skewing I have described. A
higher percentage of plaintiffs' verdicts are set aside, as Clermont and
Schwab found.
To be sure, what this analysis does not include are the cases that are
settled. Arguably, the better cases are removed from the pool by lawyers
who have effected settlements for their clients. Marc Galanter has argued
that because employers are "repeat players" while individual plaintiffs
are not, the repeat players have every incentive to settle the strong cases
and litigate the weak ones. 66 But settlements take place in the "shadow
of the law."67 It is not unreasonable to assume that the evolving case law
figures into the settlement practices.
Losers' Rules explain not simply outcomes but also the reasoning
of the cases. If case after case recites the facts that do not amount to
discrimination, decision makers h ave a hard time imagining the facts
that comprise discrimination. And they believe most of the claims are
trivial. That attitude further distorts the evolution of substantive legal
standards. Decision heuristics evolve, the kind of decision heuristics
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described above. As I described, "[c]ourts create decision heuristics to
enable them to quickly dispose of complex cases. They then write decisions employing the heuristics and publish their opinions. In short
order, other courts rely on the heuristics, which become precedent, and
the process is repeated over and over again." 68 Obviously, discrimination heuristics, like all heuristic devices, run the risk of false positives
and false negatives.
When courts believe that most employment claims are meritless, as
the judges do over time, they will be much more concerned with false
positives-the wrongful accusation of discrimination-than false negatives, when discrimination is unredressed. Indeed, that concern-wrongful accusations of discrimination and the transaction costs
associated with it- has come to dominate the decisional law of civil procedure. 59
Ill. Conclusion

Judges have created decisional rules that have gutted Title VII, rules not
required by the statute (which, after all, says very little), its legislative history, or the purposes of the Act. The patterns have garnered little attention from the popular media, and, as a consequence, there is little or
no pressure for legislative change. Since Title VII was the very model
of civil rights law reform legislation, it is critical to show how has this
has happened and, more important, why? How should these patterns
be addressed? Should Title VII be amended yet again, creating a more
explicit statute-more code-like than a statement of principles-that
would cabin judicial discretion? Or would regular monitoring of judicial
decisions-like the Northern District of Georgia study-make a difference, letting the judge know the patterns-if not overt the hostility-their decisions reflect? Or should we consider a new enforcement
structure beyond the private attorneys' general model of Title VII? For
example, would a more robust EEOC, with the power to adjudicate disputes and not just the power to investigate, make a difference, staffed by
hearing officers who can envision what discrimination looks like, in contrast to judges who plainly do not? One thing is clear: these patterns and
the attitudes they reflect should not be ignored.
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Taking Seriously Title VII's "Floor, Not a
Ceiling" Invitation

Craig Gurian

Introduction

For more than twenty-five years, it has been the practice of federal and
state judges around the country to throw victims of workplace sexual
harassment out of court because they have not been harassed "enough."
The practice is a function of the judicially created doctrine that only
"severe or pervasive" harassment is actionable under Title VII. 1 In New
York City, however, the "severe or pervasive" requirement has been
rejected by virtue of case law2 that developed in the wake of the 2005
Local Civil Rights Restoration Act,3 a law designed to "underscore that
the provisions of New York City's Human Rights Law are to be construed
independently from similar or identical provisions of New York state
or federal statutes"4 in a manner to accomplish the City Human Rights
Law's "uniquely broad and remedial purposes."5
This sea change in harassment doctrine is but one of several ways in
which the Restoration Act has brought new strength to local antidiscrimination provisions. Some of the Act's changes sought to vindicate provisions in the comprehensive 1991 amendments to the City Human Rights
Law6 that judges had long ignored; others responded to Supreme Court
decisions hostile to civil rights enforcement that were issued subsequent
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to the 1991 Amendments. All reflected an intent to develop a distinct and distinctly plaintiff-friendly- jurisprudence.
While the animating perspective of the Restoration Act is a striking
departure from the norm, the authority of New York City (or any other
jurisdiction) to forge protections stronger than those provided by federal
law was not new. From the beginning, Title VII disclaimed preemption,
stating that:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person
from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or
future law of any State or political subdivision of a State, other than any such
law which purports to require or permit the doing of any act which would
be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter?

Title VII was designed to act as a floor below which civil rights protections could not fall, not a ceiling above which those protections could
not rise. Over the decades, this invitation has been used most commonly
in states and cities around the country to extend employment discrimination protection to workplaces with fewer than the fifteen-employee
minimum required by Title VII. It has also been used to provide compensatory damages beyond those available under Title VII and to prohibit on a state level additional types of discrimination (such as discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation) beyond that proscribed by Title
VII.

It is less common, however, for a state or local law to be designed
specifically to fight back against the narrowing contours of Title VII,
especially by means of directing state and federal judges to modify their
approach to statutory interpretation. Under the Restoration Act, judges
are required to probe critically the question of whether interpretations
of federal or state civil rights law provisions genuinely further the purposes of their local counterpart. 8
This chapter identifies the approach and architecture of the Restoration Act and explains the ways in which the local law's attempt both to
protect the New York City Human Rights Law against erosion and to
expand the law's reach still further has begun to have an impact. It then
illustrates several additional barriers to strong coverage and enforcement that could be tackled if civil rights advocates focused more of
their efforts on the state and local level. Finally, it offers some observations about what is needed to deepen the Restoration Act's early success
locally and to spur efforts like the Restoration Act in jurisdictions across
the country.
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I. Why Was a Restoration Act Needed?

The short answer to the question "Why was the Restoration Act needed?"
is that courts were not paying heed to either the language of the 1991
Amendments or the City Council's intention in passing them.9
Every change made by the 1991 Amendments- whether dealing with
protected classes, vicarious liability, theories of discrimination, or damages - had been aimed at augmenting coverage, limiting evasion, or
otherwise strengthening enforcement. And the City Council's intentions
had been unmistakable. As then-Mayor David Dinkins stated when he
signed the bill, the intention was that "judges interpreting the City's
Human Rights Law... take seriously the requirement that this law be liberally and independently construed." 10 Nevertheless, prior to the Restoration Act, courts were almost universally refusing to do more than engage
in what I have elsewhere dubbed "rote parallelism," 11 simply assuming
that the result under the City Human Rights Law would be identical to
that under federal civil rights law or New York State human rights law. 12
A year before the enactment of the Restoration Act, New York's highest
court made plain just how completely it was prepared to ignore the plea
for independent interpretation that underlay the 1991 Amendments and
the liberal construction requirement of the City Human Rights Law as it
existed in 2004.
The case before the court related to the private right of action that
had been created by the 1991 Amendments - one that provided for
uncapped compensatory damages, uncapped punitive damages, and
attorneys' fees.13 Only that kind of regime allows for the possibility of
making a victim whole, punishing a wrongdoer sufficiently to create an
actual deterrent, and providing a sufficient incentive for private counsel to undertake representation. At the time that the 1991 Amendments
were enacted, the Supreme Court had not yet cut back on the availability
of fees in cases that resulted in the award of only nominal damages, and
prevailing doctrine in the Second Circuit was that attorney's fees were
available in such cases.14 The federal limitation on those fees occurred
a year later, in 1992, when the Supreme Court issued its 5- 4 decision
in Farrar v. Hobby and concluded that, where nominal damages are
awarded, "the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all."15
In McGrath v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 16 New York's court of appeals acknowledged that the City Council, in passing the 1991 Amendments, could
not have had the intention to apply the yet-to-be-decided Farrar doctrine but the court imported Farrar nonetheless because of the court's
"general practice of interpreting comparable civil rights statutes consistently," asserting that policies underlying the City Human Rights Law

Tak1ng Seriously Title VII's "Floor. Not a Ceiling" Invitation

were "identical" to those underlying federal civil rights statutes. 17 In
importing Farrar, McGrath engaged in no analysis of whether Farrar had
actually been consistent with either federal or local civil rights policy.
Perhaps most important, McGrath stated that the City Council's failure
to take affirmative action to rebut Farrar represented the Council's
implicit ratification of the importation of Farrar. 18 As such, the protections of the City Human Rights Law would be subject to being automatically ratcheted down every time federal or state law was narrowed by
judicial construction.
Along with this sort of refusal to construe the City Human Rights
Law liberally, the period between 1991 and 2005 was characterized by
the wholesale failure of courts to recognize even basic modifications
in statutory text. For example, it had already been illegal under the
City Human Rights Law "to retaliate ... against any person," but the 1991
Amendments modified that language so that it became illegal "to retaliate in any manner... against any pcrson." 19 Surely, the addition of the
phrase "in any manner" was intended to mean and do something. Year
after year, however, judges failed to appreciate that the legislative change
had any meaning at all.
In a particularly acute example of judicial lawlessness in 2003, a state
appellate court, in the case of Priore v. New York Yankees, 20 conjured up an
entirely imaginary legislative history to get around the fact that the 1991
Amendments had made individuals liable for their own discriminatory
workplace conduct. The City Council had taken the phrase common
to Title VII and many state employment discrimination statutes that it
was unlawful for "an employer" to engage in certain actions and broadened that to make it unlawful for an employer "or an employee or agent
thereof" to engage in those actions. 21 Mayor Dinkins had explained that
the 1991 Amendments had taken "the fundamental step of making all
people legally responsible for their own discriminatory conduct."22
Several courts had started to abide by the plain language (and plain
import) of this change.23 All of this, however, was of no moment to an
intermediate appeals court panel that simply did not want to believe
that anyone would (or should) want to impose individual liability. To
achieve its ends, the Priore court claimed that the added language ("or
an employee or agent thereof') was simply reflecting language that had
been in a New York State Human Rights Law provision dealing with
licensing agencies. This was a complete fabrication. The section of the
City Human Rights Law at issue did not have anything to do with licensing agencies (a different section was created for that), and the added language about employees or agents was language not found in the State
Human Rights Law.24 But the Priore court needed to create a "context."

187

188

A Nation of Widening Opportunities

Priore rejected the idea that the change in statutory language "automatically open[s] the door to an entirely new category of defendants"stating that the new language had to be read "in context" (that is,
the context it had invented) and asserted that there was "no indication
in the local ordinance, explicit or implicit, that it was intended to offer
a separate right of action against any and all fellow employees based
on their independent and unsanctioned contribution to a hostile environment."25 For the First Department of the Appellate Division (covering cases arising in Manhattan and the Bronx), individual liability was
dead. 26
For civil rights advocates, City Human Rights Law development since
1991 - or, more precisely, the lack of independent development since
1991 - meant that the City Council had to send a message to the judiciary that could not be ignored.
II. A Hybrid Approach

In some respects, the Restoration Act proceeded conventionally, making
specific changes to specific provisions. Thus, for example, protection
against discrimination based on domestic partner status was added to
the City Human Rights Law's proscriptions against discrimination in

employment, housing, and public accommodations,27 and the maximum civil penalty available in a case brought administratively was
raised to $250,000.28
The Restoration Act also went back to try to give force to the City
Council's intent to have a broad antiretaliation provision (the "in any
manner" language having been insufficient to do the job). It explicitly set
forth in the antiretaliation provision the proviso that retaliation complained of need not result in either an "ultimate action" or a "materially
adverse change" in terms and conditions in order to be actionable.29
In a direct rejection of the Supreme Court's dramatic narrowing of the
circumstances in which attorney's fees would be available in cases where
the litigation had acted as a catalyst for a change in policy on the part of
the defendant, 30 the Restoration Act explicitly declared that fees would
be available in such cases. 31
But the most important contribution of the Restoration Act was the
undoing of rote parallelism. Section 1 of the Restoration Act stated that
the "sense of the Council that New York City's Human Rights Law has
been construed too narrowly to ensure protection of the civil rights of all
persons covered by the law."32 It went on to "underscore" that the law's
provisions "are to be construed independently from similar or identical provisions of New York state or federal statutes." 33 And, in contrast
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to McGrath sdownward ratchet effect, it created an upward ratchet effect:
interpretations of the provisions of counterpart federal and state statutes
could be viewed "as a floor below which the City's Human Rights law
cannot fall, rather than a ceiling above which the local law cannot rise."34
Section 1 of the Restoration Act set forth its purpose; section 7 did
the work of amending the construction section of the law. Rather than
requiring liberal construction to accomplish the "purposes" of the law,
the Council now required such construction to accomplish the
"uniquely broad and remedial" purposes. 35 Any decision that asserted
that the purposes of the City Human Rights Law were equivalent to the
purposes of counterpart statutes simply could not be harmonized with
this language.
For good measure, the Council added additional language making
clear that the liberal construction was required "regardless of whether
federal or New York State civil and human rights laws, including those
laws with provisions comparably-worded to provisions of this title, have
been so construed."36
Each element of the Restoration Act's legislative history focused on the
importance of independent construction37 and included this statement
made on the floor of the City Council at the meeting at which it voted
on the Restoration Act:
Insisting that our local law be interpreted broadly and independently will
safeguard New Yorkers at a time when federal and state civil rights protections are in jeopardy.
There are many illustrations of cases, like Levin on marital status, Priore[,]
McGrath and Forrest that have either failed to interpret the City Human
Rights Law to fulfill its uniquely broad purposes, ignore the text of specific
provisions of the law, or both.
With [the Restoration Act], these cases and others like them will no longer
hinder the vindication of our civil rights.38

The question, of course, was whether the courts would heed what the
Council had done.
Ill. The Courts Take Notice

In civil rights, as in other areas of life, victory can be fleeting. Nevertheless, the tentative judgment to be made ten years after the passage
of the Restoration Act is that an independent City Human Rights Law
jurisprudence has indeed begun to take shape, despite some continuing
resistance in the judiciary. Much work remains for the law to fulfill its
intended potential. Ironically, the greatest need is for civil rights advocates to be willing to take up more wholeheartedly what the Restoration
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Act has offered through its enhanced liberal construction provision and
articulate in specific cases the specific reasoning that demands specific
departures from existing legal doctrine.
Williams v. New York City Housing Authority,39 decided early in 2009,
was not the first case to take account of the passage of the Restoration
Act, but it represented the most thorough and important exposition by
any court, let alone an appellate court, of the Act's intent, and demonstrated how the process of independent construction should proceed.
The overview from Williams:
rrJhe Restoration Act notified courts that (a) they had to be aware that some
provisions of the City HRL were textually distinct from its State and federal
counterparts, (b) all provisions of the City HRL required independent construction to accomplish the law's uniquely broad purposes, and (c) cases that
had failed to respect these differences were being legislatively overruled.40

Reiterating that the Restoration Act had legislatively overruled McGrath,
the court was careful to point out that the City Council envisioned
the enhancement of the liberal construction provision as "obviating the
need for wholesale textual revision of the myriad specific substantive
provisions of the law."41 The court continued:
While the specific topical provisions changed by the Restoration Act give
unmistakable illustrations of the Council's focus on broadening coverage, §
8-l30's specific construction provision required a "process of reflection and
reconsideration" that was intended to allow independent development of
the local law "in all its dimensions ... "42

The legislative history provided guidance from multiple sources as to
how courts should proceed to perform the task of deciding how provisions of the City Human Rights Law should be interpreted. All of the
legislative history pointed in the direction of choosing an interpretation
that maximized coverage;43 a related lesson was that it would be a mistake to imagine that, for City Human Rights Law purposes, the upper
bound of coverage was in any way a "settled" question. Every provision
of the law had to be examined in light of the direction to courts to interpret to fulfill the law's uniquely broad and remedial purpose. Consistent with this, the court cited with approval the argument I had made in
Return to Eyes on the Prize:
[A]reas of law that have been settled by virtue of interpretations of federal or
State law "will now be reopened for argument and analysis ...As such, advocates will be able to argue afresh (or for the first time) a wide range of issues
under the City's Human Rights Law... "44

Taking Seriously Title VII's "Floor, Not a Ceiling" Invitation

One of the specific issues before the Williams court was the scope of protection against sexual harassment, and the court demonstrated how the
process of "reflection and reconsideration" was supposed to be handled.
In the first instance, the court, true to the language of the statute before
it, treated sexual harassment as one type of gender-based discrimination
in terms and conditions of e.m ployment. It then asked "what constitutes
inferior terms and conditions based on gender."45
Rather than taking the Supreme Court's approach as the necessary
answer for City Human Rights Law purposes, Williams stated that the
"severe or pervasive" doctrine - characterized by the Supreme Court
as a "middle path"46- hindered those local objectives: "Experience has
shown;' the court stated, "that there is a wide spectrum of harassment
cases falling between 'severe or pervasive' on the one hand and a
'merely' offensive utterance on the other."47 Keeping with its focus on
whether conduct created inferior terms and conditions, the court got to
the heart of workplace reality: "It would be difficult to find a worker who
viewed a job where she knew she would have to cope with unwanted
gender-based conduct (except what is severe or pervasive) as equivalent
to one free of unwanted gender-based conduct."48
Williams concluded that the purposes of the City Human Rights Law
could best be achieved by allowing severity and pervasiveness to go only
to the question of damages, not to the question of underlying liability.
In the ordinary case, therefore, liability is established when there is evidence of an employee being rtreated less well than others because of gender.49 To "narrowly target" concerns about "truly insubstantial" cases,
the court recognized an affirmative defense "whereby defendants can
still avoid liability if they provide that the conduct complained of consists of nothing more than what a reasonable victim of discrimination
would consider 'petty slights and trivial inconveniences."'50
Critically, Williams illuminated how to tie an enhanced liberal construction analysis to each of the guideposts for interpretation set out in
the Committee Report that accompanied the Restoration Act:
1. "Traditional methods and principles of law enforcement ought to

be applied in the civil rights context."51 Determining liability by the
existence of differential treatment without regard to severity or
pervasiveness creates a greater incentive for employers to "create
workplaces that have zero tolerance," and, the court ruled,
maximizing deterrence is a traditional method and principle of law
enforcement. 52
2. "Discrimination should not play a role in decisions made by
employers, landlords, and providers of public accommodation:'
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The court stated that the "severe or pervasive" rule was inconsistent
with the "play no role" principle because it means that
"discrimination is allowed to play some significant role in the
workplace."53
3. "Victims of discrimination suffer serious injuries for which they
ought to receive full compensation." The court stated that "severe or
pervasiveness" contradicts the principle that discrimination
injuries, without limitation, are serious injuries.54 It should be
immediately apparent that this kind of analysis is transferable to
virtually any issue that would arise in the antidiscrimination law
context.
New York's Court of Appeals has grappled with the Restoration Act in
two important cases. The first was principally a matter of accepting that
the City Human Rights Law meant what it appeared to say. In Zakrzewska
v. New School,55 the court took up the question of whether the FaragherEllerth affirmative defense to employer liability56 applied to employment discrimination claims in the City Human Rights Law context.57
The court concluded it did not: section 8-107(13) of the City Human
Rights Law "creates an interrelated set of provisions to govern an
employer's liability for an employee's discriminatory conduct in the
workplace" that "simply doesn't match up with the Faragher-Ellerth
defense."58 For acts of those employees or agents who exercised managerial or supervisory authority, the section provides for strict liability,59
and the existence of antidiscrimination policies and procedures can
only go to the question of whether civil penalties (administratively) or
punitive damages (in a civil action) should be mitigated. 60 The court
ruled that the statutory text made clear that the provision, contrary to
the employer's position, applied to all supervisors and managers,6 l a
very different result from the Supreme Court's decision finding that an
employee is a "supervisor" for Title VII vicarious liability purposes only
if he or she is empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against the victim. 62 It is only in the context of actions of
nonsupervisory coworkers that the existence of antidiscrimination policies and procedures can be considered in determining liability (and only
where the conduct is not known to managers or supervisors but should
have been).63
Beyond the implications of confirming strict liability, the case represented a belated recognition that the 1991 Amendments (of which the
addition of section 8-107(13) was part) constituted a "major overhaul" of
the City Human Rights Law. 64
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New School, of course, represented a circumstance where all the court
needed to do was resist the Priore- like urge to say, "The statute just can't
mean what it says." An even more important pronouncement from the
New York Court of Appeals came the following year (2011) in a retaliation case brought against the New York City Police Department. 65 The
question at issue was the meaning of the term "oppose"-that is, whether
action was taken against the plaintiff for having opposed discrimination.
One can say with absolute certainty that, in the pre-Restoration Act,
McGrath era, the court would simply have looked at how Title VII and
the State Human Rights Law had interpreted the term.
Now, however, a unanimous court recognized that the enhanced liberal construction provision introduced by the Restoration Act required
it to construe the language of the retaliation provision, "like other provisions of the City's Human Rights law, broadly in favor of discrimination
plaintiffs, to the extent that such a construction is reasonably possible." 66
This holding could not be more significant. First, the requirement of
enhanced liberal construction analysis is applicable not only to the term
"oppose" but also to every term found in the law. 67 Second, it captures
the intent of the Restoration Act to require judges to weigh alternative
interpretations, not to pick the road that has previously been most frequently selected. Third, it dispenses with the prominent notion in Title
VII jurisprudence that Congress wanted Title VII tailored to "balance"
the interests of employers. Fourth, courts are not asked to indulge their
own policy preferences in rendering interpretations but rather to adhere
to a policy decision already made by the City Council to take the most
pro-plaintiff position that is reasonably possible.
In the case at hand, the only evidence that the plaintiff had opposed
discrimination was that, at a meeting, she reacted to her supervisor's
criticism of her recommendation to transfer a third party into the unit
in which she worked by telling the supervisor that the person she had
recommended "'was the betil:er candidate for the job'" and that '"[i]f I
had to do it all again, I would have recommended [the same person]
again."' 68 This is not the usual basis for a finding that discrimination has
been opposed. But the court found: "While [plaintiff] did not say in so
many words" that her preferred candidate "was a discrimination victim"
on the basis of perceived sexual orientation, "a jury could find that both
[the supervisor and plaintiff] knew that he was, and that [plaintiff] made
clear her disapproval of that discrimination by communicating to [her
supervisor], in substance, that she thought [the supervisor's] treatment
of [her candidate] was wrong_"69
By the time Albunio was decided, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
had also, separately, provided direction on the Restoration Act. In Loef-
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jler v. Staten Island University Hospitat,7° a public accommodations case,
the Second Circuit ruled that the Restoration Act "confirm[ed] the legislative intent to abolish 'parallelism' between the City HRL and federal
and state anti-discrimination law....'m The court aptly described the City
Human Rights Law as having a "one-way ratchet" where state and federal enactments serve only as a floor for coverage, not the ceiling. 72 Weiss
v. JPMorgan Chase is an example of a district court following Loeffler's
command.73 Weiss declined to apply the Supreme Court's decision in
Gross v. FBL Financial Services,74 the case that had required a showing
of but-for causation in age discrimination cases (rejecting what, at least
in some circuits, had been the use of mixed-motive analysis). Noting
that the City Human Rights Law does not differentiate between age and
other types of discrimination claims, the court reasoned that application
of Gross in an age case would mean that mixed-motive analysis would
not be available in any employment discrimination claims, including
those involving protected classes where Title VII provides for mixedmotive analysis.75 Reducing the City Human Rights Law below that Title
Vll floor was impermissible, the court ruled, also finding that an independent interpretation of the City Human Rights Law allowing liability
where protected class basis was "a motivating factor" was consistent with
the law's text.16
In sum, the application of the Restoration Act has generated a strong
body of basic case law on which to build.

IV. Unfinished Business and Attempts at Sabotage
In many respects, though, the Restoration Act's work has just begun. I
am not aware, for example, of any case that has specifically recognized
that Priore's excision-by-fiat of individual liability has been legislatively
overruled.77 And another element of Williams, that which rejected the
Supreme Court's limitations on continuing violation doctrine for City
Human Rights Law purposes,78 has only, to my knowledge, been applied
by one federal court. 79 More broadly, large areas of the law simply have
not been subject to any reexamination yet.
The most troubling developments in the last few years are circumstances where courts have not very subtly attempted to evade the
requirements of the Restoration Act. Two areas have stood out: the treatment of sexual harassment claims and the attempt to wall off "procedural" matters from enhanced liberal construction analysis.
Wilson v. N. Y.P. Holdings, Inc. 80 is a 2009 case out of the Southern
District of New York that came to be cited repeatedly.81 What did the
court treat as no more than "petty slights and trivial inconveniences" (the
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Williams affirmative defense)? Comments that included "training females
is like 'training dogs'" and "women need to be horsewhipped." 82 Among
the cases citing Wilson is Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreaux North America, /nc.,83 another case where the conduct complained of - which
included evidence that the chief executive officer "explicitly told [plaintiff] that male employees should be respected because they were 'male'
and thus 'more powerful' than women"84- was found to fit the "petty
slights and trivial inconveniences" exception. 85 The district court's decision in Mihalik, too, was then cited again and again by other judges in the
Southern District Court of New York. 86
That these cases contravene Williams (and the intent of the Restoration
Act) was first pointed out in a remarkably critical footnote reference
in a subsequent case decided by the appellate court that had decided
Williams. The principal focus of 2011's Bennett v. Health Management Systems, Inc. 87 will become clear later in this section, but the court was also
concerned that the Williams affirmative defense should be treated as the
"narrowly drawn affirmative defense" it was intended to be, that it was
important for "borderline" fact patterns to be allowed to be heard by
a jury, and that it should be understood that one could "easily imagine
a single comment that objectifies women being made in circumstances
where [the] comment would, for example, signal views about the role
of women in the workplace and be actionable." 88 The court skewered
Wilson and Mihalik for, among other things, "ignoring the Williams holding," relying on cases that "nominally acknowledge Williams but ignore
its teaching."89
Two years later, the Second Circuit vacated and remanded Mihalik and
taught many of the lessons of the Restoration Act again. Specifically in
the context of sexual harassment, the circuit rejected the district court's
analysis for placing "too much emphasis on Williams's recognition that
the NYCHRL should not 'operate as a "general civility code,"' and too
little emphasis on its exhortation that even 'a single comment' may
be actionable in appropriate circumstances."90 The question remains
whether lower courts will take the guidance provided (and the rebukes)
seriously.
Another area of resistance or confusion is found in connection with
what are sometimes called procedural matters. Is the manner in which
the McDonnell Douglas framework is or is not used a matter beyond
enhanced liberal construction analysis? Bennett found that it was not:
"the identification of the framework for evaluating the sufficiency of evidence in discrimination cases does not in any way constitute an exception to the Section 8-130 rule that all aspects of the City HRL must be
interpreted to accomplish the uniquely broad and remedial purposes of
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the law;' and for the court to "create an exemption from the sweep of the
Restoration Act for the most basic provision of the City HRL - that it is
unlawful 'to discriminate' - would impermissibly invade the legislative
province."91
Yet a divided panel of the same appellate court later issued a ruling in
Melman v. Montefiore Medical Center that states that neither the Restoration Act nor the Committee Report "set forth a new framework for consideration of the sufficiency of proof of claims under the [City Human
Rights Law] or indicates that the McDonnell Douglas framework is to be
discarded." 92 The statement of the Melman majority is a non sequitur:
that the Restoration Act did not set forth specific modifications to
McDonnell Douglas does nothing to limit a court's obligation to interpret
the term "to discriminate" as it must interpret all other terms of the law:
pursuant to the direction of the enhanced liberal construction provision.
It is as though that majority could not (or did not wish to) appreciate that
McDonnell Douglas is not an immutable principle of the physical universe
that predates all legislation but rather is a judicial creation designed to
give one of many possible answers to how to give shape to identifying
what constitutes discrimination. 93
As a practical matter, Melman adhered to Bennett. It was, for example,
confirmatory of the principle that the City Human Rights Law insists
that discrimination "play no role" and that mixed-motive analysis is
applicable to every case. Melman accepted Bennett's direction that summary judgment of City Human Rights Law claims should only be
granted if "no jury could find defendant liable under any of the evidentiary routes - McDonnell Douglas, mixed motive, 'direct' evidence, or
some combination thereof. ... "94
The Second Circuit in Mihalik also confirmed that the "no evidentiary
route" principle was to be applied in all City Human Rights Law cases,95
but observed in a footnote that, comparing Bennett with Melman, "(i]t
is unclear whether, and to what extent, the McDonnell Douglas burdenshifting analysis has been modified for NYCHRL claims.'' 96 In fact, however, apart from its opening statement about what the Restoration Act
had not explicitly done, Melman did not speak to or rebut some of Bennett's other conclusions.
For example, Bennett had rejected the Reeves standard for failing to
take sufficiently into account:
(a) The traditional power to be accorded to the inference of wrongdoing
that arises from evidence of consciousness of guilt; (b) the importance of
deterring a defendant's proffer of false reasons for its conduct; and (c) the
impropriety of a court weighing the strength of evidence in the context of a
summary judgment motion.97
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Picking up themes sounded by the dissent in Hicks,98 Bennett had ruled
that:
Once there is some evidence that at least one of the reasons proffered by
defendant is false, misleading, or incomplete, a host of determinations properly made only by a jury come into play, such as whether a false explanation constitutes evidence of consciousness of guilt, an attempt to cover up
the alleged discriminatory conduct, or an improper discriminatory motive
co-existing with other legitimate reasons. 99

Melman simply did not attempt to articulate a substantive objection to
Bennett's reasoning or conclusion.
In light of the dictates of Albunio, it is difficult to imagine that "to discriminate" will be walled off from enhanced liberal construction analysis. Likewise, it is hard to believe that Bennett's interpretation (picking up
on what was, after all, a four-Justice dissent in Hicks) will be found not to
fall within a "reasonably possible" pro-plaintiff construction of"discrirnination," but the ultimate willingness of judges to follow Albunio faithfully remains to be determined.
V. How Might Other jurisdictions Proceed?

I do not suggest that a push for state and local legislation would represent a cure-all for the problems and limitations in federal antidiscrimination law doctrine. First, and most obviously, there are many
jurisdictions that would not be politically congenial to such an effort.
Second, states and localities are not empowered to undo congressional
or Supreme Court efforts to stymie state-based remedies. The Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) is a particularly notable example of
the former; 100 the Supreme Court's repeated expansions of the Federal
Arbitration Act are examples of the latter. 101
Nevertheless, the list of nonpreempted problems or limitations in
antidiscrimination law doctrine is very long indeed; hence, the list of
ways that state or local legislation can be helpful is very long, too. Some
are suggested by the kinds of changes made either by the Restoration
Act directly or by the 1991 Amendments before them,102 but there are
many more.
From the point of view of the restoration of rights, an examination of
closely divided Supreme Court decisions on civil rights is the obviou s
place to begin. Bennett went back to 1993 to draw on the dissent in
St. Marys Honor Center v. Hicks,103 but one could just as easily tum to
the Supreme Court's 2013 decisions in which the term "supervisor" was
defined extraordinarily narrowly for the purpose of the determination
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of vicarious liability under Title VII, 104 and plaintiffs were stripped of
the ability to use mixed-motive analysis in Title VII retaliation cases. 105
Another source for potential state or local legislative activity is legislation that has been stymied on the federal level. The Paycheck Fairness
Act, 106 for example, has not been able to get through Congress. It would
prohibit retaliation against employees for discussing salary information
and would require the defense to a claim under the Fair Labor Standards
Act that women were being paid less than men to be a bona fide factor
other than sex that the employer proves is job related, consistent with
business necessity, and "not based upon or derived from a sex-based differential in compensation." 107
Disparate impact liability is another obvious area for state and local
legislating. Although national civil rights organizations have, surprisingly, failed to take advantage of it, the City Human Rights Law's provision is a useful model of a disparate impact scheme more robust than
provided by Title VII. 108 First, it applies to all protected classes and to all
contexts of discrimination. This avoids (and fixes) the problem that arose
in Smith v. City of Jackson; 109 it also provides a basis for the building of a
broader coalition than is offered when legislation extends protection for
a single protected class group.
Second, unlike Title VU (even as amended by the Civil Rights Act of
1991), the City Human Rights Law's disparate impact provision permits
a plaintiff to identify a group of practices that cause a disparate impact
without demonstrating "which specific policies or practices within the
group results in such disparate impact" (something that can be devilishly
difficult for a plaintiff). 1l0
The City Human Rights Law also gives the concept of less discriminatory alternative an important tweak: where the plaintiff "produces substantial evidence that an alternative policy or practice with less disparate
impact is available to the covered entity," the burden is on the covered
entity to "prove that such alternative policy or practice would not serve
the covered entity as well."lll There is no limitation on compensatory or
punitive damages set forth in the City Human Rights Law, either in the
context of a civil action generally or for disparate impact claims in particu la r. 112
Robust state and local legislation proscribing conduct that causes disparate impact based on protected class status might also help reduce
the impact of Ricci v. DeStefano,ll 3 the 2009 case in wh ich the Supreme
Court, treating the desire to avoid race-based disparate impact to be a
species of intentionally discriminatory action, h eld that an employer's
decision not to certify the results of a job examination that it believed
had a racially disparate impact was "impermissible under Title VII
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unless the employer can demonstrate a strong basis in evidence that, had
it not taken the action, it would have been liable under the disparateimpact statute." 114 According to Ricci, "a threshold showing of a significant statistical disparity... and nothing more" is "far from a strong basis in
evidence that the [employer] would have been liable under Title VII had
it certified the results." 115
A state or local law that makes disparate impact claims easier to prove
would likewise make it easier for an employer to have the requisite
"strong basis in evidence." Such a case would place Title VII's floor-nota-ceiling provision under a rare highlight: those in favor of broader
disparate impact provisions would argue that § 2000e-7 blessed such
extensions of civil rights protections; those seeking to limit disparate
impact would argue that disparate impact proscription beyond that provided by Title VII represented intentional discrimination that§ 2000e-7
does not permit a jurisdiction to sanction on the basis that such legislation "purports to require or permit the doing of any act which would be
an unlawful employment practice.'' 116
One set of important questions that each state or locality has to answer
concerns who is proscribed from committing discriminatory conduct,
who is responsible for such conduct, and what relationship a person
needs to have with a discriminatory actor to be protected. At the most
basic level, there is the question of the size at which an employer
becomes covered. For example, those working at the smallest employers, while not a large part of the labor force, are not a trivial part, either.
In California alone, there are more than 1.2 million people working in
firms with fewer than five employees. 117 Should those people not have
protection against discrimination? Though California has extended protection against discriminatory harassment to employees of employers of
all sizes,118 employers with fewer than five employees are exempt from
the other employment discrimination provisions (like discriminatory
hiring and firing). 119
Decisions as to who is covered are no less subject to political compromise than other legislative matters (perhaps more so, given the hold
that the idea of not "burdening" small businesses has on the American
imagination). But as a matter of what discrimination law seeks to provide
baseline protection against, size should not matter. Another context of
discrimination - that which occurs in public accommodations - provides interesting perspective on this question. The value sought to be
upheld in state statutes that commonly have a list of places - bowling
alleys, ice cream parlors, and so forth - where discrimination shall not
be allowed is that public life shaH not be polluted by bias, regardless of
how transitory an interaction might be. 120 One's employment- even at
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the smallest employer - is no less a matter of public life and should not
be polluted by discrimination.
Similarly, a person victimized by bias in connection with work is
harmed regardless of whether the victimizer is an "employer" or the victim is an "employee" or "independent contractor." California has taken
some steps here, as well, although only in the harassment context.
Harassers are individually liable, persons "providing services pursuant
to a contract" are protected, and extensive vicarious liability is set
forth. 121 Other states have the opportunity to expand coverage as much
or more, including, for example, considering whether to protect one
business entity from discrimination by another business entity because
of the protected class status of the first entity's employers, agents, or
associates. 122
I would be remiss if I did not touch on one additional prospective
addition to state and local antidiscrimination statutes. Ever since 1982,
standing for fair housing organizations and their testers has existed to
the furthest limits of Article Ill of the Constitution (there are no prudential limitations that may be imposed on standing in this context); if
a tester has been deprived of accurate information about housing availabilities, that is one injury; if an organization has "diverted resources"
from nontesting activities, that is another injury. 123 Testing is a crucial
technique: discrimination often will not announce itself to an individual
victim of a practice. Someone looking for a home, for example, knows
the listings that h e has been shown but very well may not know (even in
the Internet age) of listings that he has not been shown.
The utility of testing to ferret out employment discrimination should
be obvious. An individual is not going to be able to get a picture of hiring
patterns that exist; with the exception of government entities,124 only an
organization that engages in testing can decipher the patterns (whether
based on using names on resumes as proxies for race or otherwise).
There has not been very much employment testing, however, subsequent to Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc. v. BMC Marketing Corporation in 1994. 125 There, the D.C. Circuit denied the testers
standing altogether, holding that neither Title VII nor § 1981 contemplated such standing. 126 As for the Fair Employment Council, the court
reached the same result with respect to § 1981 and only allowed Title VII
organizational standing as the organization may have proven injuries (a)
flowing from actions taken against bona fide job applicants (not testers);
and (b) only insofar as there was "perceptible injury" to th e Council's
nontesting programs (beyond the decision to shift funding from nontesting to testing activities). 127 The hurdles apparent from the preceding
description make it difficult as a practical matter for an organization
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to achieve standing with respect to its employment discrimination testing.l28
As I have argued elsewhere, fair housing injuries are easily conceptualized as injuries to the government that warrant the construction
of a "private attorney general" provision.129 Employment discrimination injuries should be accorded the same importance. A straightforward
approach would be to specifically grant organizations standing when
they are deprived of accurate information about employment openings
because of the protected status of their agents (testers) or wh en they have
expended funds that result in the discovery of discrimination (avoiding
collateral litigation over whether they have "diverted resources").130
All of the foregoing discussion in this section has identified various
substantive goals, but there are important strategic and tactical decisions
that have to be made when mounting a state or local legislative effort.
One is the importance of creating as robust a legislative history as possible.131 The problem ofjudge incredulity at efforts to maximize coverage
is not going to disappear, and that legislative history can be an important
tool to persuade judges that "we really meant it."
The question that will need to be addressed on a case-by-case basis is
the extent to which an effort should rely on the adoption of an enhanced
liberal construction provision and how much on specific changes to a
law's substantive and procedural coverage. To me, an enhanced liberal
construction provision that emphasizes independent construction is
essential to prevent retrogression. Beyond that, a legislative direction to
reexamine how a statute should be interpreted can empower civil rights
advocates who are seeking to explain to courts the reasons a variety of
provisions deserve a broader reading than they have gotten. This can be
especially important in connection with matters that may seem technical to legislators - the ability to inspire a layperson to focus on who
bears the burden of persuasion, for example, is not u nlimited132 - but
have tremendous practical importance on the ability of victims of discrimination to achieve redress.
If specific changes are made, it is crucial that the legislation state
explicitly that the changes are not intended to ratify prior judicial construction of provisions not modified (again highlighting the importance
of having an enhanced liberal construction provision to reference).
VI. Closing Observati ons

The promise of expanding civil rights at the state and local level - or,
one m igh t say, the expedience of doing so given the political and judicial
environments that currently exist in Washington - is unmistakable. 133
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But efforts to make this sort of change have been sporadic. An informal
survey of the websites of several major national civil rights organizations
reveals relatively little attention being paid to this area (legislative advocacy with respect to marriage equality is an important exception to the
rule). Why isn't more being made of the political space that is available?
Especially given the trajectory of marriage equality, why wouldn't the
model of seeding an effort in the most congenial jurisdictions first be
more generally appealing?
I am acutely aware that civil rights organizations and their allies do not
have limitless funds, but my own experience over the last twenty-seven
years as a civil rights lawyer tells me that limited funding is only a small
part of the problem.
Many of the issues discussed in this chapter - the nuts and bolts
of employment discrimination litigation over the decades - are not
among the areas seen as either new or exciting (in the academy, among
civil rights organizations, and elsewhere) and thus are not ranked as high
priorities. Some of the problem comes from a habitual distaste among
some civil rights lawyers to have to be litigating in state court instead of
federal court. Another element of the problem is the failure to take the
time to study and appreciate how much stronger nonfederal causes of
action can be.
Many civil rights organizations and advocates focus attention on only
one protected class and, sometimes, on one context of discrimination.
It should not be difficult to appreciate that a coalition seeking to make
changes across the lines of protected class (e.g., those affecting age, gender, race, and disability) and across the lines of discrimination context
(e.g., changes affecting both employment and housing) will generally be
able to bring more pressure on a legislative body than a single-issue
group acting alone. But despite frequent invocations of the importance
of coalition, its practice-both in developing multi-issue legislation and
in terms of coordinating advocacy-has remained more the exception
than the rule.
In my own judgment, the single most important factor is that most
attorneys have not considered, or are uncomfortable with, the idea that
it is still possible to write on a clean slate. I have seen this reticence hinder the development of the City Human Rights Law as broadly as it otherwise could be, 134 and I think the same reticence does a lot to explain
the paucity of similar efforts elsewhere.
It is surely more difficult to accomplish one's goals when judges have
to be directed to take an active role in developing a statute to its full
potential than when there are judges already inclined to do so. But it is
worth thinking about state and local legislation as in many ways being
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at the earliest stage of development, comparable to where Title VII was
immediately after its passage more than fifty years ago. Neither McDonnell Douglas, nor Griggs, nor any other case came packaged with the law;
advocates had to see the potential, imagine the doctrines needed, and
marshal evidence and reason to get those doctrines established as best
they could. Those kinds of efforts are needed at the state and local levels
today.
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N.Y.C. Admin. Code§ 8-502(a) (providing that a civil action shall allow a plaintiff
to seek "damages, including punitive damages, and...injunctive relief and such
other remedies as may be appropriate"); see also N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(17)
(setting forth disparate impact claims contains no damage limitation).

113. 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
ll4. Id. at 563.
115. !d. at 587 (citation omitted).
116. 28 U.S.C. § 2000e-7.
117. Data on number of employees by size of employer for 2014 is available at the
website
of
California's
Employment
Development
Department,
http://www.calmis.ca.gov/file/ indsize/chart_sob2014_3.pdf (last accessed on Aug.
20, 2015).
118. CAL. Gov. CODE §§ 12940U)(l), U)(4)(A) (West 2013).
119. Id. §§ l2940(4)(A), 12926(d).
120. It was this recognition that led to a provision in the 1991 Amendments that
changed the focus on the public accommodations provisions of the City Human
Rights Law from one focused on "place" to one that covered "providers, whether
licensed or unlicensed, of goods, services, facilities, accommodations, advantages
or privileges of any kind." N.Y.C. Admin. Code§ 8-102(9).
121. CAL. Gov. CODE§ 12940U); see Roby v. McKesson Corp., 219 P.3d 749 (Cal. 2010)
(confirming individual liability and discussing statutory provision generally). The
state, however, is still stuck with the "severe or pervasive" standard. See, e.g., Miller
v. Dep't of Carr., 115 P.3d 77, 89-92 (Cal. 2005).
122. Minnesota has made it unlawful for a person who engages in a trade or business
or in the provision of a service "to intentionally refuse to do business with,
to refuse to contract with, or to discriminate in the basic terms, conditions, or
performance of the contract because of a person's race, national origin, color,
sex, sexual orientation, or disability, unless the alleged refusal or discrimination is
because of a legitimate business purpose." MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 363A.l7 (West 2013).
The Minnesota Supreme Court gave effect to the language insofar as permitting
an injured business to sue but excluded the individual discriminated against
(who was not a party to a contract) from being able to sue. Krueger v. Zeman
Constr. Co., 781 N.W.2d 858 (Minn. 2010). The court majority asserted that the
statutory language unambiguously did not provide for such liability but noted in
the alternative its fear: under the plaintiff's theory, every person affected by the
defendant's conduct could have an individual cause of action, and "[t]here is no
indication that the legislature intended such an expansive reading of the statute."
Id. at 864.
123. See generally Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
124.

Nothing stops a governmental entity from engaging in employment testing
except the lack of political will.

125. 28 F.3d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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126. Id. at 1271- 72.
127. !d. at 1276-79.
128. In the fair housing context, it is not at all clear that Havens would survive if
the standing issue arose before the current Supreme Court. Even if it would,
"diversion of resources" claims require an organization to engage in complicated
choreography (or hope that a defendant does not probe too hard). A more direct
statement of standing would be preferable but is not currently politically feasible
on the federal level.
129. See Craig Gurian, Using Local and State Legislation to Preserve and E:cpand the Ability
of Fair Housing Organizations to Prosecute the Discrimination They Uncover, HARV. L.
& POL'Y REv. ONLINE (Oct. 2007), available at http://www.antibiaslaw.com/sites/
default!files/all/ Private_Attorney_ General.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2015). The
concept of a private attorney general provision is best known through its use in
the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq.
130. Nassau County, N.Y., incorporated such a provision in 2006. Nassau Cty. Local
Law 9-2006, available at http://www.nassaucountyny.gov/ DocumentCenterNiew/
1686 (last visited Aug. 30, 2015). That law added, inter alia, section 21 -9.7(d)(3)(vi).
This private attorney general provision, which, to my knowledge, has not yet been
the subject of a court decision, did not contain a definition that limited the cause
of action to certain organizations but allowed any person to proceed who had
made the substantive showing required. A way to delimit the class of persons
eligible would be to provide standing for an "eligible civil rights organization,"
defined as "any not-for-profit organization that is recognized as exempt from
taxation pursuant to section 50l(c) of the Internal Revenue Code and whose
primary mission is fighting discriminatory practices made unlawful under local,
state, or federal anti-discrimination Jaw."
131. In the case of the Restoration Act, the Committee Report served a useful function,
but the fact that a councilmember was able to incorporate into the record the
testimony of the Anti-Discrimination Center and the statements of the Brennan
Center and the Association of the Bar (now the New York City Bar Association)
turned out to be helpful as well.
132. The broad support created for the restorative Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991), does provide an important counterexample.
133. Certainly, the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), an organization
devoted to "limited government," "free markets," and "federalism" has understood
the importance of state-level advocacy for many years and has achieved
significant success in having its agenda adopted.
134. Unfortunately, I have seen many occasions where a practitioner, having taken on a
weak case, develops an argument that is really no more than "the Restoration Act
says I win anyway." Especially because judicial obedience to legislative command
can never be taken for granted, those pursuing cases under the City Human
Rights Law, therefore, have an obligation to make that obedience as easy as
possible. At the core of that obligation is making sure that, when relying on the
enhanced liberal construction provision, the practitioner develop for the judge an
interpretation that is grounded in the purposes of the City Human Rights Law,
fully explaining how that interpretation, as compared with others, best serves the
law's purposes.

Leveraging Antidiscrimination

Olatunde johnson

On turning fifty, a friend ofmine said: "You can't pretend you are young anymore."
I. Introduction

As the Civil Rights Act turns fifty, antidiscrimination law has become
unfashionable. For those commentators and reformers who concern
themselves with addressing racial, ethnic, and gender disparities,
antidiscrimination law occupies a less central role than it did fifty years
ago, perhaps even a marginal one. The core problem, it seems, is that
discrimination is a limited explanation for current forms of contemporary inequality. Discussing race, economist Glenn Loury has argued that
discrimination should be "demoted, dislodged from its current prominent place in the conceptual discourse on racial inequality in American
life." Richard Ford and Richard Banks offer a similar assessment, arguing
that if "we are legitimately concerned about substantive disparities," then
the "goal of eliminating discrimination is too modest, not ambitious
enough."1 It is not uncommon to speak of remedying discrimination
as separate from a larger goal of addressing inequality. And civil rights
strategies are posited as not up to the serious task of improving mobility for low-wage workers or providing access to entry-level employment.
The antidiscrimination approach, it is said, is "based on the principle of freedom of individual opportunity," which necessarily helps the
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more advantaged and better trained, and is thus inadequate for reducing substantive inequality in our society. 2 If one is seeking innovations
to address poverty and inequality or to promote economic and social
opportunity, much commentary suggests that antidiscrimination law is
not the place to find them.
It is not hard to harness reasons to demote "discrimination" in contemporary inequality discourse. Discrimination remains prevalent in
our society and continues to explain extant disparities between groups. 3
However, there is much to suggest that addressing contemporary
inequities teq_uites confronting the full range of mechanisms that disparately affect racial and ethnic minorities and women, including
improving education and training of minority workers, 4 the decreasing
fortune of less-skilled workers, 5 the effects of immigration status on
social mobility, and how geography and place structures opportunity. 6
Given the complex reasons for contemporary inequality, social reform
is less likely to center merely on questions of individualized bias, but
on social welfare and education programs, interventions to improve the
economic status of unskilled and semiskilled workers, and strategies to
diminish spatial segregation and improve the conditions facing communities of concentrated poverty. Contemporary advocates might now
organize their work around narratives of social inclusion,7 or addressing
spatial inequities in the distribution of opportunity. 8
Yet there is a danger in casting aside the Civil Rights Act as one charts
this new course. For one, as I discuss in Part I, such a move misunderstands the force of the antidiscrimination directive that undergirded
the Act, one that is not limited to formal discrimination or bias and
that drew on a broad set of private and public implementation tools
to respond to evolving problems of exclusion. Reminding ourselves of
the implementation strategies that emerged in the first decade after the
Act produces a richer account of what we mean by "discrimination" and
attunes us to a broader set of implementation tools than is conventionally associated with antidiscrimination law. Second, as I show in Part II,
the Civil Rights Act continues to sustain an important set of strategies to
promote inclusion. In that Part I, discuss the emergence of strategies to
address contemporary disparities under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act,
as well as emerging efforts under Title VII-reminiscent of Title VII's
early years-to make Title VII more responsive to contemporary forces
shaping exclusion in labor markets.
Part III concludes with the value of retaining hold of this civil rights
infrastructure, even as reformers develop other tools and strategies for
promoting equity and inclusion. My argument here is that the Act provides an important regulatory framework for addressing problems of
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exclusion facing a broad range of groups (including women and racial
and ethnic minorities), across a range of domains (education, employment, transportation, environmen t, agriculture, and more) and using a
range of potentially powerful public and private enforcement strategies.
Transformative statutes do not come to us every day. For pragmatic as
well as expressive reasons, it is worth continuing to consider what one
might wrest from the Act's great aspirations and powerful design.
1. Revisiting Ambition

Antidiscrimination is at the core of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. While
the Act uses a range of terms-Title VI of the Act provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance"9 and Title VII prohibits discrimination as
well as segregation and classification in ways that deprive employees of
opportunities10- our collective shorthand for the Act is that it prohibits
"discrimination."
Among those concerned! with addressing contemporary race, ethnic,
or gender disparities or with promoting economic inclusion, the antidiscrimination approach typified by the Act is often framed as inadequate. 11
In part, this assessment ste·m s from a determination that discrimination
is either in significant decline or a fairly marginal explanation of contemporary disparities.l2 In part, this assessmen t also represents a critique of the strategies underlying civil rights law: the antidiscrimination
approach is seen as intertwined with an emphasis on litigation at the
expense of other approaches. 13 The thrust of these critiques is that the
antidiscrimination idea centers on formal, market discrimination and
bias, and is thus not sufficiently robust to be relevant today.
However, I urge caution in characterizing the 1964 Act as centered
on formal or explicit discrimination. Rather, one can fairly characterize
the Act's regime as seeking to address a range of institutional practices
that disadvantaged blacks (the main target at the Act's inception). By
"regime," I mean to emphasize both the Act as apparently contemplated
by its initial drafters and legislative and executive proponents but even
more by the private and public enforcement structure that emerged in
the years after its enactment.
The statutory history-which has been much pored over in the half
a century following passage of the Act-shows the breadth of the Act's
goals. In finally announcing support for civil rights legislation in
employment and education, President john F. Kennedy promoted such
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efforts as necessary to ensure full equality in American society and participation in economic life. 14 In his address on the floor of the U.S.
House of Representatives introducing the legislation, Kennedy cast fair
employment laws as part of a quest to end racial disparities in unemployment, en route to the larger goal of assuring full employment for all
workers. 15 Introducing Title VI, which prohibited discrimination in federally funded programs, Kennedy expansively defined the antidiscrimination idea underlying the legislation, declaring that: "[S]imple justice
requires that public funds, to which all taxpayers of all races contribute,
not be spent in any fashion which encourages, entrenches, subsidizes, or
results in racial discrimination." 16 "Indirect discrimination" through subsidization, Kennedy emphasized, is "invidious" discrimination. 17
Legislative history from the House and Senate speaks to the goals of
this new legislation. 18 The House Report to one of the bills that would
culminate in the Civil Rights Act declared that discrimination is an
"urgent and most serious national problem" requiring extensive action
to eradicate exclusion in voting, public accommodation, federal financial assistance, and employment. 19 Recognizing that states had initiated
important civil rights legislation, the House Report nevertheless recognized the need for national action: "in the last decade it has become
increasingly clear that progress has been too slow and that national legislation is required to meet a national need." 2021 In addition, the legislature identified goals that went beyond market discrimination, emphasizing that discrimination was not limited to explicit exclusionary actions
but "ranges in degrees from patent absolute rejection to more subtle
forms of invidious distinctions."21 As an example, this House Report
alluded to the effect of seemingly racially neutral practices such as "last
hired, first fired" and to the relegation of minorities "to 'traditional' positions and through discriminatory promotion practices."22 Occupational
segregation was achieved through "traditional expectations" as well as
the segregation of minorities in "involuntary part-time work."23 Discrimination could be subtle: the House Report noted that while employment agencies often engaged in "outright refusal to deal with minority
group applications," as prevalent was the refusal to refer minorities due
to "expressed agreements, tacit understandings, and assumptions based
on traditional practices:' 24 In this congr essional history, labor and entrylevel jobs emerge as a particular point of focus. The House Report refers
to efforts to improve opportunities in construction unions and ensure
access to apprenticeship training programs often run by labor unions
because of the crucial role these pathways played in "improving the
skills, knowledge and capability of" workers. 25
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To be sure, key portions of the legislative history of the Act reveal
legislative concerns about avoiding race-conscious action or intrusions
into the "prerogatives" of management (prefiguring subsequent debates
in Title VII over the extent to which the Act should be interpreted
to allow disparate impact or affirmative action).26 And forces aligned
against the Act sought to minimize administrative power to implement
Title VII, most notably succeeding in diminishing the powers of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 27 Yet this journey into
the statutory history is meant to check modern characterizations of the
antidiscrimination goal as. aimed at simply removing explicit or blatant barriers or as disconnected from the goal of economic opportunity.
Instead, the legislative history offers a more richly conceived notion
of the degree to which discrimination was embedded in employment
and credentialing institutions such as unions, the range of explicit and
implicit barriers to inclusion, and the connection between the antidiscrimination method and achieving fuller economic participation.
The ambition of the Act is further revealed when we consider the Act's
implementation context-the strategies that public and private actors
undertook to implement and enforce the Act. Implementation would
come to include strategies (1) defining the Act broadly to reach more
than intentional discrimination; (2) leveraging administrative and private resources for systemic enforcement; and (3) requiring regulated
actors to take affirmative inclusionary steps.
The move beyond intentional discrimination is seen most sharply in
the public and private implementation of the Act to reach actions with
an unjustified disparate impact. Within a year after passage of the Act,
federal agencies charged with implementing Title VI of the Act interpreted the provision to reach not just actions by funding recipients that
were intentional but also those that had the "effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination."28 (Notably, these regulations were drafted by the
agencies, with the involvement of private actors and the White House,
and formally approved by the president.) What we now understand as
the disparate impact standard in employment grew in part out of the
guidelines issued by the EEOC on employment tests, in response to the
adoption by Southern employers of formally race-neutral practices that
operated to discriminate. 29 Two years after passage of the Act, the EEOC
issued guidance instructing employers to administer an occupational
test only where it "fairly measures the knowledge or skills required by
the particular job or class of job."30 A few years later, the EEOC issued
additional guidelines requiring that employers using tests have "available 'data demonstrating that the test is predictive of or significantly correlated with important elements of work behavior which comprise or
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are relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates are being evaluated."'31 It was in giving "substantial deference" to the EEOC in Griggs v.
Duke Power that the Supreme Court allowed that the Act prohibited in
some cases employers' facially neutral practices that in fact are "discriminatory in operation."32
Commentators have debated whether the EEOC's move interpreting
the Act to reach disparate impact claims was distorting the meaning of a
statute centered on disparate treatment and color-blindness, or whether
this move was supported by the language and prevailing understandings
of "discrimination."33 Regardless of the position one takes on fidelity
to the language or the original legislative deal, the point here is that
these early moves by the EEOC implement the Act in ways that reached
beyond thin notions of formal discrimination. Instead, the meaning of
antidiscrimination emerges in response to the efforts to address the
evolving barriers facing workers.
Second, public and private enforcement strategies focused on opening
up large-scale institutions to black workers by targeting salient industries
and leveraging systemic tools such as regulatory guidance, investigations, and hearings, and using litigation mechanisms such as the class
action device and pattern and practice authority. As other commentators have shown, the EEOC adopted structurally oriented strategies--interpreting language in Title VII to permit it to collect data on
the racial composition of employers34 and using this data to systemically publicize and investigate problems of labor market discrimination in particular regions, sectors, and industries. 35 Private enforcement
also followed a systemic approach that targeted particular industries,36
employed the class action device, 37 and sought to take aim at a range of
exclusionary practices, in particular the use of non-job-related occupational tests 38 and exclusionary seniority practices. 39 As former NAACP
Legal Defense Fund (LDF) attorney Robert Belton has explained: "by
1965 overt discrimination on the basis of race was not fashionable.'' 40
Instead, LDF harnessed an approach to challenge "superficially neutral
practices, such as testing and educational devices or seniority systems
that appeared facially neutral or color-blind but operated to perpetuate
the effects of past discrimination"41 and "systemic discrimination
imbedded in basic personnel policies or organizational structures of
companies and unions."42
Third, the enforcement agency used its regulatory power to promote
goals apart from the litigation context. Although the EEOC (designed
to be a weak enforcement agency) lacked (and still lacks) power to issue
binding substantive regulations to enforce Title VII,43 the agency developed guidelines on how to avoid discriminatory practices such as
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seniority systems and, most famously, on the use of occupational tests.
Robert Lieberman has described these guidelines as emerging out of the
EEOC's investigation and conciliation power-an attempt by the EEOC
to provide a guide for "employers and employees about what practices
the commission would find acceptable and unacceptable in probable
cause determinations."44
This implementation context reveals a robust conception of the
antidiscrimination directive at the core of the Act-one that reaches
beyond explicit practices to attain subtle, embedded mechanisms that
excluded or inhibited opportunities for black workers. In addition, this
review of the implementation context makes clear that reformers
employed a range of strategies to move the Act beyond the redress of
individual claims. This is manifest in the leveraging of federal contracting and spending power, the requirement of affirmative inclusionary
strategies, the reliance on administrative investigations and regulatory
guidance, the use of the class action device, and the attempt to connect the work of private litigators and community-based organizations.
Finally, this context reveals that antidiscrimination strategies would be
cognizant of the realities of the industrial economy at that time and connected to core questions of social and economic equality. For instance,
the paradigm beneficiary of Title VII was the blue collar worker, evident
in reformers' focus on manufacturing and construction industries and
on organized labor. In its goals and implementation, the Act centered on
opening up access to jobs with training and career ladders and on providing avenues for the acquisition of skills.
By some key accounts, this enfo rcem ent approach contributed significantly to improving the social and economic status of blacks in the late
1960s and early 1970s45 and to substantial progress in the desegregation
of schools. 46 However, I do not want to overstate the success or ambition
of these p ublic-private strategies47 or to ignore the possibility of even
more transformative paths that might have been pursued, particularly
with regard to reform of labor inslitutions.48 What I propose is in the
spirit of correcting how we often regard "antidiscrimination" today-a
useful ch eck on our modern tendency to characterize the antidiscrimination idea at the center of the Act as limited to a concern about individual bias, as too court-centered, insufficiently structural, or attenuated
from core questions of access to opportunity.
II. Claiming Relevance

Today, much of how commentators understand the relevance and
capacity of antidiscrimination law is shaped by regimes of court
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enforcement and by Title VII litigation in particular. Title VII generates
more litigation than any other portion of the Act. Title VII cases are
more frequently heard at the Supreme Court than litigation involving
other provisions of the Act (or other civil rights statutes).49 And Title
VII commands the greatest share of commentary about the Act in the
legal academic literature. Title VII's rise and prominence has coincided
with a move away from the earlier more systemic or "structural" focus
of the Act. For instance, while individual Title VII cases have continued
to rise since the Act's inception, pattern and practice and class action
litigation has fallen. 5° And, even as the overall volume of litigation has
increased, litigation has shifted away from the hiring discrimination
cases that prevailed in Title VII's earlier years, which sought to open
up opportunity for previously excluded workers in economically salient
industries toward more individual claims of termination. This is a trend
that researchers identified in the early 1990s before passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 (which, through damages and other mechanisms,
increased incentives to bring Title VII claims),51 and that has continued
in the subsequent years.52 Attorneys on the ground have noted the irony
of this interplay between the Civil Rights Act of 1991's strengthening of
Title VII through a damage regime and the decline of systemic reform
litigation. 53 Some of these changes in the shape of litigation no doubt
reflect Title VII's success in creating incentives for fairer employment
practices and the provision's salience.54 Still, with the individual Title VII
case in mind, one might come to understand the Act as centered on individual bias; one might have reason to question the Act's broader relevance to contemporary forces and patterns of exclusion.
Yet focusing on Title VII's enforcement in individual cases pays insufficient heed to other provisions of the Act, such as Title VI, which do not
operate primarily in courts or as a tool for redress of individualized bias
claims. In addition, emphasizing court enforcement in individual cases
overlooks the broader regulatory tools of the Act-in both Title VI and
Title VII-that can reach beyond ex post court enforcement in individual
cases and that can operate to promote or encourage inclusion and disrupt patterns of exclusion.
To begin with Title VII, as the story of the 1964 Act's early history
shows, effective implementation of Title VII depended not just on litigation in individual cases but also on use of a broad set of tools, including
private class action and agency pattern and practice litigation, regulatory
guidance, industry targeting, data analysis, and investigations. Furthermore, implementation of Title VII depended not only on narrow conceptions of discrimination centered on market bias or prejudice but also
on the use of these hybrid enforcement tools to address a set of on-the-
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ground, evolving practices that inhibited opportunity for workers and to
open up key institutions and industries.
At the outset, it is worth noting even as Title VII litigation today is hobbled by significant doctrinal constraints,55 such litigation has continued
capacity to address patterns of group exclusion and reform organizational practices. Class actions, pattern and practice, and hiring cases may
have declined relative to the early years of Title VII enforcement, but
they are not extinct. In recent years, privately initiated Title VII litigation has sought to address exclusionary employment practices by public
agencies that exclude minority workers56 and practices such as steering and downward channeling that perpetuate occupational segregation in lower-skilled, service sector employment. 57 Litigation in this vein
maintains relevance by taking aim at systemic practices and targeting
pathways, training institutions like public employment and unions-a
traditional focus of Title VII-as well the service sector in which large
numbers of women and workers of color are employed (though often in
the lowest ranks).
Moreover, innovative litigation stems from important collaborations
between antidiscrimination lawyers and groups that organize not
around questions of discrimination but toward the goals of improving
the condition of workers within particular industries. One group that has
received some attention in the academic literature in recent years is the
Restaurant Opportunities Center of New York (ROC-NY), which seeks to
improve the working conditions and pay of restaurant workers in fine
dining establishments in New York City. The group organizes restaurant
workers to address wage and hour violations by employers and improve
benefits like sick or parenting-related leave.58 Yet central to the group's
mission is addressing what the group sees as pervasive discrimination
and occupational segregation in the restaurant industry. Much as public and private implementers used the data collected by the EEOC to
highlight the exclusion of black workers by Southern manufacturers,
ROC-NY also publicizes practices in the restaurant industry that limit
opportunity for women, immigrant workers, and workers of color.59
ROC-NY relies on audit testing-that classic tool of antidiscrimination
enforcement used most extensively in the fair housing context60 -to
document discrimination in hiring for particular restaurant positions. 61
In addition, although the group's strategies center on organizing and
policy reform, ROC-NY partners with private attorneys to litigate discrimination cases, securing remedies in individual and group litigation.
Significantly, ROC-NY leverages its investigations into discriminatory
practices, its deep knowledge of the industry, its representation of workers, and its litigation successes to publicize exclusionary practices (such
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as the lack of formal and transparent practices for hiring, training, and
promotion). It advocates for specific reform interventions and celebrates
and involves employers that perpetuate best practices in the industry. 62
There is evidence, too, of revitalization of the type of public systemic
enforcement that gave Title VII its salience in the early years of the
Civil Rights Act. The EEOC has long been seen as a broken enforcement
agency. Historically overtaxed and underresourced, the increase in Title
VII and other employment discrimination cases in the 1990s created
additional pressures on the EEOC since Title VII and most other
employment claims must first be filed with the agency. 63 And there are
serious questions about whether the agency has adapted to accommodate this crush of complaints. Indeed, if the early EEOC sought to move
away from the volume of individual complaints by focusing on systemic remedies and investigations, accounts of the EEOC in the 1990s
and 2000s suggest an agency paralyzed by processing individual complaints. 64 The EEOC, too, has recognized its need to enhance its systemic litigation program. 65
But rather than wholly abandon the prospect of wresting more from
this flawed public enforcement mechanism, it seems worth devoting
creative attention to strategies for strengthening the regime. After all,
the EEOC has formal tools and capacity unavailable to private litigants.
Unlike private litigants, the EEOC can maintain systemic litigation without meeting the requirements of class action Rule 2366 (the difficulties
in meeting the rule's requirements have hampered private class actions
in recent years 67). The EEOC can also pursue investigations without an
actual complainant by filing a commissioner's charge. 68 More, the EEOC
can pursue conciliations, hold hearings to investigate patterns of discrimination, collect data, and issue regulatory guidance.
To reverse its slide away from systemic litigation, the EEOC has
recently announced a renewed focus on systemic discrimination, developing a plan for doing so after extensive consultation with experts and
advocates. 69 Indeed, in the last few years, the EEOC has begun to bring
more pattern and practice litigation; in 2012, it significantly increased
its recoveries against employers in systemic discrimination cases over
prior years.70 The EEOC has announced an increased emphasis on preventing employment discrimination through education and outreach,
including by partnering with community groups to focus on the most
disadvantaged workers and underserved communities?1 And the EEOC
has instituted important regulatory guidance on current barriers facing
workers, notably revising its prior guidance on best practices in considering an applicant's criminal history.72 Further, the EEOC could utilize its existing powers more effectively. For instance, the EEOC might
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increase its ability to identify industries with discriminatory employment practices and to analyze the EE0-1 and other data that it collects
on private employers.73 The EEOC could use data to hold hearings on
problematic industry practices, disseminate information and best practices, generate regulatory guidance, and pursue litigation. Another tool
th~ EEOC might deploy, perhaps in conjunction with nongovernmental organizations and nonprofits, is the use of audit studies to identify hiring discrimination. Although courts are not settled on the ability
of employment testers to recover damages and injunctive relief,74 the
results of audit studies might still prove useful for conducting investigations and providing insight into industry practices.75 But the agency's
current emphasis recaptures the focus on systemic discrimination-it
attunes us to the possibilities that might still remain in a Title VII that
moves beyond a focus on individual litigation.
The other key provision of the Act-Title VI-has also served as an
important location in recent years for addressing contemporary problems of exclusion. Title VI differs from Title VII in that its central
enforcement target is not private industry but federal agencies and
grantees. Its key mode of enforcement is not litigation but administrative regulation, backed by the threat of funding withdrawal. In recent
years, regulatory enforcement of Title VI has yielded an important array
of regulations that place affirmative requirements of inclusion on
grantees. Implementing Title VI, the Department of Agriculture
requires federal agencies administering agriculture, forestry, food, and
nutrition programs to undertake ongoing analyses to ensure that
minorities benefit from these federally funded programs.76 Federally
funded public transit and highway programs must take affirmative steps
to assess the impacts of their programs on minorities and persons with
limited English proficiency, adopt mitigating alternatives, and include
minority groups in their planning. 77 In an account of these directives in
mass transit, I showed how they required grantees to incorporate impact
assessments in their planning, engage in best practices for ensuring participation of covered groups, and design inclusionary alternatives.?8
These Title VI directives bear on the debate about the relevance of
discrimination law today: they extend beyond individual bias, and their
implementation depends not on ex post enforcement by courts (although
litigation may sometimes play a role in enforcement) but on implementation by regulated actors. In addition, these directives intervene
in regulatory domains that are linchpins for determining inclusion and
opportunity distribution today. For instance, mass transportation policy
and design have strong effects on economic mobility-high minority
and poor communities are often disconnected from important job cen-
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ters-and access to transportation is a key determinant of the distribution of resources and patterns of racial segregation and concentrated
poverty across a metropolitan region.79 By encouraging inclusion of the
needs of minority communities in design decisions, promoting ongoing equity assessments, and mitigation, Title VI mass transit directives
seek to interrupt the reproduction of existing, unequal patterns of transportation access and the attendant spatial inequalities. In addition, as in
the employment example described above, these Title VI directives are
harnessed by groups that do not centrally organize around questions
of antidiscrimination-but who instead organize their advocacy around
the problems of particular geographic communities or on a specific policy problem (such as transit equity). 80
Perhaps even more than Title VII, Title VI makes plain the risk ofleaving the Act behind as reformers focus on questions of mobility, opportunity, and spatial equality. Because Title VI commands attention to race
and ethnicity in a vast number of federal programs involving billions of
dollars, its regulatory infrastructure is too powerful not to employ as a
tool for advancing reform.
Ill. Antidiscrimination's Place

As a way of defining a problem, and as a legal intervention, antidiscrimination is no doubt less central than it once was. In education, discriminatory discipline, racialized tracking, and discriminatory student
assignment, policies may remain problems, but reformers' attention
is understandably attuned to addressing disparities through reforms
to improve the quality of educational interventions. In employment,
important concerns about discrimination and occupational segregation
in labor markets might be overtaken by the fate of workers in an economy that leaves little room for less-skilled and semiskilled workers. 81
Those interested in inclusion and particularly in reducing racial and
ethnic disparities would be gravely wrong to frame their claims solely
in terms of discrimination (whether a thin or robust account) without
engaging a broader set of reform strategies.
Still, the Civil Rights Act has an important role to play in these
domains. Understanding the Act's place requires recovering the Act's
central ambition as well as innovating to make the Act responsive to contemporary problems. Some may argue that the Act in its current formulation is not worth such sustained attention. After all, much innovation
might be accomplished through new regulation and new statutes at the
federal, state, and local levels. Such innovation is reflected in statutes
requiring targeted attention to the progress of racial and ethnic minori-
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ties in education 82 or by requirements that state actors address racial
disparities in their juvenile justice systems. 83 Innovation is evident, too,
in efforts to intervene to address practices that may have a particular
impact on minorities or women but that address the declining fates of all
lower-wage workers, such as skills training, the expansion of school-towork and apprenticeship programs, wage reform, reentry programs, the
creation of new collective bargaining regimes for low-wage workers,84
child care and sick leave policy85 or reform of the inappropriate uses of
employment background checks. 86
The reasons for continuing nevertheless to ask how the Civil Rights
Act can bear on contemporary questions are both pragmatic and expressive. The pragmatic argument is that it is hard to make progress on
inequality without attention to questions of how status-race, ethnicity,
and gender-structure opportunity in d istinct ways. The Civil Rights Act
contains one of the few places in American law that directs attention
to these categories, and that provides mechanisms for disrupting longstanding patterns of exclusion. More, it provides an expansive, if imperfect, public and private regulatory infrastructure for advancing these
goals. The second perhaps more expressive reason is that the Act was
never simply about antidiscrimination in the narrowest sense. Even if
so conceived by some of its drafters, it has absorbed a meaning through
implementation and cultural salience that gestures toward broader
claims of citizenship and inclusion.

IV. Conclusion
As the Civil Rights Act of 1964 turns fifty, I am sympathetic to the idea
that we should demote discrimination. Recognizing this, social reformers increasingly organize their equality clai ms around questions of
opportunity, economic mobility, and diminishing disparities based on
geography and place. Yet the meaning of the 1964 Civil Rights Act is not
limited to narrow notions of discrimination; it still has a role to play
in structuring claims and advancing reforms in these new domains. As
reformers design new strategies, the Act's initial structural reform ambitions are worth remembering.
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A Signal or a Silo? Title VII's Unexpected
Hegemony

Sophia Z. Lee

In February 1976, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board)
held hearings on whether to continue denying its services to unions that
discriminated on the basis of race or sex. 1 Board members, like administrators at a number of the major federal regulatory agencies, had understood the 1964 enactment of Title VII to empower them to adopt its
equal employment mission as their own. The Board's greatest champion of this effort, Member Howard Jenkins Jr., believed the Board was
uniquely situated to provide "meaningful answers to the interrelated
problems of race relations and industrial relations."2 But after twelve
years of expanding the scope of the Board's antidiscrimination policies,
its members had doubts. Rather than harmonizing civil and labor rights
as jenkins had hoped, these policies, members feared, were undermining the right to collective action that the Board was designed to protect.3
The Board's 1976 hearing only exacerbated these concerns. Attorneys
for the AFL-CIO warned that employers "seek to defeat organization
through any weapon put at hand," and the Board's policies were a
weapon whose "one cutting edge directed at the 'right to selforganization."'4 That employers were the only parties urging the Board
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to more fully impo rt Title VII standards confirmed the labor lawyers'
concern.5
For scholars attuned to labor and civil rights, as for the Board members convening that 1976 hearing, Title VII has had a mixed legacy. On
the one hand, as historian Nancy MacLean has demonstrated, Title VII
transformed the workplace, not only opening jobs but also empowering
workers and forging new political coalitions among women and communities of color. 6 Labor scholar Benjamin Sachs has noted ways that
Title VII facilitates collective action today at a time when traditional
labor law is "ossified." 7 Others have sought to revitalize the labor movement by reframing labor rights as civil rights and amending Title VII to
prohibit discrimination against union organizing. 8
Yet Title VII's triumphs have come, other scholars note, at a steep
cost to unions. To some, Title VII was based on an individual rights
regime that was fundamentally adverse to the collective rights on which
New Deal labor laws such as the Wagner Act were premised. 9 To others,
the early EEOC staff and plaintiff-side lawyers were insensitive to how
unions worked and unreasonably destructive in their demands. 10 In
BLACK AND BLUE: AFRICAN AMERICANS, THE LABOR MOVEMENT, AND THE
DECLINE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY, political scientist Paul Frymer
argues that decades of inaction (or insufficient action) by Congress, the
executive branch, and the labor movement led to a bifurcated legal
regime in which the NLRB protected labor rights while the federal
courts implemented Title Vll. The courts ended up being much more
effective at integrating unions th an anyone had anticipated. But this
approach left union discrimination in the hands of officials, attorneys,
and judges who were neither familiar with unions nor motivated to
accommodate civil and labor rights. The unfortunate result, Frymer
argues, was a court-based civil rights regime that gravely weakened labor
policy and the labor movement. 11
I have suggested elsewhere that a more unified legal regime was both
more vigorously sought and more complicated to achieve than existing
scholarship recognizes. 12 I explain my skepticism at far greater length
in my book, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION FROM THE NEW DEAL TO
THE NEW RIGHT, by demonstrating that efforts to fuse labor and civil
rights faced daunting political and legal hurdles from the inception of
the New Deal labor regime. 13 For this fiftieth anniversary of Title VII,
however, I focus on that law's relationship to the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) during Title VII's first fifteen years. As the opening
vignette suggests, efforts to ch arge the NLRB with Title VII's implementation as a means to strengthen employment discrimination law while
better harmonizing it with labor rights turned out to be as, if not more,
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detrimental to unions than Title VII's enforcement by the courts. Court
enforcement of Title VII dominates employment discrimination today
partly as a result of efforts to protect workers' right to collective action.
Below I trace an impulse I call "Title VII as signal," showing how Title
VII was initially understood to instantiate a broader constitutional obligation to ensure workplace equality and to simultaneously heighten the
federal government's duty to fulfill that obligation. This penumbra emanating from Title VII encouraged the NLRB during the 1960s and 1970s
to expand its antidiscrimination policies. In the latter half of the 1970s,
however, Title VII was reconceived as a silo in which antidiscrimination efforts should be consolidated. This was in part because of concerns
that the NLRB's antidiscrimination policies came at too great a cost to
its primary mission of ensuring workers' right to self-organization. By
1979, employment discrimination enforcement was concentrated in the
agency Title VII created, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and Title VII litigation in the courts had achieved preeminence within that enforcement regime. This history casts doubt on the
viability of a more harmonized labor and civil rights regime, then, and
offers a cautionary tale to those eager to fuse the two regimes today.

I. Title VII as Signal
When Title VII was enacted in 1964, about one in four nonfarm American workers belonged to a union. 14 While this represented a drop-off
from the midcentury peak of one in three workers, unions were still
powerful actors-so powerful, in fact, that their support was pivotal to
Title VII's passage. 15 Similarly, the NLRB, although a political punching bag for business interests and anti-New Deal conservatives, was a
powerful, closely watched regulatory agency. Indeed regulatory agencies
generally loomed much larger then, presiding over major monopolized
industries-gas and electric utilities, airlines, telecommunications- that
have since been broken up and deregulated. These agencies were seen as
potential agents of reform: when consumer advocate Ralph Nader sent
armies of law student interns out to change the world in the late 1960s
and early 1970s, they wrote carefully researched manifestos about agencies like the Interstate Commerce Commission. 16 There was one prominent exception to this era of regulatory prowess: the EEOC. Indeed, so
weak was the EEOC and the statute it was created to implement that civil
rights advocates sought to strengthen the employment discrimination
regime by disseminating Title VII's enforcement throughout the federal
government.
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A. Title VII's Formal Weakness

For the thirty years prior to Title VII's enactment, moderate and conservative Republicans, to the extent that they supported a federal fair
employment law, favored one that relied on voluntary compliance or
at most would be enforced by the judiciary. 17 Civil rights advocates'
experience with unions' duty of fair representation under the federal
labor laws, a court-enforced protection that African American workers
won in 1944, made them leery of this approach. 18 As they frequently
told Congress, litigation had proved "expensive and cumbersome" as
well as "inadequate."19 Instead, civil rights and labor advocates as well
as their congressional allies countered that any federal fair employment
law should be enforced by an agency like the NLRB that had the power
to adjudicate and remedy discrimination claims. 20 Title VII, however,
had required moderate and conservative Republicans' support and thus
adopted their preferred court-enforced approach. In the opinion of the
law's civil rights supporters, this was a significant compromise. 21
Title VII's first years only aggravated civil rights advocates' concerns.
The EEOC quickly earned a reputation for ineffectiveness. Dernand outstripped the agency's resources. The EEOC's tiny staff received nearly
nine thousand complaints in its first year alone, developing a backlog
that neared two thousand. Furthermore, at first, the EEOC made only
limited use of the resources and power it had, its efforts stymied by
internal strife and rapid staff turnover. 22 And even after the EEOC got
around to investigating and conciliating a complaint, the wait was not
necessarily over. If this approach failed, complainants had to find an
attorney to file a private lawsuit and then engage in just the kind of
drawn-out litigation that had proved so "inadequate" in duty of fair representation cases. In 1967, two years after filing a complaint with the
EEOC, workers at the El Dorado, Arkansas, Monsanto plant reported
having gained only "a feeling of depression, real low down." 23
The federal courts surprised everyone with their robust enforcement
of Title VII, but civil rights advocates still worried about the law's weaknesses.24 In some industries, most employers were too small to be covered by Title VII, for instance.25 Even where Title VII applied, advocates
lamented aspects of the law's approach. There were "major limitations
upon relying on law suits as the sole or even principal instrument of
implementing fair employment policy," advocates insisted in 1972. 26
They contended that courts lacked expertise in industries' business practices, hampering their ability to determine whether employment qualifications that tended to exclude African Americans were justified. Lawsuits also affected only a single employer, while industry-wide consent
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decrees required copious time, effort, and expense. Advocates sought a
means to instead "induce a great deal of voluntary compliance."27
B. Title VII's Penumbral Strength

For those who thought lawsuits were not the best, or at least should
not be the exclusive, way to counter workplace discrimination, Title
VII nonetheless held promise. Even before Title VII's passage, some
government officials acknowledged a national policy against employment discrimination that derived from the Constitution. 28 Although
Congress technically relied on the Commerce Clause to authorize Title
VII, the law was believed by many to also codify this constitutionally
grounded antidiscrimination requirement. 29 Officials argued that Title
VII strengthened this national policy against discrimination and indicated that all government officials should implement its aims.30 At the
same time, Title VII's constitutional roots meant that government actors
were not bound by the law's formallimits. 3 LTitle VII, the justice Department advised, did not "circumscribe the authority of Fe~eral agencies... to regulate employment practices."32 Agencies were instead free to
regulate in Title VII's name, even if they exceeded its formal provisions.

C. Title VII's Dissemination
Federal officials made use of Title VII's penumbra. In the late 1960s and
early 1970s, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted
rules requiring all broadcasters and common carriers to adopt equal
employment policies. Broadcasters had argued that Congress in Title
VII delegated "regulatory power over civil rights" to the EEOC, not the
FCC. 33 The FCC disagreed, reasoning that the "national policy against
discrimination in employment" was "particularly embodied" in Title VII
but was not limited to its provisions. 34 The agency therefore imposed
equal employment requirements, including on broadcasters too small
to trigger Title VII coverage. 35 At the Federal Power Commission (FPC),
attorneys likewise argued that the agency's duty to regulate in the public
interest obligated it to consider the national policy against discrimination when licensing or certificating utilities. As at the FCC, they reasoned
that because Title VII embodied but did not delimit this policy, the FPC
could demand equal employment even from utilities that were not technically violating Title VII. 36 Similar arguments were made by officials
from numerous federal agencies. 37
Other than the FCC, the agency that made the most use of Title VII's
penumbra was the NLRB. The Board had long policed some types of
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racism in the workplace, prohibiting unions from designating the group
of workers it would represent (called a "bargaining unit") based solely
on those workers' race and regulating the use of racially charged speech
during union election campaigns. 38 If a union demonstrated sufficient
worker support, the NLRB would "certify" it as the exclusive representative of all workers in the bargaining unit. In the 1940s, the NLRB
promised to rescind the certification of any union that failed to fairly
represent the African Americans in its bargaining unit, but the Board
defined fair representation narrowly. As the NAACP's Labor Secretary
quipped in 1949, under the Board's policy, "[u]nions may exclude colored people from membership, they may segregate them into separate
locals and they may refuse to let them share in the full benefits of the
union, but no union may discriminate against them because of race."39
In the 1950s, spurred in part by Brown v. Board of Education, the Board
put more teeth in its existing antidiscrimination policies.40 In the early
1960s, even before Title VII was enacted, it further strengthened them,
including by finally decertifying a union for segregating its membership by race-a decision it symbolically released the same day President
Johnson signed Title VII into law. 41
Title VII's enactment did not dampen the Board's policy innovations.
One member contended that the law had affirmed the Board's obligation
to police racial discrimination. 42 Others, faced with charges that Title
VII, once enacted, became the exclusive basis for policing workplace
discrimination, insisted that it "had not...limit[ed] the Board's duty or
authority in this area."43 Over the next ten years, the Board found
repeatedly that unions' racially discriminatory practices violated their
duty of fair representation and constituted an "unfair labor practice"
under all three of the possible statutory provisions.44 The latter legal
tools were the most union-friendly because they allowed the Board to
order a union to remedy its discriminatory practices without threatening its status as the bargaining unit's representative. The Board also
extended its antidiscrimination policies to reach employers who were
complicit in unions' discrimination or who failed to bargain in good
faith about their own discriminatory policies. 45 In 1974, the Board, after
much internal deliberation and dissensus, established its most aggressive
antidiscrimination policy yet. In Bekins Moving & Storage Co., the Board
refused to certify a union that had won an election on the grounds that
it had in the past demonstrated a "propensity" to discriminate.46
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II. Title VII as Silo

Even as Title VII fed equal employment policy innovation in federal
agencies, some officials pushed back against the trend. The FPC, for
instance, recognized in 1970 the "national policy that discrimination in
employment is to be eliminated by all elements of our society, public
and private."47 But it contended that it was not authorized to require
equal employment fro m the utilities it regulated because employment
discrimination was not sufficiently related to any of its regulatory purposes.48 Several years later, its lawyers asked the Supreme Court to "set
the fences" between the nation's antidiscrimination and economic regulatory statutes.49 Agency oversight of utilities' employment practices,
they argued, would draw the FPC into a "hopeless morass ... of litigation" it was ill equipped to handle.5 0 The FPC declined to adopt equal
employment policies because its leadership's politics changed after
Richard Nixon's election in 1968. Nixon appointees to the NLRB, in contrast, embraced their agency's antidiscrimination duties. Yet they too
began to see the need to set some fences between the NLRA and Title
VII.
A. Title VII and Mission Preservation

Edward MiJJer, Nixon's choice for NLRB chairman, was enthusiastic
about the Board's antidiscrimination responsibilities. In the early 1970s,
Miller undertook an ambitious effort to develop a comprehensive policy
for handling claims of union discrimination 51 and gave speeches touting
the Board's antidiscrimination responsibilities.52 He insisted that Title
VII "had not...limit[ed] the Board's duty or authority in this area."53 But
he worried about making the Board, which already suffered from an
infamous backlog, too attractive an alternative to Title VII.
During the latter half of the 1960s, when the Board innovated and
Title VII disappointed, commentators praised the Board's policies and
argued that they were superior to Title VII.54 One author lauded the
NLRB's well-established administrative machinery, experienced staff,
and swifter, more economical approach.55 The Board had "sharper
enforcement teeth than Congress has provided minority workers in
recent civil-rights legislation," another observed.56 The free legal services the General Counsel's office provided and the public hearings the
Board held could also draw complaints to the NLRB and away from
the EEOC.57 Indeed, African Americans were reportedly "claim[ing that]
their demands for equal job opportunities have been frustrated under
both the law [Title VII] and agency [EEOC] specifically created by Con-
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gress to deal with race bias."58 After a federal appeals court ruled that the
Board could sanction employer discrimination even in nonunion workplaces, one government official predicted that the Board "could put the
[EEOC] ... out of business."59
This was an outcome Miller wanted to avoid. He worried that if the
Board's policies were coextensive with Title VII, it would be "so inundated with cases that its procedures would bog down in a hopeless
morass." 60 As a result, he implemented more narrow antidiscrimination
policies than Title VII required. In 1968, a federal court remanded a
case to the Board to determine whether an employer engaged in a "pattern or practice" of racial discrimination (a term lifted straight from
Title VII) and therefore should be subject to an unfair labor practice
order for "interfer[ing] with, restrain[ing] or coerc[ing] employees in the
exercise of their rights" to self-organization under the NLRA. 61 Such a
policy could empower the NLRB to remedy employer discrimination
at the vast majority of nonunionized workplaces. Miller rejected the
court's premise that any pattern or practice of discrimination would be
grounds for an unfair labor practice order. Instead, the Board would
issue such orders only where there was a "direct relationship between
the alleged discrimination" and workers' exercise of their rights under
the NLRA. 62 He also rejected the disparate impact standard the Supreme
Court adopted under Title VII, finding that racial imbalance or disparate
effects alone were insufficient to prove union and employer discrimination.63
B. Title VII and Employer Pretext

In addition to bureaucratic overload, Board members worried that their
antidiscrimination policies were facilitating employer intransigence. In
the 1960s and 1970s, resisting unionization at all costs became a mainstream business position. A new "union avoidance" industry of lawyers
and consultants advised employers to delay elections and, if unsuccessful, put off signing a contract as long as possible.64 An employer could
accomplish both aims by charging the union with discrimination, either
to prevent its certification as representative or as grounds for the Board
to deny the union an order requiring the employer to bargain in good
faith. Chairman Miller's replacement, Betty Southard Murphy, was the
Board's first female member, the only woman at the helm of a major
regulatory agency, and a strong proponent of "civil rights and equal
employment opportunity for workers." 65 Worried about "employer[s]
raising for pretextual reasons ... that a union discriminated racially;· how-
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ever, she called the 1976 Board hearings to reconsider her agency's
antidiscrimination policies.66
The employers who appeared at the hearing underscored the problem. Bell & Howell claimed a union's sex discrimination barred it from
representing the company's all-male stationary engineers. Trumbull
Asphalt Company, Inc. accused a Teamsters local organizing its all-white,
all-male truck drivers of race and sex discrimination. 57 At the time of the
hearings, these unions' petitions were already two to three years old.
"[I]t is just outrageous for an employer who was the discriminator" to
be bringing these charges, the Teamsters' lawyer charged at the Board's
1976 hearing. 68
Meanwhile, civil rights advocates had abandoned these claims. From
the 1940s to the 1960s, the NAACP waged a decades-long fight to convince the Board to police discrimination more aggressively. Although
it greeted enthusiastically the Board's early 1960s decision to do so, by
the 1970s, it had all but ceased bringing discrimination charges before
the Board. When the NLRB issued an open call to participate in its 1976
hearings, no one from the NAACP responded. The most obvious explanation would seem to be that the NAACP had decided Title VII litigation
in the courts was a more fruitful avenue. Yet the NAACP continued to
pursue equal employment policies before other regulatory agencies. 69
With its labor allies concerned that the Board's antidiscrimination policies would give union opponents "an opportunity to destroy collective
bargaining in this country," the NAACP likely decided that the NLRB
remedies were not worth defending.7°
C. The Three Branches Disentangle Title VII

During the second half of the 1970s, the Supreme Court, Congress,
and the president enclosed Title VII-and employment discrimination
policy more generally-in a legal and institutional silo. The Court was
first to act. In the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court disentangled Title VII
from the Constitution and federal regulatory statutes such as the NLRA.
In its 1975 Emporium Capwell v. Western Addition Community Organization decision, a nearly unanimous Court ruled that the NLRB did not
have to protect employees discharged for protesting employer discrimination after they rejected working through their union to redress it?1
Employees' right to be free from discrimination "cannot be pursued at
the expense of the orderly collective-bargaining process contemplated
by the NLRA," the Court held.72 The fact that Title VII's antiretaliation
provisions may have protected the employees did not mean that the
NLRA had to. Read most broadly, the Board appeared under no duty to
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counter discrimination if doing so would frustrate its core statutory mission.73
The next year, the Court further disentangled Title Vll. NAACP v. Federal Power Commission reaffirmed and refined the principle the Court had
laid down in Emporium Capwell. Again, a unanimous Court rejected the
premise that regulatory agencies had a broad mandate to implement
the national policy against discrimination. "Setting the fences" just as
the FPC had asked, the Court ruled that agencies need only implement
antidiscrimination if it was related to their primary statutory mission.74
Further undermining agencies' authority to diffuse Title VII's antidiscrimination mandate throughout the federal bureaucracy, the Court
erected a similar boundary between the Constitution and Title VII in
Washington v. Davis? 5 Contrary to the assumption of federal courts and
government officials, the Court d eclined to hold that the "constitutional
standard for adjudicating claims of invidious racial discrimination is
identical to the standards applicable under Title VII."76 Henceforward,
only Title Vll would protect against nonintentional discrimination.
During 1977 and 1978, the executive branch and Congress similarly disentangled employment discrimination policy from the federal bureaucracy and consolidated it under the EEOC. In February 1977, President
Carter announced that he intended to concentrate implementation of
federal employment discrimination policies.77 One year later, he sent a
plan to Congress that centralized enforcement of nearly forty different
equal employment requirements handled by nearly twenty different
agencies under the EEOC?8 "Fragmentation of authority among a number of federal agencies;' Carter contended "has meant confusion and
ineffective enforcement for employees, regulatory duplication and
needless expense for employers.''79 That summer, Congress allowed the
plan to go into effect. 80 With "[v]irtually all the groups protected by Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act ... support[ing]" the plan, the era of policy dissemination was over. 8l

D. The NLRB Reverses Course
With pressure to incorporate employment discrimination into Board
policy removed, the Board rejected the policies it found most likely to
hurt its primary statutory mission. In 1977, the Board decided the cases
that had been the subject of its hearings. Denying certification or bargaining orders to discriminatory unions, the Board held, gave employers "an incentive to inject charges of union racial discrimination into
Board ... proceedings as a delaying tactic... rather than to attack racial discrimination."82 These policies thus "significantly impair[ed] the national
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labor policy of facilitating collective bargaining, the enforcement of
which is our primary function," the Board concluded, and denied workers' right to a representative of their choosing. 83
The Board noted that the Supreme Court's fence-laying decisions supported its decision. When enforcing the challenged policies, a federal
appellate court had previously required the Board to assess discrimination using the same statistical methods that courts used when they were
applying Title VII. The appellate court had done so, however, because it
held that the NLRB was constitutionally obligated to police discrimination and assumed that Title VII established the standard for this constitutional duty. The appellate court's approach, the Board now found, had
not survived Washington v. Davis, which, the Board observed, had separated the two. The Board was thus free to reject the Title VII evidentiary standards the appellate court preferred. The Board also reasoned
that Emporium Capwell had recognized that the Board must interpret
the NLRA in light of "the national labor policy" but had rejected the
proposition that the NLRA "should give way to the paramount value
of combating racial discrimination." NAACP had further clarified that
when implementing national antidiscrimination policy, "consideration
must be given to whether such action promotes or runs counter to
the [NLRA's] basic policies and purposes." Because the certification and
bargaining policies the Board was reconsidering impeded its "primary
function" of "facilitating collective bargaining," the Board found that it
was justified in rejecting them. 84
The NLRB faced no resistance for this turnaround. Congress's
approval of Carter's reorganization plan in 1978 ratified the spirit of the
NLRB's approach. In 1979, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals put the judiciary's more specific stamp of approval on the Board's decision to carefully limit its antidiscrimination policies. In Bell & Howell Co. v. NLRB,
the court found that the Board's statutory purpose gave it a role in countering discrimination. The court nonetheless found this obligation better satisfied by the postcertification remedies the Board developed in
the 1960s, such as issuing unfair labor practice orders against unions
that violated their duty of fair representation or possibly decertifying
them. These, the court held, were more "consistent with the other policies of the" NLRA. 85 Henceforth, the NLRB would police discrimination
only in unionized workplaces and only according to its more narrowly
defined notion of discrimination. The days of it serving as a serious
competitor to the EEOC were over for good.
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Ill. Conclusion: Title VII's Unexpected Hegemony

Scholars today write wistfully of an alternate legal regime that could
have better harmonized antidiscrimination with labor law's recognition
of workers' right to organize and bargain collectively. During Title VII's
uncertain first fifteen years, advocates, legislators, administrators, and
workers sought to disseminate enforcement of Title VII's mandate
throughout administrative agencies, pursuing a more powerful Title VII
and one more harmonized with labor rights. But empowering Title VII
via dissemination proved less effective than its proponents expected,
while achieving a more harmonious regime was more complicated than
is currently thought. Title VII litigation's domination of employment
discrimination law today was not inevitable, immediate, or particularly
desired at the law's inception. Fifteen years on, however, it had become
the consensus position across government, as well as among civil rights
and labor advocates.
While only speculative, this history should give pause to those who
advocate incorporating labor rights under Title VII. Just as incorporating
antidiscrimination into labor law threatened workers' right to organize
in the 1970s, incorporating labor rights into Title VII in the twenty-first
century might threaten what is left of antidiscrimination law today. The
EEOC is already overloaded-perhaps even more than the NLRB was
in the 1970s-while the courts have steadily weakened Title VII. 86 Yet
employers have gutted labor law with greater vigor and coordination
than they have employment discrimination law.87 Indeed, as this history
shows, employer hostility to unions has at times fostered support for
antidiscrimination laws. 88 Given the challenges already facing employment discrimination law today, it might be best to keep the two regimes
separate, especially if Title VII is currently proving a useful tool in organizing campaigns. 89
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Labor Unions and Title VII: A Bit Player at
the Creation Looks Back

Theodore J. St. Antoine

During the debates over what became Title VII (Equal Employment
Opportunity) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1 I was the junior partner
of the then General Counsel of the AFL-CIO,]. Albert Woll. There were
only three of us in the firm. The middle partner, Robert C. Mayer, handled the business affairs of the Federation and our other union clients.
Bob was also the son-in-law of George Meany, president of the AFLCIO, which gave us a unique access to Meany's thinking. The Federation had only one in-house lawyer, Associate General Counsel Thomas
Everett Harris. Tom was an aristocratic Southerner and a brilliant lawyer
who had clerked for Justice Harlan Fiske Stone on the U.S. Supreme
Court. He and I were the labor law technicians, and we briefed and occasionally argued the court and administrative cases in which the Federation became involved, usually in an amicus capacity.
The often-fraught relationship of organized labor and the civil rights
movement is a well-known story. 2 Before Title VII, African Americans
were openly excluded from membership in most railroad unions, and
their numbers were sharply limited in the skilled construction trades,
even though all those unions eventually had the legal obligation to provide "fair representation" of any minorities who did manage to get jobs
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within the unions' jurisdiction. 3 Given the mores and culture of that
time, it was probably inevitable that many if not most rank-and-file
union workers placed their perceived economic self-interest above any
concerns about promoting racial equality. Yet the story is more complicated than that of white workers simply taking advantage of discrimination against black workers, and the other side of the story needs to
be remembered. Union leadership took a more principled position, and
ultimately the official policy of the AFL-CIO was to support passage
of the Civil Rights Act, including the prohibition of discrimination in
employment by both employers and unions.
The initial bill proposed by the Kennedy administration would have
concentrated on voting rights, access to public accommodations, and
public school desegregation. 4 A fair employment practices (FEP) provision was considered too controversial and likely to doom the entire
package. Two very different men, Walter Reuther and George Meany,
played the key roles in shaping organized labor's response and helping
to secure the addition of the Title VII that was finally adopted. Reuther,
president of the United Automobile Workers and head of the AFL-CIO's
Industrial Union Department (largely the former CIO unions before
the merger), had long been a champion of black workers' civil rig.hts,
including equal job rights, and was a member of the NAACP's board
of directors. He was an eloquent speaker and a charismatic, sometimes
imperious leader who on occasion could strain the patience even of his
natural allies. On june 13, 1963, he and other labor leaders met with President Kennedy, and Reuther made an "impassioned plea" for the inclusion of an FEP title in the administration's civil rights bill.5 About a week
later, Reuther joined a group of top civil rights leaders to see the president at the White House to reiterate the demand. 6 Reuther also participated in the March on Washington in August 1963, becoming the sole
white union speaker when Martin Luther King delivered his famous "I
Have a Dream" oration?
In personality, AFL-CIO President George Meany and Walter Reuther
were almost polar opposites. Reuther resonated to abstract principles
and noble causes. Meany, who hailed from the Plumbers Union in New
York City, was a cautious, crafty politician, struggling to hold together
a highly divergent coalition of labor adherents. In contrast to Reuther's
vaulting, evangelical speaking style, Meany's oral presentations were
clear, methodical, down-to-earth. Yet Meany could also be moved by
the plight of black workers. Although he would not have the AFL-CIO
endorse the March on Washington, he set out on his own to convey
the message to the White House that an FEP provision was essential,
including coverage of labor unions. As reported through my partner,
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Bob Mayer, President Kennedy responded: "George, I didn't think we
needed one. I thought you could keep your troops in line." At this point
Reuther might have delivered a sermon on the evils of racial discrimination. Meany's riposte was characteristically hard-nosed and lacking in
self-righteousness: "Mr. President, that's exactly the problem. I can't keep
the troops in line. I need a law I can blame!" More formally, Meany told
the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee in july 1963: "We need
the power of the federal government to do what we are not fully able to
do [by ourselves)."8
It can be argued whether the Meany or Reuther style was ultimately
more effective. It is certainly true that at least for some significant listeners, Reuther's moralistic hectoring could wear thin over time. When the
March on Washington leaders met afterward with president Kennedy,
Martin Luther King modestly sought to divert attention from his own
great speech by asking the president whether he had heard Reuther's
excellent address. Kennedy replied dryly, "Oh, I've heard him plenty of
times." 9 Numerous persons who found Reuther more congenial philosophically wound up fonder of Meany personally. How might that affect
persuasiveness? What is most important in the long run, however, is
that these two men, Meany and Reuther, in their diverse ways, united
in getting the labor movement officially to back the cause of an equal
employment opportunity title. It is still debatable just how critical union
support was. At least one reasonably disinterested observer, Professor
Nelson Lichtenstein, then at the University of Virginia, declared flatly:
"The trade union movement, both the AFL-CIO and the UAW, was
primarily responsible for the addition of FEPC, now rechristened the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), to the original
Kennedy bi11." 10 But Herbert Hill, former labor secretary of the NAACP,
has bitterly attacked this view, insisting that it exaggerated the position
of organized labor as a progressive social force and overlooked massive
union efforts to marginalize the effects of Title VII as finally enacted.11
The AFL-CIO's leadership endorsement of an FEP or EEO provision
did not end the matter, however, in the eyes of much of the rank-andfile. Senator Lister Hill of Alabama was an ardent segregationist but an
economic populist. He somehow obtained the addresses of about seventy thousand local unions affiliated with nationals belonging to the
AFL-CIO. He wrote them, warning that passage of the civil rights bill
would destroy one of their most prized possessions, seniority. Seniority
reflects time with a particular employer or in a particular job or department. It can determine priority in layoffs, recalls, promotions, and fringe
benefits like vacations. In many locations, especially in the South, black
workers were deprived of access to the better job lines and the seniority
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attached to them. As a result of Hill's intervention, AFL-CIO headquarters was inundated with outraged cries from local memberships, protesting this threat to their precious seniority rights. I was assigned to draft
the Federation's response.
My thoughts were as follows, although the exact wording was the result
of refinement by several hands:
Title VII would have no effect on established seniority rights. Its effect is
prospective and not retrospective. Thus, for example, if a business has been
discriminating in the past and as a result has an all-white working force,
when the title comes into effect the employer's obligation would be simply
to fill future vacancies on a nondiscriminatory basis. He would not be
obliged-or indeed, permitted- to fire whites in order to hire Negroes or to
prefer Negroes for future vacancies, or, once Negroes are hired to give them
special seniority rights at the expense of the white workers hired earlier.

That language was later adopted, after extensive negotiations by AFLCIO representatives and the legislation's sponsors, by Senators Joseph
S. Clark (Democrat of Pennsylvania) and Clifford P. Case (Republican of
New Jersey), in an "Interpretive Memorandum" on Title VII, for which
they were the "bipartisan captains" in the Senate. 12 The Justice Department submitted a rebuttal to the arguments of Senator Lister Hill to the
same effect. 13
Once the 1964 Civil Rights Act was safely passed and Title VII became
law, civil rights groups understandably downplayed this particular legislative history and insisted that the "current perpetuation" of past discrimination in seniority constituted a present violation of the statute.
As one African American lawyer friend put it to me: "Ted, I was not
part of whatever compromise may have been struck in getting Title VII
enacted, and as a good advocate I am going to push the statutory language as far as I think it should go." As it turned out, that was quite a way.
Until the U.S. Supreme Court resolved the issue, six courts of appeals
in more than thirty cases held that seniority systems that perpetuated
the effects of pre-Act discrimination did violate Title VII.l4 Two other
courts of appeals were in accord in dicta. 15 In International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. United States, 16 however, a 7-2 Supreme Court majority ruled
that § 703(h) of Title VII (and the legislative history previously cited)
immunized bona fide seniority systems from liability under the CRA.
Naturally, I believe the majority got it right. Section 703(h) provides in
pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards
of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a system which
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measures earnings by quantity or quality of production or to employees
who work in different locations, provided that such differences are not the
result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or
. al ongm
. . ... 17
nation

Civil rights proponents protested, not unreasonably, that the inevitable
tendency of the seniority cases was to lock a whole generation of African
American workers into the less desirable jobs to which pre-Title VII
discrimination had confined them. Even if they somehow managed to
move into the higher-level jobs that were now theoretically available to
them, they would wind up at the very bottom of the seniority ladder for
those positions or departments. They would thus risk being the first laid
off and the last recalled in the event of any economic downturn, as well
as losing other benefit priorities. Those were indeed the regrettable facts.
But labor leaders wishing to support Title VII also faced some harsh
realities. The rank-and-file were up in arms over what they perceived
(correctly, as it first developed) to be a serious threat to their valuable
seniority. Union officials must face elections, and the 1960s were a time
of flux, when numerous incumbents were voted out of office. The
Kennedy administration was initially opposed to an FEP or EEO title,
with the Justice Department calling labor-liberal efforts to add one "a
disaster." 18 Under all those circumstances, it seems entirely sensible for
Title VII supporters among the labor leadership to feel they had to mollify their memberships by preserving seniority rights as they did. In
effect, postponing for a generation the full promise of Title VII's nondiscrimination strictures may well have been the price that had to be paid
to get an EEO title. By its very nature, of course, a bona fide seniority
plan can hold back only about one generation when it is set in the context of a law prohibiting discrimination in hiring, promotions, and other
terms and conditions of employment.
Retired federal District Judge Nancy Gertner has asserted: "Federal
judges from the trial court to the Supreme Court have interpreted the
[Civil Rights] Act virtually, although not entirely, out of existence."19
Judge Gertner places much emphasis on the actual experience of discrimination plaintiffs compared to other plaintiffs in the litigation
process, from summary judgment through trial through appeal. In what
is surely the single most important judicial gloss on Title VII, however,
the Supreme Court came out most favorably for alleged victims of discrimination. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 2 Chief Justice Burger spoke
for a unanimous Court in holding that the statute was violated not only
by intentional discrimination but also by the use of any job qualification-such as a high school education or passing a general intelligence
test-that disproportionately disqualifies a particular protected group
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and is not shown to be significantly related to successful job performance.
Griggs thus introduced the now famous "disparate impact" theory of
discrimination, as distinguished from the more conventional "disparate
treatment" or intentional theory. Subsequently, the Court acknowledged: "Undoubtedly disparate treatment was the most obvious evil
Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII." 21 The Court went on
to state that disparate impact claims "involve employment practices that
are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups, but that in fact
fall more harshly on one group than another, and cannot be justified
by business necessity.... Proof of discriminatory motive .. .is not required
under a disparate-impact theory." 22
For someone like me, who was concededly only a bit player in this
great undertaking but who nonetheless had a ringside seat at it, it is significant that I cannot ever recall during the endless discussions of Title
VII any explicit reference to something like the "disparate impact" theory. Moreover, despite the Griggs Court's tussle with the legislative history, I find nothing there that clearly and positively supports disparate
impact. 23 Chief Justice Burger invoked a striking image when he said:
"Congress has now provided that tests or criteria for employment or
promotion may not provide equality of opportunity merely in the sense
of the fabled offer of milk to the stork and the fox." 24 But the artistry
cannot conceal the conclusory, unproven nature of the proposition. Section 703(h), the one provision expressly dealing with testing, states in
pertinent part:
[N]or shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give
and to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its administration or action upon the results is not
designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion,
sex or national origin. 25

Chief Justice Burger found comfort in the word "used" in the sentence
dealing with ability tests; it does not appear in the part of the same section dealing with seniority and merit systems. That can be scored as a
good debater's point. But in the absence of any further explanation of
its significance in the legislative history, one has to wonder about how
much weight to attach to that single generalized word. Would Congress
have been that indirect or circumspect in promulgating a whole new
theory of discrimination?
How necessary was the disparate impact theory, anyway? Section
8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act prohibits "discrimination ... to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization."26 In
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NLRB v. Brown, the Supreme Court concluded that "Congress clearly
intended the employer's purpose in discriminating to be controlling."27
But then the Court immediately added:
[W]hen an employer practice is inherently destructive of employee rights
and is not justified by the service of important business ends, no specific evidence of intent to discourage union membership is necessary to establish a
violation of§ 8(a)(3). This principle, we have said, is "but an application of the
common-law rule that a man is held to intend the foreseeable consequences
of his conduct."28

As I see it, most if not all of what the Court accomplished in Griggs
through enunciating the new disparate impact theory under Title VII
could have been achieved less controversially by an application of the
commonsense principle that persons may be held to have intended the
natural consequences of their actions. 29 Does anyone have any serious doubts about what Duke Power was up to when it instituted new
job qualifications on the very day Title VII went into effect? At most,
disparate treatment analysis would seem to permit a challenged party
one free pass on a claim of business necessity as a defense. Once that
defense was overcome and the consequences known, any continuation of
the practice could appropriately be regarded as an intentional violation.
One can safely say that even the present conservative Supreme Court
would be reluctant to back away from the unanimous decision in Griggs.
Moreover, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress confirmed the existence of disparate-impact violations by spelling out their manner of
proof in a new§ 703(k). 30 Nonetheless, in a concurring opinion in Ricci v.
DeStefano, justice Scalia warned that the Court's disposition of that case
"merely postpones the evil day on which the Court will have to confront
the question: Whether, or to what extent, are the disparate-impact provisions of Title Vll...consistent with the Constitution's guarantee of equal
protection?"31 justice Scalia elaborated his position:
[T]itle VII's disparate-impact provisions place a racial thumb on the scales,
often requiring employers to evaluate the racial outcomes of their policies,
and to make decisions based on (because of) those racial outcomes. That
type of racial decisionmaking is, as the Court explains, discriminatory.32

Professor Richard Primus suggests a means of defending disparate
impact analysis. 33 He starts by spelling out what he calls the Ricci
premise: the City of New Haven's suspension of a written job test
because of its disproportionately adverse effect on African American
firefighters "would constitute disparate treatment under Title VII unless
suspending the test were justified by Title VII's provisions regarding
disparate impact."34 Primus concedes that if the emphasis is placed on
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the race conscious action of a public employer (subject to constitutional
limitations) in implementing a disparate impact remedy, which is how
justice Scalia sees it, disparate impact doctrine is likely to be in "fatal"
conflict with equal protection's requirement of racial neutrality. 35
Primus insists, however, that there are two other ways of viewing the
situation. First, there is an institutional difference between the roles of
public employers and courts. 36 Courts are authorized to remedy racial
discrimination and they cannot assess any kind of discrimination claim
without knowing the race of the parties. Public employers are precluded from such race-conscious decision making. Second, the attention may focus on the visible victims. 37 In Ricci, Primus points out, New
Haven's decision "disadvantaged determinate and visible innocent third
parties-that is, the white firefighters," while "(m]ost disparate impact
remedies avoid creating such victims."38 Primus concludes that the constitutionality of disparate impact doctrine may turn on the particular
lens through which the Court subsequently views such equal protection
claims-and the skill of advocates in bringing the right case before the
Court. 39 My own conclusion is that the Griggs Court could have avoided
these problems by a more generous and realistic reading of Congress's
actual design-to prohibit intentional discrimination in all its manifestations.
The problem of disparate impact pales by comparison with the problem of "affirmative action"-conceptually, ethically, and sociologically.
Affirmative action-racial or other preferences among human
groups-to achieve some seemingly desirable or compelling public
interest is well covered by other contribu tors to this volume. 40 I will
therefore limit myself to a few brief personal observations. The first and
most obvious is that the primary, abiding theme of both the text and the
legislative history of Title VII is color-blindness (or equivalent blindness
regarding gender and other protected categories). The Clark-Case Memorandum filed by the senators who were in effect floor managers for the
EEO provision is replete with such references. It is a model of the "plain
meaning" approach to language:
It has been suggested that the concept of discrimination is vague. In fact it
is dear and simple and has no hidden meanings. To discriminate is to make
a distinction, to make a difference in treatment or favor, and those distinctions or differences in treatment or favor which are prohibited by section
704 [now 703] are those which are based on any five of forbidden criteria:
race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.41

Congress, like the rest of us promoting equal employment opportunity,
was very naive-or else we all affected naivete. It was as if the magic
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wand of one federal statute could erase three hundred years of bondage,
degradation, and exclusion. At least by hindsight, we know it did not
work.
Justice Brennan showed more sophistication when he wrote for the
Court in the Weber case:
It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's concern over
centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of those who
had "been excluded from the American dream for so long," constituted the
first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private, race-conscious efforts to
abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy. 42

In Weber, a 5-2 Court upheld the legality of a union-employer affirmative action plan that reserved 50 percent of the openings in a plant's
craft training program until the percentage of black craft workers in the
plant was commensurate with the percentage of blacks in the local labor
force. 43 Yet however much one might wish to applaud the result in Weber
on the basis of policy, it contained a very serious analytical flaw. Justice
Brennan never came to grips with the meaning of the critical word, "discriminate."
The Clark-Case Memorandum equated "discriminate" with "distinguish" on certain specified grounds. That reading, if straightforwardly
applied, would have been fatal to the Weber approach. But there is
another way to interpret "discriminate." One of the great federal judges,
Henry Friendly, had this to say: "Although '[i]n common parlance, the
word (to discriminate) means to distinguish or differentiate,'... it more
often means, both in common and particularly in legal parlance, to
distinguish or differentiate without sufficient reason." 44 That could have
opened the door to a more capacious interpretation than a strictly literal
reading. Once Justice Brennan had accomplished that, his reliance on
the spirit rather than the letter of the law, and his use of somewhat
strained but favorable portions oflegislative history, would have seemed
more acceptable.
Another aspect of Weber has always seemed anomalous to me as someone who is not a constitutional specialist. Justice Brennan emphasized it
right at the outset of his analysis: "Since the Kaiser-USWA plan does not
involve state action, this case does not present an alleged violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."45 The implication is that equal protection would have been a more stringent standard
for a valid affirmative action plan. Indeed, subsequent decisions invalidating the plans of governmental bodies appear to bear that out.46 Yet
it is Title VII that defines the prohibited conduct so explicitly as "to discriminate ... because of...race." 47 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
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does not even mention race and speaks very broadly: "[N]or shall any
State ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws."48 If one emphasizes the text, "equal protection" is surely
the more flexible test. And a philosopher whose mind was uncluttered
by vacillating judicial pronouncements might well conclude that a state
is not denying equal protection when it treats differently-and preferentially-groups of persons who are in fact differently-and
unequally-situated. 49 Those unequal situations could be the result of
hurricanes, earthquakes, plagues, or physical or mental disabilities. Why
not generations of racial discrimination?
I hardly expect a return to such a pristine concept at this relatively
advanced stage in the development of equal protection theory. But the
more we recognize that the equal treatment of unequals may not be the
best way to ensure the "equal protection of the laws," the more we may
be ready to extend such established doctrines as "compelling state interest" as a qualification on the prohibition of racial distinctions.
A half-century ago, many of us, those in the civil rights movement
and union supporters alike, shared Martin Luther King's "dream." The
"dream" was a dream of genuine integration-the existence of all races
in our society on a plane of equality. We felt Title VII was our vehicle. Yet
fifty years after the passage of Title VII, the median household income
of blacks is $33,321 while that of whites is $57,009, or 71 percent more. 50
The unemployment rate of blacks is 12.5 percent, or double that of
whites at 6.2 percent:S1 We may have come a long way in certain respects
since 1964. But to fulfill that dream, we still have a very long way to go.
About the Author
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justice Ginsburg's Umbrella

Ellen D. Katz

I. Introduction

Near the end of her dissent in Shelby County v. Holder,1Justice Ginsburg
suggested a simple analogy to illustrate why the regional protections
of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) were still necessary. She wrote that
"[t]hrowing out preclearance when it has worked and is continuing to
work to stop discriminatory changes is like throwing away your
umbrella in a rainstorm because you are not getting wet." 2
The image .went viral in the aftermath of the decision. It appeared
in media accounts, academic commentary, fundraising appeals, and
sundry blogs. And for good cause. The image crisply captured why the
VRA's supporters3 believed the preclearance regime remained necessary
and why they thought scrapping it would be so damaging. It is still raining, they had been urging, and the umbrella the VRA offers continues to
provide critical protection. Throw out that umbrella, the argument went,
and lots of people are sure to get soaked.4
Curiously, the Shelby County majority seemed to agree. Chief Justice
Roberts's opinion for the Court held § 4(b) of the VRA unconstitutional
and thereby rendered the preclearance regime inoperative.5 But while
the Chief Justice discarded the umbrella Justice Ginsburg deemed so
important, he never disputed the consequences she said would follow
from doing so. Indeed, the reasons he provided for shutting down the
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preclearance regime suggested that he, too, expected that many people
would get wet as a result of the decision.
It turns out that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Ginsburg disagreed
about a different point entirely. To belabor the analogy-something, be
warned, this chapter will do repeatedly-the justices disagreed about
whether getting wet was worse than carrying an umbrella. For the Chief
Justice, carrying an umbrella, at least one like the VRA's preclearance
regime, is an extremely costly and damaging activity. By contrast,Justice
Ginsburg viewed getting wet as the more damaging experience. She recognized that carrying an umbrella may be inconvenient and even costly
but, in her view, well worth the bother. Keeping dry should be the priority.
The "umbrella" at issue in Shelby County was, without doubt, an unusual
one. With its regionally applicable, burden-shifting requirements, the
VRA's preclearance regime has long been understood to be an "exceptional" and "extraordinary" statute. 6 Disagreement among the Justices
about its continued use might accordingly be minimized or even dismissed as a regime-specific dispute. And yet, I will argue that the different ways in which the majority and dissent in Shelby County valued getting wet and staying dry exposes a more foundational and far-reaching
disagreement.
Specifically, this chapter presses the idea that Chief Justice Roberts's
willingness to discardJustice Ginsburg's umbrella reveals a distinct conception of federal antidiscrimination law. It is a conception that sees the
existing regime to be a source of unjust enrichment to its beneficiaries.
Under this view, the regime does not simply make victims of undeniable discrimination whole but instead places a host of interested parties,
victims included, in a decidedly better position than they would have
been had the discrimination never occurred. For this reason, the regime
is viewed to be a costly and damaging enterprise that should be limited
at every opportunity.
Notably, this conception of federal antidiscrimination law does not
deny the persistence of discrimination, and indeed, discrimination of
the old-school, unconstitutional variety. To be sure, adherents of this
view continue to be concerned that the linkage between challenged conduct and invidious intent has become too attenuated in some, and perhaps most, cases? But their more pressing worry is that the regime today
does more harm than the discrimination it presently addresses, even
when that discrimination is indisputably unconstitutional or otherwise
invidious in nature.
Put differently, the issue disputed in Shelby County, and in a host of
other contemporary civil rights cases, is not about whether people are
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still getting wet but whether it is worth it to keep them dry. And for
a majority of the present Court-and a majority for some time
now-keeping dry is no longer cost-justified.

***
This chapter proceeds as follows. Part I explores why the Shelby County
majority discarded Justice Ginsburg's umbrella. Specifically, it argues
that Chief Justice Roberts did not mistake dry conditions for a problem
solved but instead implemented a considered preference for getting
wet. Part II situates this preference in a larger jurisprudence, in which
a majority of the Court has limited the use of the umbrella provided
by federal antidiscrimination law even as it acknowledged the rain to be
ongoing. Part III argues that these cases represent a distinct strand in the
Court's long-standing antipathy to federal antidiscrimination law, one
that seeks to limit the regime based on the belief that it is more costly
than the discrimination it presently addresses.
II. Was It Raining in Shelby County?

Much of the debate preceding the Court's decision in Shelby County
focused on the conditions for political participation in covered jurisdictions. No one disputed that these conditions had improved markedly
since Congress first crafted the statute and that the VRA itself was largely
responsible for these improvements. 8 What was disputed was the extent
to which these improvements were dependent on the VRA's continued
operation and the degree of backsliding that would occur if the regime
were scrapped. In other words, the dispute concerned whether or not
the rain had stopped.
Justice Ginsburg's umbrella analogy captured what supporters of the
VRA had been arguing-namely, that the improved conditions in covered jurisdictions existed only because the preclearance regime actively
blocked misconduct where it applied. Under this view, the VRA was not
only responsible for improved conditions in covered jurisdictions, but
its continued operation was essential to maintaining those conditions.
As Justice Ginsburg explained, do not mistake dry conditions under the
umbrella for a sunny day. 9
The regime's critics countered that conditions in covered jurisdictions
looked better because they were better and that preclearance no longer
had much to do with it. 10 After all, some rainy days turn into sunny ones,
and when they do, putting away the umbrella makes a lot of sense. It
was, notably, this view that animated Chief Justice Roberts's suggestion
in 2009 that the preclearance regime might be nothing more than an
elephant whistle, shooing away a nonexistent threat. II
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And yet, the Chiefjustice's opinion in Shelby County did not pursue this
line of argument. True, it dismissed a defense based on deterrence as
analytically flawed, explaining that deterrence could always be invoked
to justify the regime even if evidence on the ground suggested the risk
of backsliding was negligible. 12 What the opinion did not do, however,
was take issue with justice Ginsburg's argument that severe backsliding would occur absent the preclearance regime. Indeed, Chief Justice
Roberts declined to dispute Justice Ginsburg's characterization of the
evidence. He did not question the scope of unconstitutional conduct she
described or the consequences she said would follow from the Court's
ruling in Shelby County.
Justice Ginsburg described that evidence in detail, and her desc ription
made clear that she thought the evidence left no doubt that it was still
raining in places like Shelby County, Alabama. She cited numerous
examples in which covered jurisdictions violated both the VRA and the
Constitution. 13 She observed, moreover, that contemporary unconstitutional conduct in covered jurisdictions remained remarkably wid espread even as the evidence showed that the preclearance regime
worked to deter and block a good deal of misconduct in covered jurisdictions.14 Put differently, the evidence showed how preclearance, much
like a real umbrella, operated imperfectly as a shield against the rain and
that this imperfect protection provided a good indication of what would
follow should the umbrella be discarded.
The Shelby County majority likely viewed the evidence justice Ginsburg
cited more equivocally. Much of it involved dilution claims stemming
from redistricting disputes of the sort that once prompted the Chief
Justice to lament this "sordid business, this divvying us up by race." 15
More broadly, the Shelby County majority no doubt suspected that many
of the examples cited by Justice Ginsburg and collected in the congressional record sounded more in discriminatory effect than intent or simply tracked a jurisdiction's inability to disprove animus rather than its
affirmative existence.
But insofar as the Justices in the majority held these suspicions, Chief
Justice Roberts opted not to voice them. 16 Rather than take issue with
justice Ginsburg's characterization of the evidence, the Chief Justice
concluded that the discrimination she described as she described it was
legally insufficient to justify the statute's continued regional applicationP As explanation, he observed that this discrimination was not as
severe as it was when Congress first crafted the regime in 1965; that it had
not led Congress to alter the statute's preexisting coverage formula; and
that it encompassed subjects different from the ones that Congress listed
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in the coverage formula when it first subjected places to the regime's
requirements. 18
I have explained elsewhere why these observations, all of which are
true, should have been insufficient to render preclearance obsolete-and
indeed should have been irrelevant-under applicable doctrine that the
Shelby County majority did not purport to displace. 19 For present purposes, however, the doctrinal inadequacy of these observations matters
less than what they expose about the Court's toleration for unremedied
or inadequately remedied discrimination, including, notably, discrimination that violates the Constitution. And it turns out that the Court is
willing to tolerate quite a bit.
For example, Chief Justice Roberts observed that the discrimination
documented in the 2006 record was not as severe as the discrimination
that first led Congress to enact the VRA. As he noted, the record evidence
did not "showO anything approaching the 'pervasive,' 'flagrant,' 'widespread,' and 'rampant' discrimination that faced Congress in 1965, and
that clearly distinguished the covered jurisdictions from the rest of the
Nation at that time." 20
The Chief Justice was certainty correct about this. The 2006 record
documented a host of ugly incidents but nothing that rose to a level
equivalent to the systemic, brazen defiance of constitutional norms that
defined the pre-VRA South. Even with the aggressive backsliding now
under way in places like Texas and North Carolina, no one expects conditions to deteriorate to the level that prompted Congress to enact the
statute in the first place.
That's good news, as far as it goes, but it does not explain why contemporary, persistent, and prevalent unconstitutional discrimination in covered jurisdictions should not be remedied in the manner in the manner
Congress had selected. The Warren Court had recognized Congress to
possess close to plenary authority when crafting remedies for unconstitutional racial discrimination in voting. 21 And even when the Rehnquist
Court pulled back, requiring a tight connection between remedies and
unconstitutional conduct, it never suggested that some constitutional
violations were more worthy of remedy than others. 22 That Court's concern was with remedies that targeted conduct that was not itself unconstitutional rather than with gradations among constitutional injuries.
Shelby County, by contrast, appears to stake out a distinction between
discrimination of the extreme Jim Crow variety, and the more contained
type of unconstitutional conduct we see today. And it suggests that Congress may not select what it reasonably believes is the most effective way
to remedy unconstitutional racial discrimination when that discrimination falls short of the type that defined Alabama in 1965.
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Chief Justice Roberts, however, makes clear that the discrimination
Justice Ginsburg described was insufficient not simply because Jim
Crow-era discrimination was worse. I Ie explained that it was also flawed
because it involved problems that were different in kind from those that
first prompted Congress to enact the regime. He wrote, "The dissent
relies on 'second-generation barriers,' which are not impediments to
the casting of ballots, but rather electoral arrangements that affect the
weight of minority votes."23 In other words, the discrimination that Justice Ginsburg described differed from the type of discrimination captured by the original coverage formula, which was "based on voting tests
and access to the ballot, not vote dilution." 24 This difference, apparently,
renders contemporary discrimination legally insufficient to justify Congress's decision to retain the original coverage formula. 25
Much like the observation that contemporary discrimination is not as
rough as the Jim Crow variety, the ChiefJustice's suggestion that secondgeneration barriers are off-point demands more explanation than he
provided. It is true, of course, that the coverage formula invalidated by
Shelby County made no mention of so-called second-generation problems, such as the practice of manipulating district lines to inhibit minority influence, and was based instead on the use of tests and devices and
low voter participation. 26 But that fact hardly means that the practices
grouped as "second-generation" are unrelated to the concerns Congress
meant to target when it crafted the coverage formula. In fact, just the
opposite is true.
So-called second-generation practices predate the VRA by decades
and stand with the white primary, the literacy test, the poll tax, and other
tactics that were used concurrently in the Jim Crow South to ensure
that Mrican American citizens lacked the ability to cast "meaningful"27
ballots and to "strip" them "of every vestige of influence" in selecting
public officials. 28 True, Congress relied on the use of tests and devices
as the "trigger" for the original coverage formula, but it did so not in
order to limit the statute's reach. Instead, it selected the specified trigger
because it captured with remarkable accuracy the places that engaged in
the broader range of conduct (including "second-generation" conduct)
that had rendered the Fifteenth Amendment a nullity throughout the
pre-VRA South. 29 The statutory trigger linked tests and devices to low
participation, but the statute's target was never so limited. 30
T he Supreme Court itself recognized as much in 1969. 31 Justice Harlan
disagreed at the tirne,32 and Justices Thomas and Scalia would do so
later.33 But a m ajority of the Court has repeatedly recognized congressional intent for the VRA to apply to these practices and confirmed
Congress's power to deploy the VRA in this way. Chief Justice Roberts's

269

270

A Nation of Widening Opportun ities

opinion in Shelby County nevertheless suggested otherwise but did not
explain why.
What is clear, however, is what the opinion as written accomplished. It
brought the preclearance regime to an immediate and, perhaps permanent, 34 halt, even as it countenanced evidence of widespread and ongoing discrimination. This discrimination, to be sure, fell short of the Jim
Crow norm and did not directly involve those "tests or devices" listed in
the original coverage formula. It was discrimination, nevertheless, and
a good deal of it ran afoul of the Constitution. Critically, Chief Justice
Roberts never suggested otherwise. Indeed, he seemed to agree with Justice Ginsburg when she wrote that it was still raining in covered jurisdictions and that it would continue to rain, predictably, for some time to
come. At a minimum, the ChiefJustice said nothing that called her forecast into question.
Therein lies Shelby County's significance. The decision displays the
Court's willingness to discard an umbrella on a rainy day with full
knowledge that rain will continue. It may have been raining harder in
the past, and the present rainstorm may (or may not) differ in other ways
from what came before. Regardless, the Shelby County majority opted to
toss out an umbrella in the middle of a rainstorm, fully aware of what it
was doing.
The umbrella at issue in Shelby County was an unusual one, and it is
certainly arguable that the Court's willingness to discard it rested on its
distinctive features. Long considered strong medicine, the VRA's preclearance requirement reversed the presumption of validity that typically attaches to legislative and administrative action, and presumed
instead that public officials in places subject to the requirement were
engaged in discrimination unless and until they could convince a federal
official otherwise.35
It turned out, however, that this defining aspect of the preclearance
regime was less controversial in Shelby County than the regime's limited
geographic reach. The fact that the preclearance obligation existed in
some places but not others has always bristled, 36 but it had also been
thought to contribute to the regime's legitimacy. Far from a blanket
obligation, preclearance had long been seen as a targeted remedy, applying only in places where the need for it was most acute. Indeed, geography was one reason justice Kennedy once cited the VRA as the paradigmatic example of congruent and proportionallegislation. 37
That, of course, was nearly two decades ago, and times change, as the
Chief Justice has reminded us. 38 Ultimately, it was the regime's limited
geographic application that contributed more directly to its downfall in
Shelby County than its burden-shifting requirements.39 A majority of the
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Justices found themselves unconvinced that places subject to the statute
were sufficiently different from other places to justify their being subjected to the statute's distinct requirements. And it was this skepticism
that may best explain the Court's willingness to scrap the regime.
If so, the Shelby County majority's willingness to discard preclearance
in the face of persistent, documented discrimination might be dismissed
as a regime -specific move to secure a desired end. Whether the Court
was more troubled by the regime's geographic selectivity or the burdenshifting obligations it imposed, it was convinced that preclearance had
to go. Under this view, the holding is consequential, to be sure, but only
because the specific statute the decision incapacitated was itself a consequential one, in terms of both its real world effect and the salient place it
occupied in the public's imagination.
And yet, this reading of Shelby County is not, in my view, the best reading of the decision. Rather than simply charting a one-time path to a
desired destination, the Court's willingness to discard an umbrella in
the rain is better understood within a broader jurisprudence, described
below.
Ill. Is It Raining Elsewhere?

Far from unique, Shelby County's tolerance for ongoing discrimination
represents a common stance in modem civil rights law. In numerous
cases, the Court has limited federal antidiscrimination measures such
as the VRA, Title VII, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) in the face of uncontested evidence of discrimination of the sort
the statutes at issue were designed to address. These cases, moreover, all
generated dissenting opinions, often written by justice Ginsburg, which
disputed both the holdings and the analytical moves used to reach them.
Situated within Justice Ginsburg's Shelby County construct, these dissenting opinions all argued that an umbrella should be used in the rain,
while a majority, time and again, sided with getting wet.
Consider a few eclectic but representative examples.
Nassar and Gross: Two days before the Court handed down Shelby
County, it held that an employee alleging retaliation under Title VII
needed to show that the complaints he lodged about status-based discrimination not only contributed to his being denied a coveted transfer
but also were the but-for cause of that denial. University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar-40 relied heavily on the Court's 2009 ruling in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., which applied the same rule to
an employee alleging age discrimination under the ADEA. 41 Both decisions deemed the employees involved to be ineligible for the more for-
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giving "motivating factor" analysis Congress set forth in § 703m of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991.42 The Court split 5-4 in both cases, with dissenting opinions by Justices Ginsburg and Stevens challenging the way
the majority understood relevant precedent, the purpose and structure
of the 1991 CRA, and applicable agency action.43
Amid this disagreement, however, all of the Justices seemed to
agree-or, at least, no one denied-that the plaintiff-employees who
brought both cases had been subjected to intentional discrimination of
the sort the statutes at issue targeted44 -namely, that Naiel Nassar's complaints about disparate treatment based on his Middle Eastern descent
contributed to his being denied a transfer/M and that Jack Gross's age
contributed to the restructuring of job responsibilities he challenged.46
In both cases, then, the Justices seemed well aware and willing to accept
that intent-based discrimination had occurred. They split over whether
the employees should be entitled to relief given this discrimination.
Put differently, no one doubted that the employees who brought these
cases had been caught in the rain. What they disagreed about was
whether they were entitled to the umbrella provided by Title VII and the
ADEA. And a majority held they were not.
Coleman: A year before Nassar, the Court struck down a provision of
the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) that guaranteed twelve weeks
of unpaid medical leave to eligible employees suffering from serious
medical conditions. 47 Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinion ·in Coleman v.
Court of Appeals of Maryland argued that the sex-neutral "self-care" provision constituted an essential part of a comprehensive statutory regime
that included the family care provisions that the Court had already
upheld. 48 She explained that Congress crafted this regime to address the
pervasive discrimination women confronted in the workplace stemming
from pregnancy-related issues and more general sex stereotypes about
family care responsibilities. 49
Justice Ginsburg did not invoke umbrella imagery in Coleman, but she
might easily have employed it. Her argument, at bottom, was that the
umbrella provided by the FMLA would have a gaping hole in it without
the statute's self-care provision. The self-care provision, she explained,
"serves to blunt the force of stereotypes of women as primary caregivers
by increasing the odds that men and women will invoke the FMLA's
leave provisions in near-equal numbers.''50
A majority of the Court, however, was unmoved. Justice Kennedy's
plurality opinion held that the relationship between the self-care provision and the discrimination Justice Ginsburg described was too complex and attenuated to satisfy constitutional scrutiny.51 And yet, much
like Chief Justice Roberts's opinion in Shelby County, Justice Kennedy's
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opinion in Coleman did not question the prevalence of the discrimination justice Ginsburg described.52 Like the Chief justice, moreover, justice Kennedy opted to discard the umbrella Congress crafted to address
that discrimination.
Ledbetter: In 2007, a majority of the Court held that an employee's
claim for sex-based wage discrimination was time barred because she
filed suit long after the employer's initial discriminatory wage decision.
justice Alito's majority opinion in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co. 53 held that the statute of limitations ran from that initial decision
rather than from the issuance of subsequent paychecks, the amount of
which reflected the initial discrimination.54
justice Ginsburg's dissent argued that the statute was better read to
allow Ledbetter's suit to proceed, an argument she might easily have
bolstered by invoking the umbrella image she employed in Shelby
County. Indeed, justice Ginsburg's dissent made clear that Goodyear had
been raining on Lilly Ledbetter for a very long time and that Title VII
should be available to provide her relief. justice Ginsburg closed her
opinion calling for a statutory amendme nt to reverse the majority's ruling, a call Congress heeded.55
The majority in Ledbetter was not p ersuaded by Justice Ginsburg's
argument, but it never questioned that Goodyear had intentionally discriminated against Ledbetter based on sex by paying her less than both
similarly situated and less-qualified male colleagues. justice Alito
expressed no doubt about this point. But in his view, Ledbetter's failure
to use the Title VII umbrella at the beginning of the storm precluded her
from using it later.
Bossier Parish: Like Ledbetter, Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board was
reversed by subsequent statutory amendment (albeit one that was later
ruled to be unconstitutional). 56 Back in 2000, Justice Scalia's majority
opinion held that the VRA permitted implementation of a districting
plan in which African American voters constituted a majority in none of
the plan's twelve electoral districts. It was alleged and, somewhat surprisingly, stipulated that the School Board had refused to draw a majorityminority district because it wanted to prevent an African American
candidate from being elected to the board.57
justice Scalia's majority opinion held that the redistricting plan could
be implemented notwithstanding this discriminatory purpose. The
opinion explained that § 5 of the VRA did not block implementation of
electoral changes enacted with discriminatory intent. Instead, it blocked
only that subset of electoral changes enacted with "retrogressive"
intent-that is, the intent to make things worse for the minority group
in question. Mere animus would not suffice. 58 The opinion, moreover,
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suggested any rule to the contrary would raise a serious constitutional
question.59
Justice Souter's dissent argued that electoral changes enacted with
a discriminatory, albeit not "retrogressive" purpose, fell within the §
5 proscription. As he put it, blocking implementation of unconstitutional conduct of this sort-the rain Justice Ginsburg subsequently
described-was precisely what Congress had designed§ 5 to address and
what Congress, in his view, had ample power to mandate.60
Thirteen years later, Shelby County made clear that Congress lacks this
power. The decision viewed Congress's 2006 decision to adopt Justice
Souter's Bossier Parish reading as evidence of constitutional overreach. It
thereby suggested Congress had no power to include within the statutory proscription conduct that was unconstitutional.6 1
Bossier Parish, Ledbetter, Coleman, Gross, and Nassar are, without doubt,
distinguishable from one another on numerous grounds. Yet they share
a defining characteristic that makes them representative examples of
a more general stance in federal civil rights law. Like Shelby County,
these decisions all circumscribe the federal regime in contexts in which
the occurrence of intentional, invidious, and even unconstitutional conduct is left unquestioned. Placed within Justice Ginsburg's Shelby County
framework, these cases all involved rain; the Court knew it, and a majority was nevertheless steadfast that an umbrella should not be used.
Admittedly, likening the discrimination observed in these cases to rain
is a contestable move. My premise is that discrimination may be distinguished from liability, at least in certain contexts, and that we learn
something by making this distinction. That premise accordingly rejects
the idea that discrimination is necessarily or most usefully understood
as a legal conclusion that is coextensive with liability. Instead, it posits
that people like Naiel Nassar and Lilly Ledbetter found themselves in the
rain even though the Court ruled against them. They lost despite the fact
that it was raining and decidedly not because the Court thought the sky
was clear.
Understanding the cases in this manner-that is, by parsing discrimination from liability-brings into focus a distinct strand of civil rights
jurisprudence. To be sure, judicial skepticism toward the federal civil
rights regime is nothing new, and the Court has long sought to scale back
federal antidiscrimination law. Decisions that do so in the face of uncontested evidence of intentional discrimination are undoubtedly part of
this effort. And yet, my claim is that they are a distinct component of
it. Unlike those cases that deny relief by deeming challenged conduct to
be nondiscriminatory, these decisions discard the umbrella even as the
need for it persists. The suggestion is that the federal civil rights project,
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while hardly complete, is no longer worth pursuing. Rather than a mission accomplished, it is a mission abandoned.
Of course, not every decision circumscribing the federal civil rights
regime falls decisively into one group or the other. Some deny the rain,
or at least express skepticism about it, but also voice mistrust about
using the available umbrella should the rain alleged actually be falling. 62
Elsewhere, however, the distinction is clear, with a growing number of
decisions displaying a willingness to discard the umbrella in the rain
knowing full well people will get wet as a result.
Shelby County's willingness to immobilize § 5 of the VRA without disputing the discriminationjustice Ginsburg described is part of this latter
group of decisions. Far from unique, Shelby County stands with a host of
other decisions that acknowledge discrimination persists and yet posit
that core elements of the federal civil rights project are no longer worth
pursuing. The next section explores why this sensibility drives so much
of contemporary antidiscrimination law.
IV. On Unjust Enrichment and Harmless Error

Decisions that limit federal antidiscrimination law typically view the
regime's broader application as deeply problematic. Among the concerns most often cited is the worry that an expansive approach to the
regime encourages frivolous lawsuits, exposing employers and other
defendants to wasteful litigation costs and spurring inefficient defensive
decision making. 63 Curb the regime, it is argued, lest undeserving plaintiffs be unjusdy enriched at the expense of diligent defendants and, in
many circumstances, the rest of us.
Animating this concern is the suspicion that frivolous claims outnumber legitimate ones and that the discrimination federal antidiscrimination law was crafted to address is largely a thing of the past. Unsurprisingly, decisions that find challenged conduct to be nondiscriminatory
highlight this sensibility, with the dispute at hand seen either to involve
a frivolous claim or to suggest circumstances in which one might find
expression. 64
Less expected, decisions that deny relief in the face of uncontested
discrimination also voice concern that frivolous claims are rising as
genuine discrimination declines. These decisions acknowledge the rain
but deem it insufficiently worrisome to warrant use of the umbrella at
issue. 65 More. pressing is the. nee.d to check the regime and guard against
its unjustified application.
Under this view, victims of documented discrimination might be
understood or even dismissed as unfortunate, but unavoidable, collat-
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eral damage sacrificed for the greater good. And yet, it is not the
unpleasantness of the image that keeps it off the pages of U.S. reports but
instead the belief that the victims of discrimination in these cases have
not be~n significantly damaged at all. True, they have been caught in the
rain, but these decisions suggest that getting wet may not be as damaging as some seem to think. In fact, they suggest it might not be damaging
at all.
With this suggestion, Shelby County and cases like it shift the terrain on
which civil rights disputes have long been fought. Rather than contest
allegations or evidence of discrimination, they dismiss discrimination
itself as inconsequential. They reject Justice Ginsburg's belief that getting caught in the rain is the source of enduring damage and, in its place,
insert the idea of harmless error into civil rights jurisprudence.
That idea, in turn, has led the Court to view much of federal antidiscrimination law as providing a windfall to its beneficiaries. Far from
making victims of discrimination whole, the regime is seen as leaving
them in a decidedly better position than they wou ld have been had they
never gotten wet. The umbrella Justice Ginsburg thinks provides vital
protection is seen instead to be a source of unjust enrichment to those
it shields. The resulting project consequently becomes one dedicated to
limiting use of the umbrella whenever possible, rain notwithstanding.
Hence, the recent mixed-motive decisions requiring plaintiffs to show
"but-for" causation work hard to make sure that getting wet is not the
vehicle for getting ahead. These decisions hold that if, absent the discrimination alleged, the plaintiff would have been denied the disputed
promotion or transfer, the discrimination itself should not be the source
of liability. 66 Because Title VII's "motivating" factor rule a11ows for liability in such circumstances,67 Nassar and Gross rejected it, finding the
plaintiff-employees ineligible for both the acknowledgment of wrongdoing a liability ruling embodies and the attorneys' fees that accompany
it. Of no moment was the fact that the rejected approach barred injunctive relief when the desired transfer or promotion would have otherwise
been denied. 68
As telling, and perhaps even more so, is a little noted aspect of Chief
Justice Roberts's opinion in Shelby County, in which he described the
2006 amendment overruling Bossier Parish to "prohibit laws that could
have favored [minority voters] but did not do so because of a discriminatory purpose."69 The words "could have favored" are revealing. Far from
unartful drafting, they suggest that the Bossier Parish School Board did
not inj ure minority voters when it adopted a districting plan avowedly
designed to prevent the election of an African American representative.
Instead, Shelby County suggests that the school board's unconstitutional
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conduct only blocked adoption of a plan "that could have favo red" black
voters. The broader suggestion is that unconstitutional discrimination
does not necessarily deny minority voters an equal opportunity to participate in the political process but instead may simply deprive th em of
favored or preferential treatment.
That suggestion is a remarkable one, and one that documents the
extent to which the locus of civil rights jurisprudence has shifted. A longstanding worry in this realm has been the concern that the prohibition
on disparate impact would devolve into a mandate for affirmative action
and prompt potential defendants to adopt preferential policies in order
to shield themselves from liability?0 To guard against this result (and its
apparent conflict with explicit statutory language), the Court has long
refused to read bans on disparate impact expansively.
But now, this concern about preferential treatment is also shaping
the Court's approach to discriminatory intent. In a growing number
of cases, it has read the VRA, Title VII, and other federal civil rights
measures narrowly in contexts where animus was evident (or at least
evidence of it went unchallenged), and it has done so because more
expansive statutory readings were thought to yield unwarranted preferential treatment. Notably absent from these cases is a well-intentioned
defendant laboring to comply with a statutory mandate. Instead, the
Court has come to see federal antidiscrimination law itself as the source
of damaging preferences. Even the prohibition on invidious intent, the
core tenet of federal civil rights law, has evolved into a problem and
hence a target. It is what needs to be constrained, if not eliminated, while
the conduct the regime once targeted is dismissed as harmless and those
once understood as victims are transformed into the unjustly enriched.
V. Conclusion

The Court has long sought to scale back the federal civil rights regime
and has typically done so by characterizing challenged conduct as
nondiscriminatory. This chapter tracks a distinct line of cases that are
undeniably part of the larger effort but that limit the regime while recognizing discrimination rather than denying it. These decisions throw
ou t an umbrella in a rainstorm, knowing full well it is raining and that
th e rain will continue. They accordingly posit that the rain does less
damage than the umbrella, at least in certain circumstances, and that the
Court is institutionally able to figure out the circumstances in which the
umbrella should be discarded.
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Disparate Impact Abroad

julie Suk

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 banned discrimination in various realms
of social and economic life. Title VII, prohibiting discrimination in
employment, gave rise to an innovative body of jurisprudence theorizing the very concept of discrimination. For the past five decades,
Title VII doctrine has influenced not only the American workplace but
also the growth of antidiscrimination law throughout the world. Several
European jurisdictions took inspiration from Title VII to develop a body
of equality law that appears more robust today than its American
cousins. On the occasion of Title VII's fiftieth anniversary, this chapter
reflects on this alternative trajectory of the disparate impact theory, Title
VII's most ambitious and contested doctrine. European "indirect" discrimination law is a notable legacy of Title VII that raises hard questions
about the future of the American Civil Rights Act.
Citations to Griggs v. Duke Power Company, the U.S . Supreme Court's
landmark disparate impact case, can be found in the decisions of English
courts, the Court ofJustice of the European Union (CJEU), and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) elaborating the doctrine of "indirect'' discrimination. Griggs was transplanted into soil that had already
been fertilized by similar legal reasoning in an earlier line of cases developed by the CJEU in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s on the free
movement of workers. European treaties guaranteed free movement of
workers by dismantling employment practices that favored a nation's
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own citizens. In early cases construing free movement of workers, the
CJEU understood that barriers to the shared treaty goal of a common
European market could arise from existing policies that indirectly disadvantaged nonnationals of any given member state. These cases draw
out aspects of disparate impact doctrine that have not been fully appreciated in the United States. The comparison highlights the significance
of pursuing a substantive shared goal, such as a single, common, integrated European labor ntarket, in giving coherence to disparate impact
theory. It points to a question that must be confronted in the next fifty
years of antidiscrimination law in the United States: What, if anything,
does this body of law aspire to achieve?
I. The Civil Rights Act and the Rise and Fall of Disparate Impact
Discrimination

Griggs v. Duke Power Company1 was the first decision in which the
Supreme Court repudiated an employer practice as a violation of Title
VII. As is well known, the Duke Power Company required a high school
diploma and a cutoff score on a general ability test for workers
employed in any department other than its Labor Department. 2 Prior to
the adoption of these requirements, which coincided with the effective
date of Title VII, the Duke Power Company had segregated its workers
on the basis of race: black workers could only be assigned to the Labor
Department and could not be transferred or promoted to the betterpaid jobs in the company's other departments. 3 In Griggs, the Supreme
Court held that, even though the new criteria appeared racially neutral, they violated Title VII because they disproportionately disqualified
blacks and were not shown to be significantly related to successful job
performance. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Burger explained:
"[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem
employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'builtin headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job
capability."4 Justice Burger also blessed consequentialist thinking about
Title VII: "Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences
of employment practices, not simply the motivation."5 In a subsequent
paragraph, Justice Burger generally challenged traditional indicators of
accomplishment:
The facts of this case demonstrate the inadequacy of broad and general testing devices as well as the infirmity of using diplomas or degrees as fixed
measures of capability. History is filled with examples of men and women
who rendered highly effective performance without the conventional badges
of accomplishment in terms of certificates, diplomas, or degrees. Diplomas
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and tests are useful servants, but Congress has mandated the commonsense
proposition that they are not to become masters of reality. 6

For decades, scholars have debated the theory underlying the disparate
impact definition of discrimination? On one end of the spectrum, the
disparate impact is regarded primarily as an evidentiary dragnet for
intentional discrimination. In the facts of this case, the Duke Power
Company had been discriminating overtly on the basis of race until it
was no longer lawful to do so, so it is perfectly plausible that the new
facially neutral policy was a covert way of continuing the same racial
discrimination. On the other end of the spectrum, the disparate impact
theory articulates a principle that goes far beyond the elimination of
intentional discrimination and its lingering effects. Individual employees are entitled, under a disparate impact theory, to consideration for
jobs based on rational criteria that correspond to successful job performance and not based on arbitrary indicators of past privilege. 8
During the years immediately following Griggs, as Reva Siegel has
eloquently exposed, a majority of the federal courts of appeals used
disparate impact frameworks to interpret equal protection, viewing a
policy's racial effects as evidence of presumed purposes. 9 The Supreme
Court, however, limited the disparate impact theory in at least three different phases. First, in the late 1970s, the Supreme Court declined to
extend the disparate impact theory to the Equal Protection Clause, holding that the Constitution only proscribes intentional discrimination. 10
Second, in the 1980s, the Court heightened the burdens on Title VII
plaintiffs seeking to establish disparate impact discrimination.l 1 Third,
in the past decade, the Court in Ricci v. DeStefano has limited the scope of
employers' permissible actions to avoid racially disparate outcomes by
holding such actions to be intentionally discriminatory.l 2 The Obama
administration has embraced the disparate impact theory as a construction of discrimination in violation of the Fair Housing Act.l 3 Although
the Supreme Court has recently validated the disparate impact theory
under the Fair Housing Act, its decision sustained disparate impact in
its modern weakened form. The Court has noted that disparate impact
must be "properly limited in key respects that avoid the serious constitutional questions that might arise .. .if such liability were imposed based
solely on a showing of a statistical disparity." 14
Even as disparate impact continues to be used in the United States,
the Supreme Court's construction of it in Title VII cases has limited
its potential. The second phase-by which U.S. courts heightened the
burdens of proving the prima facie case for disparate impact plaintiffs
and deferred to the justifications for disparate impacts proffered by
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defendants-brings out the contrast between American and European
courts' approaches. The U.S. Supreme Court has required plaintiffs to do
more than simply point to statistical disparities between groups to shift
any burden, whether it is a burden of production or persuasion, to the
employer. The plaintiff must identify a specific practice or requirement
and show that it causes the disparity alleged to be discriminatory.
In Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio, cannery workers had sought to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination by relying on
statistics showing a high percentage of nonwhite workers in certain jobs
and a low percentage of nonwhite workers in better jobs.l5 The Supreme
Court held that a prima facie case could not be established by these facts
alone, noting that "[i]f the absence of minorities holding such skilled
positions is due to a dearth of qualified nonwhite applicants (for reasons that are not petitioners' fault), petitioners' selection methods or
employment practices cannot be said to have had a 'disparate impact' on
nonwhites."16 In short, statistical disparities had to be accompanied by a
causal theory about a practice undertaken by the employer that caused
the disparity. In this decision, the robust prima facie case was purportedly necessary to avoid a world in which
any employer who had a segment of his work force that was-for some reason-racially imbalanced, could be hauled into court and forced to engage
in the expensive and time-consuming task of defending the 'business necessity' of the methods used to select the other members of his work force. 17

In that landscape, the Court predicted, the "only practicable option for
many employers would be to adopt racial quotas."18 And since quotas
were "expressly rejected" by the drafters of Title VII and would be "far
from the intent of Title VII," the Wards Cove Court concluded that statistical disparities alone could never be enough to force an employer to
articulate some explanation or justification for those disparities. 19
After Wards Cove and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, courts have consistently required plaintiffs to identify the specific employment practice
that caused the disparate outcomes that are being challenged. 20 In WalMart v. Dukes, the Supreme Court rejected the class certification of plaintiffs' disparate impact claims by invoking the disparate impact plaintiff's
burden of identifying a specific practice to establish the prima facie
case. 21 The Court noted: "Other than the bare existence of delegated
discretion, respondents have identified no 'specific employment practice'-much less one that ties all their 1.5 million claims together."22
And even when the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of disparate
impact discrimination, the burden that shifts to the employer is not particularly demanding. Once a prima facie case is established, the plaintiff
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wins unless the employer can prove that the specific practice is justified by business necessity. The employer must show a legitimate business purpose for the policy that causes a disparate impact, and the
employee can then point to alternative means of achieving that purpose that have less of a disparate impact. Wards Cove had held that
the employer merely had a burden of production, not persuasion, in
response to the plaintiff's prima fade case of disparate impact discrimination.23 Congress amended Title VII in 1991 to overrule this aspect of
Wards Cove. 24 So, for the past two decades, employers have the burden of
showing business necessity once a prima facie case of disparate impact
has been made. Yet, following the 1991 Act, courts accepted reasonable
legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons as meeting the "business necessity" standard required by the statute. 25 As Michael Selmi notes, "courts
readily accept most proffered justifications."26 The weakness of U.S. disparate impact doctrine comes into clearer focus when encountering the
development of disparate impact doctrine abroad.
II. The Migration of Griggs

While the evolution from Griggs to Ricci is a story of disparate impact's
decline in the United States, Griggs migrated and followed an alternative
trajectory in Europe, by way of Britain. Griggs influenced the drafting
of the United Kingdom's Sex Discrimination Act. Roy Jenkins, the U.K.
Home Secretary, made a visit to the United States in 1974, when the government was proposing a new law on sex discrimination. 27 Jenkins was
accompanied by Anthony Lester, a lawyer who had been active in litigating on behalf of discrimination plaintiffs under the Race Relations
Act. 28 Shortly before their visit to the United States, the government had
published a white paper, Equality for Women, largely drafted by Lester.
The white paper had proposed that unlawful discrimination should only
include intentional discrimination: "In the absence of any intention (or
inferred intention) to treat one person less favourably than another on
the grounds of sex or marriage, there will be no contravention of the
proposed Bill."29 However, after Jenkins's visit to the United States, the
Sex Discrimination Act was redrafted to include indirect discrimination,
an idea that was directly shaped by the Jenkins's and Lester's encounter
with Griggs. Lester recounts:
We were much influenced in determining the content of the sex and race
equality laws by the U.S. civil rights law, including the crucial concept of disparate impact discrimination articulated by the American Supreme Court in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. in 197l....We learned about that concept when we
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visited the United States in December 1974; but it was expressed in unnecessarily restrictive language in section l(l)(b) of the Sex Discrimination Act. 30
Thus, the line of influence between Griggs and the indirect discrimination provision of the Sex Discrimination Act was conscious and direct.
The Sex Discrimination Act, like the Race Relations Act of 1968, begins
by defining discrimination as less favorable treatment:
(l) In any circumstances relevant for the purposes of any provision of

this Act...a person discriminates against a woman ifa. On the ground of her sex he treats her less favourably than he
treats or would treat a man.Bl
But after Jenkins's and Lester's encounter with Griggs, the proposed
statute that eventually passed also included the disparate impact provision at section l(l)(b), which then influenced a revision of the Race Relations Act in 1976:
b. [H]e applies to her a requirement or condition which applies or

would apply equally to a man buti. which is such that the proportion of women who can comply with it is considerably smaller than the proportion of
men who can comply with it, and
ii. which he cannot show to be justifiable irrespective of the
sex of the person to whom it is applied, and
iii. which is to her detriment because she cannot comply with
it.32
Anthony Lester also invoked the indirect discrimination idea when litigating cases arising under the British Equal Pay Act. Lester's litigation
strategy involved requests to English courts to refer the disparate impact
construction of the Equal Pay Act to the European Court of Justice,
with the aim of bringing the disparate irnpact theory to European Community law and then harmonizing EC law with English law. 33 Thus,
Griggs's disparate impact theory migrated yet again to the European
level, and it is in the jurisprudence of the CJEU that the law of disparate
impact, through the doctrine of indirect discrimination, has been given
an expansive scope, both in terms of the doctrinal bases for liability and
in terms of the transnational diffusion of legal norms.
In 2003, further amendments to the British Race Relations Act heightened the justification requirement in the standard for indirect discrimination. T he statute required employers to show not only that the justification is unrelated to the sex or race of the persons involved but
also that the justification is proportionate to a legitimate aim. In addition, the Race Relations Act's definition of indirect discrimination was
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broadened: to include a "provision, criterion, or practice," not merely a
"requirement or condition":
A person also discriminates against another if...he applies to that other a provision, criterion or practice which he applies or would apply equally to persons not of the same race or ethnic or national origins as that other, but:
(a) which puts or would put persons of the same race or ethnic or
national origins as that other at a particular disadvantage when compared with other persons,

(b) which puts or would put that other at that disadvantage, and
(c) which he cannot show to be a proportionate means of achieving a
legitimate aim. 34

The 2003 Amendment to the Race Relations Act was adopted in order
to comply with the European Union's Race Equality Directive of 2000.
The Race Directive required all member states to adopt antidiscrimination laws that included a prohibition of indirect discrimination subject
to a proportionality test:
(b) [I]ndirect discrimination shall be taken to occur where an apparently
neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons of a racial or ethnic origin at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons, unless
that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim
and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.35

This same definition of indirect discrimination was applied in the EU's
Framework Directive on Equal Treatment, which prohibits and defines
discrimination on the basis of religion, disability, age, and sexual orientation.36 The U.K. statutory framework has been revised again, unifying
the Sex Discrimination Act, the Race Relations Act, and other antidiscrimination statutes under a single Equality Act. The Equality Act retains
the basic definitions of the 2003 Race Relations Act on indirect discriinination. It provides that a "provision, criterion or practice" is indirectly
discriminatory in violation of the Act when the following four conditions are met:
a. A applies, or would apply, it to persons with whom B does not share the
characteristic,
b. it puts, or would put, persons with whom B shares the characteristic at a
particular disadvantage when compared with persons with whom B does
not share it,
c. it puts, or would put, B at that disadvantage, and
d . A cannot show it to be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate
aim.37

Scholars of antidiscrimination law in Britain have acknowledged the
influence of Griggs on the Sex Discrimination Act, the Race Relations
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Act, and decisions of the European Court of Justice and the European
Court of Human Rights. 38
Ill. The Disparate Lives of Disparate Impact

In the last thirty years, the CJEU has developed an indirect discrimination doctrine that diverges in at least four significant respects from
American disparate impact law. First, the indirect discrimination idea
emerged to construe a treaty guarantee of "equal pay for male and
female workers for equal work." 39 By contrast, in the United States, the
Supreme Court declined to import the disparate impact theory into its
construction of the Equal Pay Act. 40 Second, the outcomes reached in
CJEU cases are arguably more protective of women workers than are
those reached by U.S. courts interpreting Title VII. For example, U.S.
courts have declined to extend disparate impact theory to proscribe discrimination against part-time workers. 41 In Europe, early cases established that discrimination against part-time workers disproportionately
burdened women, as women were statistically more likely than men
to be engaged in part-time work. Thus, the CJEU drew on the concept
of indirect discrimination to instruct national tribunals to scrutinize
the justifications employers gave for any policies that treated part-time
workers worse than full-time workers. Third, the CJEU's case law enables
plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case more easily than American
courts have permitted. A series of CJEU cases of the 1980s and the 1990s
permit the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of indirect discrimination by presenting a disparity between the advantaged and disadvantaged group, without proving the disparity to be caused by a specific
identifiable practice. Thus, the burden on the employer is more easily
triggered. Finally, the employer's burden in European indirect discrimination cases is heavier than that in U.S. disparate impact cases. According to the CJEU, the employer must defend a specific practice if one is
identified by a plaintiff, or must prove that the disparity was caused by
an employer policy with a legitimate aim and that the means of pursuing
that aim were necessary and appropriate. The CJEU applied proportionality analysis to the employer's "business necessity" defenses, making it
more difficult for the employer to defend itself in the face of a prima
facie case.
This evolution appears to have been catalyzed by Griggs. The CJEU
first cited Griggs in Jenkins v. Kingsgate Clothing Productions, Ltd., in construing the equal pay guarantee of Article 141 of the EC Treaty (then Article 119 of the EEC Treaty).42 The application of disparate impact theory
to an equal pay case is itself an interesting contrast with the American
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doctrinal landscape, as the U.S. Supreme Court has explicitly declined
to extend Griggs to construe the Equal Pay Act. 43 The CJEU heard the
equal pay case through a p reliminary reference from the Employment
Appeal Tribunal of the United Kingdom, before which Anthony Lester
had brought an equal pay claim on behalf of Mrs. jenkins under English
law as well as EC law.44 Mrs. Jenkins was a part-time employee, and her
rate of pay was 10 percent lower than full-time employees performing
the same work. 45 All the male employees except one worked full-time,
and four of the five part-tirr1e employees were women. In the preliminary reference proceedings before the CJEU, Lester argued that paying
part-time workers a lower rate than that paid to full-time workers for
the same work constituted sex discrimination because of its disparate
impact on women, unless such a policy could be objectively justified. 46
The CJEU highlighted Jenkins' reliance on Griggs in its decision:
Mrs. Jenkins also refers to the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court of
the United States in Griggs v Duke Power Co 401 US 424 (1971), according to
which what must be prohibited are not merely practices which are intended
to discriminate, but equally those which are discriminatory in their effect,
irrespective of the intentions of their authors. 47
Although the Jenkins decision does not elaborate on the meaning and
scope of Griggs, the Advocate General's opinion in that case is illuminating. It is obvious that Advocate General Warner's understanding of
Griggs was shaped by Lester's submissions:
At the hearing Counsel for Mrs[.] Jenkins explained that what that proposi-

tion meant "in plain language" was that if, as was clearly the case, women
were less able to work 40 hours a week than men, because of their family
responsibilities, the requirement that an employee should work 40 hours a
week to earn the full hourly rate must obviously hit, in a disproportionate
way, at women, compared with men. That did not necessarily mean that
there was discrimination, but it did mean that there was prima-facie discrimination in effect, which required "some special justification from the
employer." Counsel called this the "Griggs approach" after the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in Griggs v. Duke Power Company (1971),
401

us 424.48

Griggs facilitated the expansion of the discrimination concept to include
employment practices that disadvantaged women because of their family responsibilities. Jenkins was the first in a line of CJEU decisions that
used the indirect discrimination concept to scrutinize employers' policies toward part-time workers. The court concluded that, where unequal
treatment of part-time and full-time workers had a disproportionate
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impact on women, such treatment had to be "objectively justified" based
on reasons other than sex. 49
From the beginning, the European notion of "objective justification"
had some teeth. The employer purported to have a commercial interest
in encouraging its employees to work longer hours. The CJEU acknowledged that this interest could constitute an objective justification and left
it to national courts to scrutinize whether an employer's allegation of
such an interest was convincing in any individual case. At the same time,
the court expressed some skepticism of the proffered business justification in this case: "If an employer wished to encourage his employees
to work longer hours, he should pay a suitable overtime rate and not
reduce the pay of those working part-time.''50 Thus, an objective justification required consideration of other ways of achieving the purported
legitimate aims, without the disadvantaging effect on women.
Griggs provided European courts with inspiration and transnational
authority to develop an indirect discrimination doctrine that would
scrutinize employer policies that disadvantaged women with family
responsibilities. Two subsequent cases, both involving unequal treatment of part-time workers, developed this idea. In Bilka-Kaujhaus GmbH
v. Weber von Hartz, the CJEU confronted the question of whether a German department store had violated the equal pay provision of the EEC
Treaty by refusing to pay a pension for employees who had not worked
full-time for a minimum of fifteen years. 51 Karin Weber von Hartz, a
woman who had worked for the department store part-time for fifteen
years, argued that the pension policy placed women workers at a disadvantage "since they were more likely than their male colleagues to take
part-time work so as to be able to care for their family and children."52
The CJEU built on the logic of Jenkins v. Kingsgate and concluded
that excluding part-time workers from the occupational pension scheme
would violate the equal pay provision where, "taking into account the
difficulties encountered by women workers in working full-time, that
measure could not be explained by factors which exclude any discrimination on grounds of sex" but rather by "objectively justified factors."53
Bilka, the department store, argued, as Kingsgate had, that its policy
was justified as a discouragement of part-time work.54 Weber von Hartz
pointed out that Bilka could discourage part-time work simply by refusing to hire part-time workers, and the European Commission urged the
court to adopt a test that would require pay practices to be "necessary
and in proportion to the objectives pursued by the employer"55 to comport with the treaty's equal pay provision. Here, the CJEU spelled out a
proportionality standard, strongly implied in Jenkins, for the employer's
justification of policies that disadvantaged women. It required the
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national courts to find "that the means chosen for achieving that objective correspond to a real need on the part of the undertaking, are appropriate with a view to achieving the objective in question and are necessary to that end."56
While making the justification burden on the employer heavier, the
CJEU stopped short of reading the equal pay provision as imposing positive duties on employers to accommodate workers' family responsibilities. The court concluded: "Article 119 does not have the effect of
requiring an employer to organize its occupational pension scheme in
such a manner as to take into account the particular difficulties faced by
persons with family responsibilities in meeting the conditions for entitlement to such a pension."57 Advocate General Darmon, in denying the
existence of employers' positive duties in this regard, affirmed the existence of positive duties on the part of the state in compensating for the
disadvantages caused by family responsibilities: "[A]n employer cannot
be required to take over the role of the authorities in constructing a pension scheme which will compensate for the special difficulties faced by
workers who have family responsibilities.''58 AG Darmon also suggested
that such positive duties, on the part of the state, could even be located
in the equal pay provision of the treaty: "Article 119 lays positive duties
only on the Member States and not on commercial undertakings, which
are subject, within the limits described above, only to an obligation not
to discriminate.''59
Seven years later, in Enderby v. Frenchay Health Authority, 60 the CJEU
strengthened the proportionality requirement in the indirect discrimination standard in a case challenging the pay inequality between speech
therapists and pharmacists employed by a state health authority. Pharmacists, who were predominantly male, were paid more than speech
therapists, who were predominantly female. In this case, the state health
authority gave two justifications for paying pharmacists more than
speech therapists. First, the rates of pay had been determined through
collective bargaining processes conducted by the same trade union, and
second, the pay reflected, in part, the shortage of candidates for pharmacist positions and the need to attract them with higher salaries. 61
In Enderby, the CJEU concluded that a prima facie case of indirect discrimination could be established by a statistical showing that a job with
lower pay is predominantly occupied by women, while a comparable job
with higher pay is predominantly occupied by men. 62 Once this prima
facie case has been made, the burden of proof shifts to the employer,
who must then show that the difference in pay is based on "objectively
justified factors unrelated to any discrimination on grounds of sex." 63
Enderby requires national courts to apply the principle of proportion-
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ality to determine "whether and to what extent the shortage of candidates for a job and the need to attract them by higher pay constitutes an
objectively justified economic ground for the difference in pay between
the jobs in question."64 In addition, the mere fact that any pay rate was
produced by collective bargaining could not be accepted as an "objective
justification" for a difference in pay.
As Advocate General Lenz makes clear in his opinion, the Enderby
decision does not require complainants to point to a specific requirement or practice of the employer that causes the disparate impact.65 It
appears sufficient for the female plaintiffs to have established through
statistics that jobs predominantly held by women are paid less than
those held by men in order to make out a prima facie case of indirect
discrimination, which then places a proportionate objective justification
burden on the employer.
Griggs thus invigorated the evolution of a European doctrine of indirect discrimination, primarily in cases construing the meaning of equal
pay between men and women. But Griggs's influence, both directly and
by way of CJEU case law, was not limited to the gender context. The
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) cited Griggs in its landmark
2007 ruling, D.H. & Others v. Czech Republic,66 which recognized an indirect discrimination theory to find a violation of the equality guarantee
in Article 14 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with the Article 2
Protocol 1 right to an education. 67 The claimants argued that a Czech
government's disproportionate assignment of Roma children to special
education programs constituted a form of indirect discrimination in
violation of Article 14.
In issuing its final decision in that case, the Grand Chamber of the
ECtHR closely followed the approach developed by the European Court
of justice. The ECtHR began to scrutinize the Czech government's policies and justifications for them after the claimant's presentation of official statistics documenting a racial disparity in assignments to special
school. 68 The claimants had shown that Roma children were grossly
overrepresented in special schools, where they received an inferior education. But the claimants had not made any showing that any specific
policies, such as the particular psychological exams employed, caused
the disproportionate outcomes. The statistical disparity was sufficient
to require the Czech government to justify its entire scheme of special
education assignment. Based merely on the presentation of undisputed
reports that Roma children had constituted 70 to 90 percent of students
in special schools since the 1990s, the ECtHR concluded:
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In these circumstances, the evidence submitted by the applicants can be
regarded as sufficiently reliable and significant to give rise to a strong presumption of indirect discrimination. The burden of proof must therefore
shift to the Government, which must show that the difference in the impact
of the legislation was the result of objective factors unrelated to ethnic origin.69

Following the CJEU's approach, the ECtHR applied a proportionality
test to the government's proffered justifications. The Czech government
explained the disparities by claiming that they were the result of legitimate attempts to adapt the education system to the capacities of children with special needs. Specifically, they argued that the disparities
resulted from the use of psychological tests that measured children's
capacities, which were used to make school assignments. Once the
assignments were made, the parents consented. Thus, the government
attributed the disparities to the intellectual capacities of Roma children
and parental consent. The government claimed that parental consent
was "the decisive factor without which the applicants would not have
been placed in special schools."70 The court rejected the government's
submissions, first by raising the possibility that the tests were biased or
that their "results were not analysed in the light of the particularities and
special characteristics of the Roma children who sat them,'>71 and second, by holding that parents could not validly consent to discriminatory
treatment, which would amount to an impermissible waiver of a Convention right? 2
The ECtHR's approach in D.H. & Others v. Czech Republic illustrates
the gulf between current European jurisdictions' "indirect discrimination" concept and disparate impact doctrine in the United States. In
Europe, discrimination plaintiffs can shift the burden of justification to
the alleged discriminator simply by pointing out a disparity and alleging that the defendant is responsible for it. It is then for the defendant to
explain the causes of the disparity, specifically that the disparity results
from the pursuit of legitimate aims, and that the means utilized are necessary and appropriate toward achieving those aims. In the absence of
this "objective justification," disparate outcomes are presumed to indicate discriminatory causes. The ECtHR's indirect discrimination framework has become firmly established in subsequent cases. In two similar
decisions challenging the overrepresentation of Rorna children in special schools for the mentally disabled or academically challenged, the
ECtHR has required the state to justify the overrepresentation after a
statistical showing of disparity, and has then rejected the state'sjustifications.73
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IV. Indirect Discrimination before Griggs: Free Movement of
Workers of All Nationalities within the European Community
Despite the embrace of Griggs in the CJEU's early indirect discrimination decisions, the European concept of disparate impact discrimination
was not merely transplanting American antidiscrimination law. In fact,
Griggs was imported to strengthen and give structure to a concept of
discrimination that the CJEU had developed in 1969 to enforce a treaty
provision guaranteeing the free movement of workers. In this context,
the norm against discrimination on the basis of nationality within the
European Economic Community was not primarily a protection of individuals from the dignity- harms of unequal treatment. Rather, the EC
Treaty prohibited discrimination on the basis of nationality to enable
the members of the European Economic Community to work toward
the primary goal of their treaty: the creation of a single European market.
The influence of the free movement cases is subtle but explicit in
Advocate General Warner's opinion in Jenkins v. Kingsgate. In that opinion, AG Warner distinguished between the so-called Griggs approach
and that advanced by an English case, Clay Cross (Quarry Services) Ltd. v.
Fletcher.74 Warner read Clay Cross as developing an effects-based test for
discrimination as an evidentiary dragnet for intentional discrimination
and suggested it was inapplicable to the instant case. He then went on to
embrace the Griggs approach instead, reading Griggs as allowing a prima
facie case to be established by evidence of disproportionate effects of an
employer policy on men and women and then requiring the employer
to provide some special justification.75 At that point, he noted: "I draw
similar comfort from the fact that that conclusion accords with a familiar line of authority in this Court, Case 152/73 Sotgiu v Deutsche Bundespost
[1974], I ECR 153, Case 61177 Commission v Ireland [1978] ECR 417 and Case
237178 CRAM v Toia [1979] ECR 2645."76
Article 48 of the EEC Treaty (EC Treaty article 39, and currently Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union art. 45) provided: "Freedom
of movement for workers shall be secured within the Community" and
specified that "[s]uch freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of
any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions
of work and employment."77 Additionally, a Council regulation adopted
in the 1960s, addressing terms and conditions of work as well as unemployment and dismissal procedures, stated: "A worker who is a national
of a Member State may not, in the territory of another Member State,
be differently treated from national workers by reason of his national-

Disparate Impact Abroad

ity... "78 The common market created by the treaty in 1958 was based on
four fundamental freedoms: free movement of persons, services, goods,
and capital. These freedoms were delineated as essential to the creation
of a single economic area.
In Sotgiu v. Deutsche Bundespost,79 the first free movement case mentioned by the Advocate General in Jenkins, the CJEU developed the concept of "indirect" discrimination in the context of interpreting Article
48 of the EEC Treaty. Mr. Sotgiu was an Italian citizen working in Germany for the German postal service. Postal workers in Germany who
were employed away from their place of residence received a separation allowance. However, the separation allowance was higher for workers whose residence at the time of their initial employment was within
the Federal Republic of Germany than for workers whose residence at
the time of their initial employment was abroad. But the policy did
not obviously treat German nationals differently from foreign nationals.
The policy did not use the nationality of workers as a criterion for different treatment. An Italian national who was already residing in Germany
before taking the job with the German postal service would get the same
separation allowance as a German national in the same situation, and a
German national who was residing abroad before taking the job with the
German postal service would get the same reduced allowance paid to
foreign nationals living abroad before the initial employment.
Nonetheless, the CJEU concluded that the policy at issue violated the
prohibition of discrimination based on nationality in the free movement provisions of the EEC Treaty. In justifying its decision, the court
stated:
The criterion of the place of recruitment might make it possible to circumvent the prohibition on discrimination based on nationality: in fact workers recruited abroad are normally of foreign nationality and a criterion of
differentiation based on place of recruitment of the worker would lead substantially to discrimination against non-national Community workers. Such
a criterion is contrary to the principle of freedom of movement. 80
The inquiry is not a technical one as to whether the distinction made is

one of nationality but a question of principle: Does the category at issue,
whether it can be viewed as a proxy for nationality or not, contravene
the principle of freedom of movement?
The court then framed the problem as one of "hidden or indirect
discrimination," taking a very fact-based, consequentialist, practical
approach:
The concepts of discrimination and of nationality must be interpreted on
the basis of factual criteria. A purely theoretical idea is not sufficient. Rules
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based on other criteria such as residence abroad, language, place of birth,
descent or performance of military service in the country may in fact conceal discrimination on the basis of nationality. Such would be the case in particular if the application of certain criteria of differentiation were to result,
in all cases or in the vast majority of cases, in foreigners alone being affected
without any objective justification.8!
Here, we can discern the outlines of an indirect discrimination test
that was given much fuller articulation seven years later in Jenkins v.
Kingsgate. If a rule or criterion disproportionately affects foreigners, an
objective justification must be present to avoid a finding of nationality
discrimination. Further, the court provides some guidance to be applied
by the national court as to what might or might not constitute an objective justification:
The criterion of residence abroad might not appear to be discriminatory in a
case in which, unlike workers recruited within the country, workers recruited
abroad receive a separation allowance without having to find a home in
the country of employment or to remove, and in which they receive the
allowance at the lower rate for a practically unlimited period throughout of
the whole of their period of employment. The question whether this scheme
gives rise to discrimination either in intention or in effect, or whether it is
only intended to control one particular situation in an objective way, should
be settled in terms of national.law.82
If, for example, the employer were to require its own nationals to relocate to the city of employment, thereby paying a larger allowance for a
shorter period of time, while permitting nonnationals to commute with
a smaller allowance for an indefinite period, the court suggests that this
could meet the objective justification test. These arrangements would
appear to facilitate, rather than undermine, the nonnationals' ability to
work in a different member state. Ultimately, what matters with regard
to the objective justification is whether, as the court stated earlier, the
principle of free movement of workers is contravened.
The Sotgiu case was decided in 1974, after Griggs. But the indirect discrimination idea that is so robustly articulated in Sotgiu does not cite
Griggs, and there is no indication that Griggs played any role. The idea of
indirect discrimination derived from a 1969 free movement case before
the CJEU. Invoking both the treaty provision prohibiting nationality discrimination as well as the regulations, an Italian citizen who was working
in Germany challenged the application of a German law, which entitled
workers who had served in the German armed forces to have their periods of military service counted as time employed for the purposes of
wage reguJations and collective contracts. 83 Salvatore Ugliola, the Italian employee of a German company, sought to have his military ser-
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vice for Italy counted for the purpose of calculating his duration of
employment. Again, the policy did not necessarily treat German nationals and nonnationals differently. Germans who did not serve in the German military would be treated the same as non-Germ.a ns who did not
serve in the German military. The German government pointed out
that the law providing for the counting of military service as employment was part of German military law, not German labor law. Thus, the
law was presented as a policy enabling the German state to compensate employment disadvantages sustained by persons who had served in
their military. Germany argued that, therefore, there had been no discrimination based on nationality.
The CJEU responded to this line of argumentation by focusing on the
effects of a policy rather than the intent behind it. Thus, the concept of
"indirect" discrimination emerged:
A national law which is intended to protect a worker who resumes his
employment with his former employer from any disadvantages occasioned
by his absence on military service, by providing in particular that the period
spent in the armed forces must be taken into account in calculating the
period of his service with that employer falls within the context of conditions of work and employment. Such a law cannot therefore, on the basis
of its indirect connexion with national defence, be excluded from the ambit
of Article 9(1) of EEC Regulation No 38/ 64 and Article 7 of EEC Regulation
No 1612/ 68 on equality of treatment and protection for migrant workers "in
respect of any conditions of employment and work."
[A] rticle 48 of the Treaty does not allow Member States to make any exceptions to the equality of treatment and protection required by the Treaty for
all workers within the Community by indirectly introducing discrimination
in favour of their own nationals alone based upon obligations for military
service.84

Here, the concept of ''indirect" discrimination is not the same as "disparate impact" discrimination. The discrimination in this context is
"indirect" in the sense that the law makes no explicit facial distinction
between Italian workers and German workers and does not use nationality, as such, as a criterion of differentiation. It distinguishes on the basis
of the government for which one has performed military service. The
law could benefit a foreign national who performed military service for
Germany or disadvantage a German who performed military service for
another nation. This is why the discrimination is characterized as "indirect."
The CJEU's reasoning as to why the treaty must prohibit these "indirect'' forms of discrimination can be discerned in Advocate General
Gand's opinion. He points out that "performance of military service in
the army of the State other than that of which one is a national is a
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hypothesis which even the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany considers to be somewhat theoretical."85 Advocate General Gand
identifies the obvious consequences of the law for Germans and nonGermans: "In fact, the provision in question only benefits German citizens ... "86 But instead of harping on the Italian national's right to equal
treatment, Gand emphasizes that "the very purpose of the regulation
on freedom of movement is precisely to abolish such privileges."87 In
short, what's wrong with German policies that benefit German workers only is that they hamper the integration of the European market.
The wrong of discrimination is located by reference to one of the four
fundamental freedoms protected by the European Economic Community-specifically, free movement of workers. Finally, Gand points out
that, while indirect forms of discrimination are prohibited, the possibility of justifying policies that undermine free movement is articulated
in the limitations in Article 48, Paragraph 3 of the treaty. 88 Section 3
provides that the freedom of movement for workers is subject to limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public security, or public
health. 89 Applying this standard, AG Gand concludes that there are no
such grounds that could justify the employment policy of remunerating
former Gem1an military members at a higher rate.90 In the cases of the
1970s protecting the free movement of workers, the CJEU did not draw
a sharp line between direct and indirect discrimination. Rather, national
rules or employer policies that disadvantaged nationals of one member
state were generally scrutinized to determine whether the interference
with workers' free movement and European integration could be tolerated.91
V. Conclusion

Thus, the European approach to indirect discrimination originated
before the citations to Griggs, in cases rooting out member state policies
that had the effect of advantaging workers who were nationals of that
state. Such policies made sense when markets were national, but they
were contrary to the goal of a common supranational market. When the
CJEU invalidated such policies, it was aiming not to eradicate racism or
national animus but rather to end a prior set of institutional arrangements that supported a different type of market. Thus, the European
law of indirect discrimination, unlike disparate impact law in the United
States, did not begin as an evidentiary dragnet for racism, ethnic animus,
or any other evil that was being repudiated and rooted out by law.
Rather, indirect discrimination doctrine began because it was acknowledged that the new and collectively shared goal of European economic
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integration would require the eradication of existing practices that had
been premised on a different, nation-centered economic model.
The am algamation of Griggs's disparate impact theory with the indirect discrimination theory in the free movement cases highlights the
potential and limits of American antidiscrimination law. The free movement line of cases envisions the paradigmatic instance of discrimination
as a privilege reserved for nationals, not a rights violation stemming
from animus. That privilege is problematic not because it is morally
repugnant but because it undermines the fundamental goal articulated
by the treaties organizing the European Economic Community: the economic integration of these national rnarkets. Similarly, the Griggs Court
characterized the policies that it repudiated as "barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over
other employees."92 Does anything significant happen if we say that the
target of disparate impact liability-or antidiscrimination law in general- is not black disadvantage but white advantage? What is the difference between characterizing the purpose of Title VII as the eradication
of white advantage, as contrasted with the eradication of black disadvantage? If white advantage is to be eradicated by antidiscrimination
law, one might argue that this goal can only be achieved by forging a
new economic and political order after segregation. Yet Title VII did not
deliver the ar chitecture for one.
Sociologists have suggested that racial inequalities today are largely
the result of whites' ordinary use of available social networks and
resources to amass opportunities for themselves. 93 Most people help
their friends and family find educational opportunities and jobs, if possible. (In fact, many people believe this is what it means to be a good parent or friend.) Should civil rights law regard these dynamics as illegitimate "opportunity-hoarding" or desirable m ethods of preserving muchneeded social capital? It would only be possible to render "opportunityhoarding" as illegitimate if one developed an account of how these
behaviors significantly undermined clearly shared social goals, such as
the eventual and complete racial integration of American civil society.
The evolution of a robust indirect discrimination doctrine in Europe
suggests some limits to the concept of discrimination. When the concept
of discrimination emphasizes effects and consequences rather than
practices or procedures, those consequences have to be understood in
relation to a collective goal. It is only because the European Community
was attempting to create a single market that policies undermining the
four fundamental freedoms become problematic. Note also that the
freedoms that are thought to be "fundamental" are not freedoms in a
universalistic human rights sense. They are freedoms instrumental to
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the project of European integration. Free movement of workers only
refers to workers within the European economic community and not to
an abstract free labor idea. The freedoms are valuable primarily by reference to their furtherance of the articulated goal of creating a common
market. Within fifty years, enforcing the norm against nationality discrimination within the European Community enabled a transnational
integration of labor markets. The EU is now the largest internal market
in the world, and it exercises enormous regulatory power globally.
By contrast, the Civil Rights Act in the United States did not aspire to
the collectively shared purpose of a fully racially integrated workplace.
Rather, the American ideal of equal opportunity appears consistent with
the absence of integration. In fact, the framers of the Civil Rights Act
explicitly avoided defining what the end-state of this body of law should
be and made clear that the prohibition of discrimination would never
require employers to achieve racial balance. As Ricci illustrates, the fear
of encouraging the use of quotas motivates courts to limit the disparate
impact theory. As we prepare for the next half-centu ry of Title VII in the
United States, we must confront the difficult question of whether American antidiscrimination law has any collectively shared social goal. Are
we striving for a total racial integration of the workplace by Title VII's
centennial? If not, one wonders what the Civil Rights Act is for today.
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